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THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF IMPERIAL ATHENS

By ROBERT J. BONNER

The evidence regarding Athenian trade and commerce in the fifth century is so meager that little attention has been paid to discovering the means adopted by Athens to centralize the trade of the empire in the Piraeus.¹ But enough is available to reveal the main features of her imperial commercial policy.

No port in Greece was more favorably located than the Piraeus. Xenophon in his essay on "Revenues"² enumerates the advantages and attractions of Athens as a center of commercial enterprise.

The city of Athens lies at the navel not of Greece merely but of the habitable world. . . . The traveller who desires to traverse the confines of Hellas from end to end will find that whether he voyages by sea or by land he is describing a circle the center of which is Athens. Once more this land though not literally sea-girt has all the advantages of being accessible to every wind that blows and can invite to its bosom or waft from its shores all products since it is a peninsula; while by land it is the emporium of many markets as being a portion of the mainland. . . . We possess the finest and safest harborage for shipping where vessels of all sorts can come to moorings and be laid up in absolute security as far as stress of weather is concerned. But

¹ For the general commercial situation see Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III (1897), 490; for the literature regarding the Megarian decrees up to 1904 see Busolt, *ibid.*, III, 2, p. 811. The more recent literature is cited in my article on "The Megarian Decrees," *Class. Phil.*, XVI, 238 ff. Cf. Lamb, *Clio Enthroned* for some timely remarks on Thucydides' knowledge of commercial factors in international policies.

² i. 6. Dakyns' translation.

further than that in most states the trader is under the necessity of lading his vessel with some merchandise or other in exchange for his cargo since the current coin has no circulation beyond the frontier. But at Athens he has a choice: he can in return for his wares either export a variety of goods such as human beings seek after or if he does not desire to do this he can simply export silver.

There is no doubt that the Athenians succeeded in building up a great port in the Piraeus. "Whatever desirable things are found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnesus, or anywhere else are all brought together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea."¹ In the funeral speech Pericles is represented as saying, "our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands."² This immense trade was fostered and secured in various ways.

The greatest menace to free commercial intercourse was piracy. In tracing the early commercial growth of Corinth, Thucydides³ remarks: "When navigation grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of piracy, and offering a mart by sea as well as by land, raised their city to great power by means of their revenues." Naturally Athens⁴ also took measures to suppress piracy which never wholly disappeared from the Mediterranean, and it was no doubt due to her efforts that it had practically disappeared from the main trade routes though it was still prevalent among the Locrians, Aetolians, Acharnanians and others in that part of Greece. In view of the protection thus offered, the smaller communities willingly submitted to commercial restrictions in favor of Athens. But the imperial city did not scruple to use its sea power to enforce its "navigation laws." "Of the continental cities ruled by Athens, the larger are held in subjection by their fear

¹ (Xenophon) *Resp. Athen.* ii. 7.

² Thucydides, ii. 38.

³ i. 13.

⁴ Cimon expelled the Dolopian pirates from Scyrus when he captured the island (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8). In the fourth century the allies of Athens were persuaded to take preventive measures against robbers and pirates (Demosthenes), 58, 53 ff. Evidently the local authorities were required to exclude pirates from their harbors. In accordance with an Athenian decree the Melians were fined ten talents for harboring freebooters. Cities sometimes provided by treaty for reciprocal restrictions upon freebooting. Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 44.

and the smaller by their needs. For no city can escape the necessity of exporting or importing something. This they cannot do unless they become dependent on the rulers of the sea."¹ Isocrates² speaking of the Athenian empire remarks that "no individual city is selfsufficient in the matter of its products. In some there is a shortage or entire lack; in others there is a surplus. Athens rendered a great service to Greece by providing at the Piraeus a commodious and convenient harbor and mart." He is writing after the downfall of the first empire and the inauguration of a more considerate commercial policy and so prefers to emphasize the commendable features of Athenian imperialism. But in the Peace³ he presents the other aspect. Complaining of the activities of pernicious politicians he says, "they have the assurance to tell us that we ought to imitate our ancestors and not permit those who are unwilling to pay tribute to sail the seas." The means of suppressing the commerce of a recalcitrant city are indicated by the Megarian decree forbidding the Megarians to "use the ports of the empire and the Athenian market."⁴ The effect of this provision was literally to close the Aegean Sea to the Megarians, for without a single friendly harbor in the islands or littoral they could not venture far afield; they would be confined to coasting voyages about the Peloponnesus. Pseudo-Xenophon is right when he says that those who oppose Athens *οὐ χρήσονται τῇ θαλάττῃ*.⁵

Food and raw materials especially for shipbuilding were vital to imperial Athens. "The Athenians are the only people in the Hellenic and the barbarian world," says Pseudo-Xenophon,⁶ "who are able to control an abundant supply of raw materials. For if a state

¹ (Xenoph.) ii. 3.

² Peace, 36.

³ Panegyricus, 42.

⁴ Thucydides, i. 139.

⁵ (Xenoph.) ii, 12.

⁶ ii. 11. The text of the last sentence is uncertain. Kalinka reads *πρὸς δὲ τοῖσις ἄλλοις ἄγειν οὐκ ἐάσουσιν, <ἥ> οἷτινες ἀντίπαλοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν [ἥ] οὐ χρήσονται τῇ θαλάττῃ*. He translates, "Überdies werden sie gar nicht erlauben, es anderswohin zu verfrachten, oder—die unsere Widersacher sind, werden die Benützung des Seeweges verlieren." Cornford (Thucydides, *Mythistoricus*, p. 21) renders, "We will not allow other states who are our rivals to import them on pain of being excluded from the sea." Meyer's translation suits the argument better. "Anderswohin aber zu unsern Rivalen lassen wir diese Dinge nicht ausführen." If *ἥ* before *οἷτινες* be omitted as in the Oxford text there is no objection to this interpretation. Those who possess raw materials are forced to export them to Athens. In the main these communities would belong to the Athenian empire. There is with this rendering no question of excluding real rivals such as Corinth from the sea.

is rich in timber for shipbuilding, where will it find a market for it if not with the masters of the sea? If another abounds in iron or bronze or linen yarn, where will it find a market except with the sea lord? Yet this is the stock from which ships are made in Athens. One city yields timber to her, another iron, a third bronze; a fourth linen yarn, a fifth wax, and so on. Moreover Athens prevents her rivals from transporting goods to other countries than Athens, by the threat of driving them from the sea altogether." The fate of the Megarians shows that this was no idle threat.

There are indications that Athens regulated the trade of the subordinate cities by measures which correspond roughly to the English navigation laws of the eighteenth century which were intended to centralize colonial trade in the mother country. Under the second Athenian empire the people of Ceos¹ were forbidden to export their ruddle elsewhere than to Athens. This stringent regulation is perhaps a reversion to the more arbitrary policy of the first empire due to the revolt of Ceos in 364 and 363. A fragmentary decree² of the late fifth century granted to the inhabitants of Aphytis in Chalcidice the privilege of exporting their products anywhere. Imports were also regulated. Thus a decree of the year 424 B.C. granted to the people of Methone³ the right of importing a specified quantity of grain from Byzantium. It would seem that this concession was due to the fact that the Methoneans were excluded from the markets and harbors of Macedonia from which their grain supplies normally came. There is a trace of some sort of commercial restrictions in the charter of the colony established at Brea⁴ in Thessaly in 446-444 B.C. Special commercial privileges were also granted to individuals. For example Lycon an Achaean was given special permission to trade anywhere in the Athenian empire except the gulf of Corinth which was blockaded.⁵

Where there were privileges there were also restrictions. Before these decrees neither Aphytis nor Methone enjoyed entire freedom of trade. No doubt there were special regulations intended to meet

¹ *C.I.A.*, II, 546. Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, 137.

² *I.G.*, I, 41.

³ *I.G.*, I, 40. Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, 60.

⁴ *I.G.*, I, 51. Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, 48.

⁵ Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 46.

the particular needs of Athens or those of individual cities; but there were also laws of general application. There is a provision in the Methonean decree that no general legislation¹ affecting the allies is to apply to Methone unless it is specifically mentioned. This provision is obviously intended to prevent the withdrawal of the special privilege by any general commercial regulation that might be put in force in the future. It is significant in this connection that in the extant "acts of settlement"² by which Athens regulated the affairs of her revolting allies there is no reference to trade. The omission can be satisfactorily explained only by assuming the existence of laws of general application which regulated the trade of the subordinate cities presumably by requiring surplus grain and essential raw materials to be marketed in Athens. Exceptions affecting particular communities and products were made as occasion required.³

It is interesting to observe that Athens consulted the commercial interests of her allies and subordinates as was shown in the case of Methone. Not only was permission given to import grain from the Pontus but remission of tribute was granted and an embassy was sent to Macedonia to remonstrate with the king for excluding the Methoneans from the Macedonian markets. Without going to the length of rationing the subordinate cities the Athenians encouraged them to rely as far as possible upon local food supplies by withholding the right of importing grain from areas easily controlled. By means of the Ἑλλησποντοφύλακες stationed at Byzantium they were able to control the distribution of grain from the Pontus. But Mytilene had no difficulty in provisioning itself for a siege.⁴

No doubt it frequently happened that Athenian commercial interests coincided with those of their allies, but there are indications

¹ Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, 60, 40-45.

² These documents are assembled in Hill, *Sources for Greek History*, I, 125-30. Cf. also p. 195.

³ The plain implication of the passage quoted above from Pseudo-Xenophon (ii. 11-12) is that Athens by reason of the threat of using her sea power to ruin those who opposed her will secured an adequate supply of such essential articles as timber, iron, bronze, linen yarn and wax. Pressure would be put upon the subordinate cities by legislation, upon the others by threat of exclusion from the sea. The articles enumerated include shipbuilding materials only. Doubtless there were others such as grain, and ruddle from Ceos.

⁴ Thucydides, iii. 2.

that sometimes the regulations were burdensome. The revolt of Thasos¹ was due to a quarrel about the mines and trading posts on the mainland of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits. After the reduction of the island the inhabitants gave up both the mines and the trading posts. The details of the quarrel are unknown. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Thasians were building up their own trade and manufactures by annexing Thracian trading posts. By detaching them from Thasos Athens brought them under the general regulations requiring exports to come to Athens. A similar motive may have induced Mytilene to try to annex the other towns on the island of Lesbos.

Athens, however, did not rely entirely upon the mailed fist to increase the commerce of the Piraeus. Foreigners were encouraged "by equality of intercourse between aliens and citizens" to settle in the city and the port because, as Pseudo-Xenophon² remarks, "they were needed on account of the multitude of handicrafts and the fleet." Among them were shipowners, merchants, and money-lenders. Athens was strong financially; Athenian money was current everywhere. Shipowners and merchants found it easy to obtain loans on either vessels or cargoes. "The trading community," says a client of Demosthenes,³ "thrives not so much by the borrowers as by the lenders of money, and neither ship nor shipowner nor passenger merchant can put to sea without the assistance of the lenders." The Athenians were quick to take advantage of the financial needs of commerce by enacting that, "It shall not be lawful for any Athenian nor any alien residing at Athens nor anyone under their control to lend out money on a ship which is not commissioned to bring corn to Athens or anything else which is particularly mentioned."⁴ The meaning of the words *καὶ τὰλλα τὰ γεγραμμένα περὶ ἐκάστου αὐτῶν* is doubtful. They may cover an enumeration of articles of commerce in the law or the merchandise mentioned in the contract.⁵ As it stands the law is not quoted word for word for it was open to a capitalist to lend money for the outward voyage only and to receive his money at the end of the voyage, but if he lent the money for a cargo to be purchased in the foreign port

¹ Thucydides i. 100.

² i. 12.

³ (Demos.), 34, 50.

⁴ (Demos.), 35, 51.

⁵ Gernet, *L'Approvisionnement d'Athènes en Blé*, 372.

also it must be brought to Athens. Another law provided that no resident of Athens could send a cargo of grain elsewhere than to the Piraeus. There were also restrictions on re-exporting grain from Athens. These regulations, it is true, belong to the age of Demosthenes but it is not unlikely that similar laws were in force in the fifth century. There is no extant literature of the period in which they would be mentioned, for no fifth-century speeches in mercantile cases have been preserved.

Athenian citizens settled in large numbers either as cleruchs on confiscated lands or as individuals in the overseas dominions. These men retained their Athenian citizenship and had the right to own all kinds of property where they settled. It was only natural to expect that they would make use of their home associations if they engaged in commerce and thus increase the business of the Piraeus. Trading companies are known to have been organized in the fifth century but we have no information regarding their operations. Judged by modern standards the banking system was crude. Clearing houses were unknown. But merchants could avoid the risk of transporting money from one city to another. For example an alien client of Isocrates¹ resident in Athens had money coming to him in the Pontus. A fellow countryman on his departure for home turned over to him in Athens the amount and collected the debt in the Pontus. No doubt between large trading centers this could often be done with advantage to both parties.

Greater security for loans and credits to foreigners was afforded by the commercial treaties² providing for reciprocity in litigation which Athens and other Greek cities began negotiating with each other early in the fifth century. The cases coming under these provisions were known as *δικαι ἀπὸ συμβόλων*. One of the chief features of these treaties was that as a rule they provided that the place of trial should be, not the place where the contract was made, but the home of the defendant thus insuring the enforcement of the verdict. Provisions for a special commercial code according to which the cases were to be tried were sometimes included. Naturally this

¹ 17, 35.

² Hitzig, *Allgriechische Staatsverträge über Rechtshilfe*; Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht*, pp. 965 ff.

would happen most frequently where one of the cities was backward. When the Delian league was formed Athens had a number of such treaties with the cities that entered the confederacy. These treaties continued in force even after the cities were reduced to subjection. General regulations restricting the judicial independence of the subject allies were in force throughout the whole empire. "We submit," says an Athenian apologist,¹ "to reciprocity in litigation with our inferiors and we make provision for the trial of their cases in our courts under laws the same for both ourselves and them." In the processes of litigation the interests and convenience of merchants, both citizen and alien, were carefully consulted. Cases arising out of written commercial contracts were classed as "mercantile suits"² (*δίκαι ἐμπόρικαι*) which were governed by special rules. Unnecessary or vexatious litigation was discouraged by the imposition of a penalty amounting to one-sixth of the sum claimed, if the litigant failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes. Interference with business was reduced to a minimum by the requirement that these cases could be tried only during the winter months when navigation was suspended. In spite of the notorious congestion of the courts they were brought to trial within one month after the issue of the writ. As one or both litigants was often a foreigner there was a danger that the damages awarded might not be paid at all, or at least not promptly. As a safeguard against this eventuality the court was empowered to imprison the loser pending satisfaction of the verdict. These regulations are drawn mainly from speeches attributed to Demosthenes and are not known to have been in force in the fifth century. But a passage in the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes³ shows that a merchant enjoyed some privileges. A young man about whom two old hags quarrel resorts to various expedients to escape their unwelcome attentions. One is a claim that he is a merchant. Van Leeuwen is undoubtedly right in rejecting the view that the poet has in mind exemption from military service. Rather the young man is asking to have the case postponed until the season for "mercantile suits." In support of this view it may be noted that the

¹ Thucydides, i. 77. Cf. *Class. Phil.*, XIV, 284 ff.

² Lipsius, *op. cit.*, 631.

³ 1028. Cf. Van Leeuwen's note on Aristophanes, *Plutus* 904.

other devices of the young man are all legal. It is true that even if the reference is to legal privileges of merchants it carries them back only to 392 B.C., but it is quite unlikely that Aristophanes would venture to try to raise a laugh by the misapplication of recent legislation. It may be assumed with considerable confidence that in the matter of litigation the interests of capitalists and merchants were consulted in the fifth century as well as in the fourth. Naturally, however, since commercial considerations began to influence Athenian policy more in the fourth century more attention was devoted to the interest of those engaged in commerce. Xenophon¹ for example writing about 355 B.C. suggests that rewards be offered to magistrates for the "speediest and most just settlement of commercial disputes." Evidently mercantile cases were not yet classified as monthly suits (*ἐμμηνοὶ δίκαι*).

Demosthenes² when defending a money-lender takes occasion to urge upon the jury the advisability of upholding the sanctity of contracts in the interest of Athenian trade, and Isocrates³ laments the tendency to regard equity rather than the law. "Strict adherence to the letter of the law is more to the interest of borrower than the present-day tendency to look to the equity of a particular case rather than the law," because it encourages the capitalists to lend their money more freely. Democratic juries may well have been inclined to favor the poor man when hard pressed by a money-lender but as between the capitalist and the merchant often resident aliens or foreigners there was little to choose.

It was inevitable that large numbers both of subjects and strangers should find it advantageous or necessary to resort to the city which was at once the administrative center of a great empire and the "school of all Hellas." And, as Xenophon⁴ observes, every increase in the numbers of those who sojourned or settled in the city brought a corresponding increase in the imports and exports.

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¹ *Revenues*, iii. 3.

² *Areopagiticus*, 33.

³ (*Demos.*), 56, 48.

⁴ *Revenues*, iii. 5.

POSIDONIUS AND CICERO'S *TUSCULAN*
DISPUTATIONS i. 17-81

BY ROGER MILLER JONES

In the last years much has been written concerning the influence of Posidonius on later eschatologies and theories of the nature of the soul. This influence has been traced in such authors as Cicero, Varro, Vergil, Philo Judaeus, Manilius, Seneca, Plutarch, the neo-Platonists, Gregory of Nyssa. How significant a figure in the history of philosophy and of religion Posidonius is conceived to have been may be seen by reading Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, pages 84-86, and Cumont, *After Life in Roman Paganism*, pages 27-31. If we inquire what is the source of our knowledge of Posidonius' theory of the soul, we find that there is very little that bears upon this subject in the attested fragments or the testimonia, and that the imposing structure has been built largely on conjecture.

The prevalent theories concerning Posidonius seem to have taken their origin from Peter Corsen's dissertation, published in 1878, *de Posidonio M. Tulli Ciceronis in libro I Tusculanarum Disputationum et in Somnio Scipionis auctore*. Corsen's arguments were reinforced and in some details corrected by Schmekel, in his work *Die mittlere Stoa*, published in 1892. Since this time there has been a growing tendency to regard as proved the thesis that Posidonius is Cicero's source in the first part of *Tusculans* i, and upon this as a foundation to base investigations concerning the source of theories of the soul in other authors.

These views, however, have not been without opponents, among whom we may mention Hirzel, in his *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, III, 342 ff. Leopold Reinhardt, in a little known article published in *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, 1896; O. Gruppe, in his *Bericht über die Literatur zur antiken Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, 1898-1905; A. Lörcher, in his *Bericht über die Literatur zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften aus den Jahren, 1902-11; Bursians Jahresbericht*, 1913; J. T. Dobson, "The Posidonius Myth,"

Classical Quarterly, 1918. Karl Reinhardt, too, in his recently published volume, *Poseidonios*, has expressed dissent from the conventional theories. Little attention, however, has been paid by the partisans of Posidonius to the views of opponents, except by Schmekel, who attempted to answer the objections of Hirzel.

Since so much depends upon the judgment concerning the sources of the defense of immortality in *Tusculans* i, it is our purpose in this article to subject this to further investigation. The procedure of Corssen and Schmekel has been to point out Stoic ideas and phrases, ideas attested as Posidonius', or believed to be his, and from the presence of these infer that Cicero's whole treatment (with the exception of a few sections) is taken from this philosopher. But it is our primary purpose to consider how much of this work it is conceivably possible to attribute to Posidonius in view of our knowledge of him gained from explicit testimony.

The argument of Book i takes its origin from the assertion of the interlocutor, in section 9: *malum mihi videtur esse mors*. After Cicero has forced the admission that the dead are not wretched, he declares it to be a matter of no difficulty at all to show that death is no evil, and professes his intention of convincing his interlocutor, if he is able, that it is rather a good. To the interlocutor's request that he speak continuously, asking as few questions as possible, he answers:

Geram tibi morem, et ea, quae vis, ut potero, explicabo, nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint et fixa, quae dixero, sed ut homunculus unus e multis probabilis coniectura sequens. ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut veri similia videam, non habeo; certa dicent ii, qui et percipi ea posse dicunt et se sapientis esse profitentur.

This is plainly an attack upon the Stoic theory of knowledge, and a reiteration of the Academic point of view set forth in the introduction.

There follows in sections 18-22 a doxography, which has frequently been overlooked by those who have sought to discover the sources of *Tusc.* i, though it has very intimate connections with the rest of the work.

Then in sections 23-34 Cicero goes on to show that the logical consequence of all these opinions about the soul is that death is no evil, since the soul either ceases to be, or passes into a more blessed state.

But it will be necessary for us to examine more carefully certain features of this part of the work. Cicero begins in section 18 by distinguishing those who hold that death is a separation of body and soul from those who hold that body and soul perish together, the soul in the body. Of those who believe that the soul leaves the body, some hold that it is immediately dissipated, some that it persists for a long time, some that it exists forever. It is plain that the belief that the soul survives the body for a long time is that of the Stoics; cf. the section of the *Placita* of Plutarch *περί ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς*, iv. 7, and *Tusc.* i. 78. There follows a statement of the opinions of various thinkers concerning the nature of the soul: Some think it is the heart; Empedocles, the blood about the heart; others, that it is neither heart nor any portion of the brain, but that its seat is in the heart or the brain; still others think it is breath (*anima*); Zeno the Stoic, that it is fire; Aristoxenus, that it is harmony; Xenocrates, that it is number; Plato, that the soul is threefold, consisting of ratio, ira, cupiditas, each with a different seat; Dicaearchus, that there is no soul at all; Aristotle, that the soul is

quinta essentia: cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia meminisse, amare odisse, cupere timere, angustari, haec et similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo putat; quantum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum *ἐνδελέχεια* appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem.

After an allusion to Democritus Cicero adds, in the recurrent Academic manner: "harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus aliqui viderit; quae veri simillima, magna quaestio est." Refusing to discuss this question at the present time, he goes on to deduce the consequences of the various beliefs: If the soul is heart or blood or brain, it will perish with the rest of the body, *si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur*; *si ignis, extinguetur*, if it is harmony, it will be dissolved. Why speak of what follows from Dicaearchus' opinion?—*his sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest*. The other theories afford a hope that souls, having left the body, *in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire*.

There is a strange incongruity between section 24 and the rest of Cicero's argument in the first half of this book: here he states that the theory that the soul is air and the theory that it is fire involve

its annihilation at death; later, as in sections 40-43, 60, 65, he admits the compatibility of these theories with the survival of the soul. It seems fairly probable, therefore, that Cicero did not compose section 24 for use in this work, but copied it from some source, perhaps a *consolatio*, where it was appropriate. Since section 24 depends upon the preceding doxography, it is reasonable to assume the same origin for much of the latter. But the sentence in section 18 which distinguishes between the theory of immortality and that of limited survival cannot have been originally joined with the rest, for the supporters of the latter theory can be none else than the Stoics, and yet the definition of the soul ascribed to Zeno in section 19 is said in section 24 to involve its immediate annihilation. Cicero must have added this sentence because of his purpose of opposing the theory of limited survival in section 78. There is obvious difficulty, too, in the fact that Zeno's theory is said to involve the annihilation of the soul. Two explanations are conceivable: Cicero may himself have substituted the name of Zeno for the name that stood in that place in his source; or if the name of Zeno was in the original list, the author meant that, without regard to what Zeno taught concerning the survival of the soul, his definition involved its destruction at death.

This doxography, together with section 24, is much more in harmony with the fragment of Cicero's *Consolatio*, quoted in section 66, than with many passages of *Tusculans* i, for in the fragment of *Consolatio* the affirmation of the immortality of the soul is connected with a denial that it can be air or fire. Further, there is a most striking resemblance between the sentence of section 22, beginning "cogitare enim et providere" and the *Consolatio*. It scarcely needs to be said that Cicero's source in the doxography cannot be Stoic, whatever theory of the origin of the passage we accept.¹

Schmekel, p. 139, having omitted consideration of the doxography, lays stress upon the fact that at the end of section 24 the interlocutor says that while he is reading the *Phaedo*, he assents to the doctrine of immortality, but afterward loses faith, whereas at the end of the argument in sections 76-78 he professes complete conviction. This

¹ We cannot concern ourselves here with other difficulties involved in the doxography, which do not bear upon our main problem.

Schmekel takes as evidence that the author conceives his method of proof to be more cogent than Plato's, and from this he infers that the source cannot be academic. But surely nothing can be concluded from what is obviously a piece of literary machinery; and we must remember that in the same section, immediately above, Cicero says: "evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo; amplius quod desideres, nihil erit."

In section 26 Cicero begins his defense of immortality with arguments from authority. (1) Men of early times, being nearer the gods and for this reason having a better discernment of the truth, were convinced that man does not perish altogether at death. We have evidence for their belief in the pontifical law and funeral ceremonies; in the deification of Romulus, Hercules, Liber, the Tyndaridae; and in the myths disclosed in the mysteries. "Sed qui nondum, ea quae multis post annis tractari coepta sunt, physica didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum natura admonente cognoverant, rationes et causas rerum non tenebant, visis quibusdam saepe movebantur, iisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur ei, qui vita excesserant, vivere." (2) Mourning for the dead involves belief that they still exist and feel the deprivation of the joys of life. "Omni in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est." The universal belief in gods, too, is proof of their existence, though many opinions held about them are utterly false. (3) The fact that men are concerned about what is to be after their death is an argument for the survival of the soul.

We find these arguments employed in defense of immortality in other works of Cicero. In *de amicitia*, section 13, occurs the argument from funeral rites. In *de legibus* ii. 27 we find the idea that men of old time were near the gods, and that their deification of Hercules and others shows that the souls of all men are immortal, the souls of good and brave men divine. In fragment 11 of the *Consolatio* we find the deification of Ino, Hercules, the Tyndaridae ascribed to the wisdom of those "quorum ingeniis et inventis omnem vitam legibus et institutis excultam constitutamque habemus." In fragment 90 of the *Hortensius* there is a reference to the doctrine concerning the soul contained in the mysteries which were established by prophets of old. The argument from the concern of men about what is to be after their death is found in *de senectute*, section 82.

The part of *Tusculans* i which contains these arguments has frequently been claimed for Posidonius. According to Sextus *adv. phys.* i. 28 certain of the younger Stoics asserted that primitive men had superior insight into the nature of the gods. From Seneca *epist. mor.* 90 we learn that Posidonius glorified primitive man. Section 28, concerning deification, resembles *de nat. deor.* ii. 62. The argument from consent is frequent in Stoic passages: cf. for example *de nat. deor.* ii. 5: *de div.* i. 11, where stress is laid upon the antiquity of the belief in divination as well as upon its universality. Seneca writes in *epist. mor.* 117, 6: "cum de animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium." In view of this passage from Seneca, the occurrence of Stoic passages in Cicero which infer the existence of gods and the validity of divination from the universality and the antiquity of the beliefs makes it probable that similar arguments were used at that time, too, in the Stoic school to prove the survival of the soul.

But these ideas were not confined to the Stoics. Aristotle in the *Eudemus*, fragment 44 (Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 115 B.C.) dwells on the fact that the belief in the blessedness of the dead goes back to the most ancient times. That Cicero was acquainted with this passage is almost certain, since it immediately precedes the story of Midas and Silenus, which was told by Cicero in the *Consolatio* (fr. 9) and *Tusculans* i. 114. Crantor, too, emphasizes the antiquity of the belief that human life is a punishment (*Consolatio ad Apollonium* 115 A). In fragment 39 of the *Eudemus* we find the idea that the belief in immortality is confirmed by the fact that men swear by the dead and ἀντοφνῶς pour libations to them.¹ If in what we have left of the *Eudemus* Aristotle does not say expressly that men of old time had more discernment in such matters than we, somewhat similar assertions are made by Plato in *Timaeus* 40 DE and *Philebus* 16 C. For a parallel to the thought that we need reason to supplement our instinctive belief we may cite Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1074 b 1-14 (with regard to our knowledge of God); cf. also Plutarch *Amatorius* 762 A, certainly not a Stoic passage. For the appeal to rites and ceremonies we may cite *Phaedo* 69 C; cf. also Plutarch *Consolatio ad uxorem* 611 D, 612 A. The fragment from the *Hortensius* (90) which

¹ Cf. Hirszel, *Untersuchungen*, loc. cit.

refers to the mysteries is probably taken from the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle (fr. 60 Rose).

We have said enough to show that the arguments from antiquity and consent were commonplaces, and known to Cicero from sources other than Stoic. With regard to deification, we have no reason to believe that Posidonius was responsible for the occurrence of such speculations in the Stoic school, or that they were altogether peculiar to the Stoics. Heraclides Ponticus went into considerable detail concerning the deification of Heracles (Servius in *Georg.* i. 34): in Lactantius, *inst. div.* i. 18. 11 we read:

Apud Ennium sic loquitur Africanus: Si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est mi soli caeli maxima porta patet . . . cui vanitati etiam Cicero adsensit. "Est vero," inquit, "Africane; nam et Herculi eadem ista porta patuit."

In view of Cicero's complete familiarity with these ideas, and their wide occurrence, it seems quite unnecessary to assume that he was using Posidonius or any other definite source; it is possible, of course, that he had such a source before him, but, granting this, we have no adequate reason to believe it was Posidonius, unless we find evidence of a very extensive use of this philosopher in our treatise. Even if we were sure that the emphasis laid upon deification was due to Posidonius¹ the occurrence of this idea throws little light on the source of the surrounding material, for in the *Consolatio*, where it evidently played a great part, we have reason to believe that Cicero was following Crantor to a considerable extent (fr. 7) and has preserved to us definitely anti-Stoic doctrine (*Tusc.* i. 66).

The argument from concern about what is to be after death seems to come ultimately from [Plato] *Epistle* ii. 311 CD:

ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὥς ζοικε, μέλειν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τυγχάνουσι κατὰ τινα φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀνδραποδωδέστατοι οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες αὐτοῦ, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικέστατοι πᾶν ποιῶντες, ὅπως ἂν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον εὖ ἀκούσωσιν. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ τεκμήριον ποιῶμαι, ὅτι ἔστι τις αἴσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν ἐνθάδε· αἱ γὰρ βέλτισται ψυχαὶ μαντεύονται τὰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, αἱ δὲ μοχθηρόταται οὐ φασι, κυριώτερα δὲ τὰ τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν μαντεύματα ἢ τὰ τῶν μῆ.

Where Cicero found the idea is, of course, uncertain. The occurrence

¹ Cf. Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, p. 85, n. 2.

in this passage of one of Cicero's favorite ideas,¹ "quae est melior—natura quam eorum qui se natos ad homines iuvandos, tutandos, conservandos arbitrantur," though it was held by Stoics, proves nothing for the source of this argument.

The ideas of sections 36–37, which explain the origin of the belief in mythical hells beneath the earth are possible for a Stoic, as is shown by the parallel in Sextus *adv. physicos* i. 66, but we have no reason to believe they were confined to this school. The references to Pherecydes, Pythagoras and Plato in section 38 point to no particular source, though Schmekel lays stress upon the fact that *Posidonius* said that the doctrine of the parts of the soul was first taught by Pythagoras, but was perfected by Plato (Galen *de placit. Hipp. et Plat.* 401, 11 M). The sentiment concerning Plato expressed in section 39 (*errare . . . malo cum Platone . . . quam cum istis vera sentire*) is a commonplace, possible even for Chrysippus; cf. Plutarch *de repugn. Stoic.* 1046 A.

In introducing the argument that the soul rises from the earth, Cicero speaks from the point of view of an Academic: "Num igitur dubitamus? an sicut pleraque? quamquam hoc minime." For a somewhat similar Academic phrasing we may compare *de amicitia*, section 13, also a passage concerning immortality: "vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper animos hominem esse divinos," etc. The argument which follows in sections 40–41 is as follows: If the soul consists of air or fire, it must rise, whether air and fire are light by nature or are pushed upward by heavier bodies; if the soul is number or *quinta essentia*, it will leave the earth far behind. After dismissing Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, and Democritus, Cicero reverts to the possibility that the soul may be *inflammata anima, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio*. If this theory be true, the soul either is dissipated high above the earth, or continues to exist and rises to heaven. Since it is the swiftest of all things, it passes through the heavy atmosphere, gains a place suitable to its nature, *iunctis ex anima tenui et ex ardore solis temperato ignibus*, and ceases to rise or to move in any direction. It will then be nourished by the same things that nourish the stars.

¹ Cf. the passage of Wendland cited above.

Section 40 and the first part of 41 are written from an Academic point of view: various theories of the nature of the soul are admitted as possibilities; two theories are given to account for the fact that air and fire rise.¹ The assertion that the earth is a point in comparison with the universe is a commonplace, going back to Aristotle *Meteorol.* 352 a 27. The very expression "sive illi sint animales, id est spirabiles, sive ignei," though Cicero presumably has the Stoics chiefly in mind here, has a non-Stoic tone.

The account of the abode of the soul, on the assumption that it continues to exist, is thoroughly Stoic. The closest parallel is Sextus *adv. physicos* i. 71, which Corssen and Schmekel give to Posidonius, von Arnim to the school of Chrysippus. According to the statements of both Cicero and Sextus the soul rises only as far as the moon; cf. for the interpretation of Cicero, Diels, *Rheinisches Museum*, 34, 487. There is a sentence in Sextus' account which it is well to examine (sec. 73):

ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον, τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκείᾳ τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὥς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄσπρα, τὸ διαλύσόν τε αὐτὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσι.

If Cicero used the same source as Sextus, he suppressed the mention of the long term of existence of the soul because he did not desire at this point to raise the issue of immortality and limited survival.

The order in which Cicero treats his topics calls for comment at this point. When he seems to be about to renew the argument for immortality in section 40, his mind reverts to section 36, where he has said that, though we are assured of the survival of the soul by consent, we require reason in order to determine its abode and its nature. Thus he sets out to prove that in accordance with various theories the soul must rise and in sections 42-43, assuming it to be *inflammata anima*, he describes its abode. If he had omitted the *sive-sive* clause in section 42, the argument would have been quite in harmony with section 36: *qua in sede maneat . . . ratione descendum est*. Having described the abode of the soul in accordance with one theory of its nature, he naturally goes on to describe its bliss in sections 44-47, which we have yet to consider. Thus we see that it is entirely

¹ The definition of the soul attributed to Panaetius in section 42 belongs as well to the orthodox Stoics and Posidonius; cf. Diogenes *Laërtius* vii. 157.

unnecessary to adopt Pohlenz' theory¹ that Cicero, borrowing, as he believes, the greater part of sections 24-81 from Posidonius, has changed the latter's order, putting the description of the abode and bliss of the soul before the arguments for its immortality.

There follows immediately upon section 43 the account of the bliss of the soul after death. Freed from the body and therefore freed from desires, the soul will give itself to the contemplation of truth and the vision of the beauty of the heavens and the earth. Even in this life it is the mind that perceives, not the senses. This portrayal of the state of the soul is, in Cicero's mind, compatible with all the theories which admit its survival and its abode in heavenly regions. The main ideas are found in Plato: *Phaedo* 66; *Theaetetus* 184. The vision of the earth is connected with the eschatology in the myth of the *Phaedo*; cf. 110-111; 114 BC. But there is no break between the admittedly Stoic sections and this passage. The Stoics, too, held that the ἡγεμονικόν is the source of sense-perception. If we can believe what Cicero says concerning Posidonius in *de divin.* i. 129, the latter would seem quite capable of saying what we find in section 44. But there are two details which we must consider. In section 45 we read: "tum et habitabiles regiones et rursum omni cultu propter vim frigoris aut caloris vacantis." This geographical theory recurs in section 68:

tum globum terrae eminentem e mari, fixum in medio mundi universi loco, duabus oris distantibus habitabilem et cultum, quarum altera sub axe posita ad stellas septem, unde horrifer Aquilonis stridor gelidas molitur nives, altera australis, ignota nobis, . . . ceteras partis incultas, quod aut frigore rigeant, aut urantur calore.

It is found also in *Somnium Scipionis*, section 21: ". . . medium [i.e., *cingulum*] autem illum et maximum solis ardore torreri. Duo sunt habitabiles," etc. All these passages are opposed to Posidonius' theory that the torrid zone is habitable and in fact inhabited. The inconsistency between section 21 of the *Somnium* and the position of Posidonius was pointed out by W. Volkmann in his treatise, *Die Harmonie der Sphären im Ciceros Traum des Scipio*, but Capelle in his review in *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* (1909), pp. 646 ff., lightly dismissed the matter, alleging that Cicero's language was too inexact

¹ *de Ciceronis Tusculanis Disputationibus*, 1909.

to make us believe he meant that the torrid zone was utterly uninhabitable. But in *Tusculans* i. 45 the language is perfectly definite: *omni cultu propter vim . . . caloris vacantis*. There is no evidence to lead us to believe that Posidonius contradicted himself upon the habitability of the torrid zone.¹ Nor is it likely that out of carelessness he would have introduced the opposite theory into rhetorical passages, since his master Panaetius had held the same view and the question was a live issue at the time; cf. Cleomedes i. 6; Geminus, p. 172 (Manitius); Strabo ii.

The general idea of section 46 is found in the *Theaetetus* and in the Stoics, but there is no mention anywhere in Plato of the passages which lead from the seat of the soul to the sense organs. These are clearly the *πόροι* of Alcmaeon (cf. Theophrastus *de sensibus* 26) and of Aristotle. The fact that we fail to see and hear at times when we are deep in thought, though the sense organs are unimpaired, was adduced by Strabo to show that perception is impossible apart from the mind; the same philosopher also compared the senses to *ὄπαι*, as does Cicero (*quae quasi fenestrae sint animi*).² But nowhere in any Stoic passage have we been able to find any allusion to *πόροι*, *viae*, *foramina*, the nearest approach being *πνεύματα νοερά ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένα* in *Dox.* 393 a b 16 ff. In Alexander *de anima* the *πόροι* are mentioned in the treatment of Aristotle's theory of sensation, not in that of the Stoic theory. It is interesting to observe that Chalcidius, chapter 246, in his account of Plato's theory of vision, appeals, as Cicero does, to *physici* and *medici*, mentioning Alcmaeon, Callisthenes and Herophilus.

We are prevented from believing that Cicero was copying Posidonius by the contradiction between the latter's geographical theory and section 45. We have not the least ground for assigning to any

¹ Strabo ii. 3 (155 A) says that Posidonius contradicted himself on the question whether the land under the equator was flat or mountainous, but this has nothing to do with the point at issue. As regards the contradiction which Strabo finds between Posidonius' assumption of land beneath the equator and his assertion that the ocean is *σῆπρος*, Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, p. 63, is probably right in explaining this as due to Strabo's reading into Posidonius' words a meaning which they did not have. Macrobius' statement in *Saturn.* i. 23 is true enough concerning Cleanthes (cf. Geminus, p. 172), but is probably a careless error with regard to Posidonius. In any case there is no evidence to show that Posidonius ever said the torrid zone was uninhabitable because of heat.

² Cf. Zeller, II, 2^a, 917-18.

other Stoic the ideas of section 44. The fact that we have found no mention of *πρόποι* in Stoic accounts of sensation makes us disinclined to think of a Stoic source. There is, besides, no necessity for our assuming that Cicero had a text before him: the main ideas are commonplaces, known to him from Plato and undoubtedly other philosophers as well; the psychological detail is common in the Peripatetics; the geography of section 45 is conventional. If we were compelled to think of a source for sections 44-47, as we are not, we should have more reason for thinking of Cratippus the Peripatetic than of Posidonius the Stoic (cf. *de divinatione* i. 70; note also the quotation from Theophrastus in section 45).

There is nothing in sections 48-49 which points to the use of a source. The criticism of Epicurus is possible for either a Stoic or an Academic; cf. a somewhat similar passage in Plutarch, *non posse suaviter vivi*, chapters 8-9; equally possible for both is the sentiment with regard to Plato; cf. *de divin.* i. 62.

A new division of the work begins in section 50 and is concluded in section 71. In this Cicero tries to prove the immortality of the soul from considerations of its nature. Sections 50-52 form an introduction to this series of arguments: Men find immortality (*aeternitas*) incredible because they cannot conceive of the nature of the soul when it is out of the body. As if they knew its nature and its seat when it is in the body!

Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multo obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit tamquam alienae domui, quam qualis, cum exierit et in liberum caelum quasi domum suam venerit.

We are able to conceive of God as *corpore liberatum*. Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus denied the very existence of the soul because it was difficult to conceive its essence and quality.

Est illud quidem vel maximum animo ipso animum videre et nimirum hanc habet vim praeceptum Apollinis, quo monet, ut se quisque noscat. Non enim, credo, id praecipit, ut membra nostra aut staturam figuramve noscamus, neque nos corpora sumus, nec ego tibi haec dicens corpori tuo dico. Cum igitur "nosce te" dicit, hoc dicit: "nosce animum tuum." Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est aut aliquod animi receptaculum; ab animo tuo quicquid agitur, id agitur a te. Hunc igitur nosse nisi divinum esset, non esset hoc acrioris cuiusdam animi praeceptum tributum deo.

The admission of the obscurity with regard to the nature and seat of the soul while it is in the body is highly inappropriate to a Stoic. Impossible for Posidonius is the clause in section 51: "certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione complecti possumus"; cf. Diogenes *Laërtius* vii. 148:

οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μὲν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὁμοίως δὲ . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν ᾧ περὶ θεῶν.

The interpretation of γινῶθι σαυτόν as "know your own soul" was a commonplace in Cicero's time.¹ But section 52 is so close to the language of I *Alcibiades* that we can scarcely avoid the belief that Cicero either had this passage in mind, or was borrowing from some author who had copied I *Alcibiades*; cf. especially 130 E:

τοῦτ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται, λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.

There is no reason why Posidonius may not have copied I *Alcibiades*; but sections 50-51, and, as we shall see, 53-55 cannot be assigned to him; hence we have no reason to think of him as the source.²

In sections 53-71 we have in a more elaborate form the four arguments of *de senectute*, section 78; but here the order is different and the argument from reminiscence is made a part of the argument from the divine qualities of the soul. The first to be treated is that from self-motion, the second in the *de senectute*. Cicero connects it thus with the preceding section:

Sed si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, dic, quaeso, ne esse quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? Ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in *Phaedro* explicata, a me autem posita est in secto libro de re publica.

There follows a translation of *Phaedrus* 245, substantially the same as that in the *de re publica*.

¹ Cf. Dr. Eliza G. Wilkins' Chicago Dissertation, "Know Thyself" in Greek and Latin Literature, pp. 60 ff.

² Gronau's apparent disposition to treat as Posidonian all later occurrences of this interpretation of γινῶθι σαυτόν is utterly unwarranted (*Posidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisezesege*, p. 232). *De legibus* i. 58, somewhat resembling our passage, has a Stoic color, but in all probability is not from Posidonius. For an example of a similar use of the maxim in a Peripatetic, cf. Alexander *de anima*, p. 1 (Bruns) not cited by Gronau or Dr. Wilkins.

Corssen and Schmekel hold that Cicero has taken this passage of Plato from Posidonius, who himself employed it in his argument for immortality. But we observe that the concession made in section 53, *si, qualis sit animus, ipse animus nesciet*, like sections 50–51, is inappropriate to a dogmatist who defined the soul as *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμόν*. Cicero's point of view is the same as in section 67. Further, Hirzel has adduced as evidence against Posidonius as a source for the argument of the *Phaedrus* the following passage of Hermias, in *Phaedrum*, p. 102, 10 Couvreur:

οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μόνης ᾠήθησαν εἶναι τὸν λόγον διὰ τὸ εἰρηκέναι "πᾶσα" καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα ἐπάγειν "ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσαν τε γένεσιν ξυμπεσούσαν στήναι." ὧν ἐστὶ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Στωικός.

Schmekel tries to answer this argument, p. 250, n. 3:

Dieser Schluss ist nicht stichhaltig. Posidonius lehrt, wie wir von Galen ausdrücklich erfahren, dass das höchste Vermögen des Menschen, der *λόγος*, der Weltseele vollkommen wesensgleich ist. Was von der Weltseele gilt, muss demnach auch von der Seele des einzelnen gelten; also muss sie unsterblich, ja ebenso wie die Weltseele unentstanden sein. Der Grund nun, warum Posidonius den obigen Beweis von der Unsterblichkeit der einzelnen Seele in Platos *Phädrus* von der Weltseele verstanden wissen wollte, liegt offenbar darin, dass er *seine* Anschauung bei Plato finden wollte und deswegen Plato einfach in diesem Sinne interpretierte. . . . Dies Beweisverfahren, die Unvergänglichkeit der Seele aus der Unvergänglichkeit der Gottheit zu erschliessen, finden wir nun unverkennbar auch an zwei Stellen wieder (Cic. *deorum nat.* ii. 11, 31 ff. Sextus Emp. *adv. phys.* i. 75 ff.), die auf dieselbe Stelle des Posidonius zurückgehen: Folglich hat Posidonius thatsächlich in der angegebenen Weise argumentiert. Da wir nun sowohl in Varros *Ant. rer. div.* i wie in Cic. *Tusc.* i dieses Beweisverfahren ebenfalls haben, mit der ausdrücklichen Andeutung, dass es von Plato verschieden sei, so lässt sich auch inhaltlich nicht im geringsten bezweifeln, dass Cicero a. a. O. dem Posidonius gefolgt ist.

But Cicero in sections 53–54, as in *Somnium Scipionis*, sections 27–28, uses the argument of the *Phaedrus* directly to prove the immortality of the individual soul; there is no inference here from its likeness to the world-soul or God. Nor is there any such inference in the two Stoic passages which Schmekel cites as parallels. In *de natura deorum* ii. 31 the argument is as follows: Self-motion, as Plato held, exists in souls only, and it is from souls that all motion is derived. But all motions are derived *ex ardore mundi*; therefore this *ardor*

mundi is *animus* and the universe is *animans*. The argument in Sextus *adv. phys.* i. 75 is somewhat similar, save that it is not assumed that souls are self-moving, but that there is a *δύναμις* in the universe analogous to the soul in us. This *δύναμις* is proved to be self-moving since otherwise we have an infinite regress; it is then proved to be eternal and so, God. The parallel in Servius, in *Aeneid.* vi. 724, to which Schmekel refers as a fragment of Varro, is not included in Agahd's collection, and certainly has nothing to do with Posidonius.

Further, Posidonius did not believe the human soul to be eternal. If on the evidence of *de divin.* i we grant that he taught that it pre-exists, the only soul that is eternal, as surviving the *ἐκπύρωσις*, is the world-soul. Thus it is easily seen why Posidonius interpreted as he did the passage of the *Phaedrus*.¹

In sections 56-70 Cicero argues from the attributes of the soul, especially memory and invention, that it is divine and so immortal. This is in substance the first argument of *de senectute*, section 78: *sic persuasi mihi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria praeteritorum futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantae scientiae, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam quae res eas contineat esse mortalem*. The express assertion of the divinity of the soul we find in *de senectute*, sections 77, 81, 84. In *Tusc.* i Cicero combines with this argument the argument from *ἀνάμνησις*, which stands fourth in the *de senectute*. This section, with the exception of the quotation from the *Consolatio*, is given by Corssen and Schmekel to Posidonius, chiefly on the ground of the occurrence in it of Stoic ideas, one of them attested as characteristic of Posidonius.

The idea that the soul is divine or akin to the divine is a commonplace: cf. for example, Plato, *Phil.* 30; *Laws* 899 D; *Rep.* 611 E;

¹ That Posidonius adhered to the doctrine of the *ἐκπύρωσις* is attested by Diogenes Laërtius vii, 142; *Dox.* 338 a b 19. The statement in *de divinatione* i. 131, a passage apparently going back to Posidonius, that souls have lived from all eternity and will live forever is correctly explained by Zeller, III, 1⁴, p. 603, n. 1: "Aber das *semper* und *ab omni aeternitate* käme auch dann auf Ciceros Rechnung, denn Posid. konnte die Seelen doch weder vor dem Anfang noch nach dem Ende der Welt, zu der sie gehören, existieren lassen." A similar explanation is to be given for the assertion in *de natura deorum* ii. 62 that Heracles, Castor and Pollux, and Romulus are *aeterni*; or else we must say that *aeterni* is used loosely, as in Seneca, *Consolatio ad Marciam*, chap. 26 fin., where he speaks of the dissolution of "eternal" souls at the time of the *ἐκπύρωσις*. That Cicero is perfectly well aware of the difference between the theory of the *aeternitas* of the soul in the proper sense, and the Stoics' theory of limited survival, is clear from *Tusc.* i, sections 18 and 77-78.

Tim. 89-90; 41 C (in the last passage note the virtual equation of *θεῖον* and *ἀθάνατον*); Aristotle, *περί φιλοσοφίας*, fragment 11 (Rose); *Protrepticus* fragment 51; Cratippus in Cicero, *de div.* i. 70; Stoics *passim*; Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 4, 8; iv. 3, 14; *Cyropaed.* viii. 7, 20. The argument that since it is like the divine it is immortal is stated expressly in *Phaedo* 80 B, and is constantly repeated by Platonists. A very close parallel to Cicero's handling of the argument occurs in [Plato] *Axiochus* 370 BC:

οὐ γὰρ δὴ θνητὴ γε φύσις τοσόνδε ἂν ἤρατο μεγεθουργίας, ὥστε καταφρονῆσαι μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων θηρίων βίας, διαπεραιώσασθαι δὲ πελάγη, δέμασθαι δὲ ἄσπῃ, καταστήσασθαι δὲ πολιτείας . . . εἰ μὴ τι θεῖον ὄντως ἐνὴν πνεῦμα τῇ ψυχῇ, δι' οὗ τὴν τῶν τηλικῶνδε περίνοιαν καὶ γνῶσιν ἔσχεν.¹

But let us proceed to a consideration of certain details. In section 56 we have Stoic phrasing: if the soul of man gave him life only, we might think "tam natura . . . hominis vitam sustentari quam vitis, quam arboris. Item si nihil haberet animus hominis nisi ut appeteret aut fugeret, id quoque esset ei commune cum bestiis"; cf. *de natura deorum* ii. 33-34. Of the distinctive attributes of the human soul, which are to be regarded as divine Cicero first takes up memory; this is divided into Platonic *ἀνάμνησις* and memory in the ordinary sense. For the first he refers to the *Phaedo* and the *Meno*. The very manner of reference to the *Meno* makes it likely that Cicero is drawing from his recollections, not copying some handbook on immortality: *et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quo si geometrica didicisset*. Much discussion has been occasioned by the word *ἐννοίας* in section 57; cf. Schmekel, p. 142, n. 2. Schmekel is right in asserting, against Corssen, that there is no confusion between *ἐννοιαί* and *ιδέαι*, but hardly in saying: "Wenn Cicero hier schreibt . . . notiones, quas *ἐννοίας* vocant etsq., so ist hier *ἐννοία* offenbar als term. techn. gebraucht und als solcher ist das Wort bekanntlich stoisch." It is not a technical term for the Stoics in this sense, because they had no occasion to use it. It may be that the currency of *ἐννοία* among the Stoics made it the natural word to use in this context, but its use was at least suggested by Plato himself: *Phaedo* 73 C: ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο

¹ The word *πνεῦμα* perhaps shows Stoic influence, but the *Axiochus* was certainly not written by a Stoic; cf. 371 AB.

δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβε. It is used in Olympiodorus, in *Phaedonem*, exactly as in Cicero; 150, 16 (Norvin) πᾶς γὰρ ἂν εἶποι ὅτι δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον etc. ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ τινὰς τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴχομεν πρεσβυτέρας ἐννοίας; cf. also Alcinous, *Εἰσαγωγή*, chap. 25. There follows in section 58 an account of the Ideas in closest connection with the theory of ἀνάμνησις. It is impossible to believe that the argument, as set forth here, was used by any Stoic to prove the immortality of the soul. If one should urge that Posidonius may have set forth this argument, though he was himself unable to accept it, we should answer that there is no indication that Cicero regards it as unsound; cf. *de senectute*, section 78: "magnoque esse argumento homines scire pleraque antequam nati sint," etc.

In section 60 neither the attitude toward dogmatists nor the way in which Cicero alludes to Stoic theory is compatible with his use of a Stoic source: "animae sit ignisne, nescio, nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam; illud, si ulla alia de re obscura adfirmare possem, sive anima sive ignis sit animus, eum iurarem esse divinum." For other passages which combine scepticism as to the nature of the soul and conviction of the likeness of the soul and God cf. Philo Judaeus *leg. allegor.* i. 91-92; *de somniis* i. 30 ff. There is no indication of a definite source in section 61 where Cicero rejects crudely materialistic explanations of memory; the image of the waxen tablet was rejected even by Chrysippus.

In the eulogy of *inventio* which follows in sections 62-63 there seems to be nothing characteristic of any one school. The phrase *illa (astra) non re sed vocabulo errantia*, from Plato *Laws* 821, was a commonplace at this time; cf. *de natura deorum* ii. 51. The sphere of Archimedes is mentioned in a Stoic passage in Sextus, *adv. phys.* i. 115. The reference to the *demiurgus* of the *Timaeus* can hardly indicate anything. But the idea in section 64 that philosophy is the mother of the arts is said by Seneca, *Epist. mor.* 90 to belong to Posidonius; it occurs again in *Tusc.* v. 5. The first part of section 65 (memory and invention are divine; nothing greater can be conceived even in God) is the familiar commonplace; cf. also Plutarch *de Iside et Osiride*, chap. 1. The second part of this section is impossible for a Stoic: ". . . si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus

hominis. . . . Sin autem est quinta quaedam essentia, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum."

After the mention of the quinta essentia Cicero introduces a quotation from the *Consolatio*. As Schmekel points out, this cannot be from Posidonius.¹ Decisive for this is the denial that the soul can be air or fire; almost equally decisive the statement that God is to be conceived as *mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali*.

We have indicated above the affinities between this passage and the doxography contained in sections 18-24. But we observe certain resemblances with other parts of our work. The conception of God is the same as in section 51. There is a similarity of idea between the sentence: *nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo*, and section 56: *quae si cernerem quem ad modum nasci possent, etiam quem ad modum interirent viderem*. But what is of most significance, the argument from the divine attributes of the soul, elaborated by the addition of Stoic ideas in *Tusculans* i, is here fully set forth in a non-Stoic passage:

His in naturis [i.e., the elements] nihil inest, quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia, quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur, etc. Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est.

Further, the argument from the simplicity of the soul, set forth in *Tusc.* i, section 71, and *de senectute*, section 78, is involved in the first clause of the second sentence: *nihil enim est in animis mixtum et concretum*; cf. *Tusc.* i. 71:

dubitare non possumus—quin nihil sit animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex; and *de senectute* 78: *cum simplex animi esset natura neque haberet in se quicquam admixtum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi*.

In section 67 to the imagined question: "Ubi igitur aut qualis est ista mens [i.e., *divina*]?" Cicero rejoins "Ubi tua aut qualis? potesne dicere?" If we cannot understand everything, should we not be allowed to use what knowledge we have? Just as the eye, so the

¹ Gronau seems to regard it as Posidonian; cf. p. 235.

mind sees other things, but not itself. But it discerns at least its own powers, and these are divine and eternal. *Qua facie quidem sit aut ubi habitet, ne quaerendum quidem est.* This is the same point of view as we have seen in sections 53 and 60, and cannot be Stoic.

In sections 68-70 the argument is developed with rhetorical elaboration that just as we recognize God from his works, though we do not see him, so though we cannot see the soul of man we should recognize its divine nature from its attributes. The argument is a commonplace, but two details deserve consideration. In section 68-69 we find the same anti-Posidonian geography as in section 45. In section 70 we are allowed our choice of supposing with Plato that the world came into being, or with Aristotle that it has always existed; there is no reference to Stoic theory. In view of these facts it is impossible to believe that Cicero is here copying Posidonius. If the glorification of the universe resembles Stoic rhetoric, we should remember that Cicero was perfectly familiar with such commonplaces and needed no text before him.

In the last part of section 70 the question of the seat of the soul, dismissed in 67, recurs. Cicero answers:

Credo equidem in capite, et cur credam, adferre possum, Sed alias, ubi sit animus, certe quidem in te est. Quae est ei natura? Propria, puto, et sua. Sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem; nihil ad id, de quo agimus.

While it is probable, as Schmekel, believes, that Posidonius placed the ἡγεμονικόν in the heart, it makes little difference for our purpose. The point of view is the same that we have observed elsewhere. We may note, however, Cicero's inclination toward the theory advanced in the fragment of the *Consolatio*.

The argument from the simplicity of the soul, set forth in section 71, came originally from Plato *Phaedo* 78-80, and was in common use among Platonists; cf. Wythenbach's notes on *Phaedo* 78 B. It is incompatible with the Stoic theory of the nature of the soul. Simplicity in the required sense cannot be said to belong to that which is fed by exhalations from the earth (sec. 43), the term of whose survival is prolonged by reason of the purity of the air beneath the moon and the absence of anything which would dissolve it (Sextus *adv. phys.* i. 73). Further, we find statements in Alexander and Galen (von Arnim, II, secs. 786-87) to the effect that the Stoics held

the soul to be *συγκείμενόν πως ἐκ τε πυρός καὶ ἀέρος*, and the conventional definition, accepted by Posidonius, is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμόν*. The argument from simplicity proves the aeternitas of the soul, not its survival to the time of the *ἐκπύρωσις*. We observe, too, that in the fragment from the *Consolatio* the simplicity of the soul is brought into the closest connection with the denial that the soul is composed of any of the four elements: *Nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut igneum*.

But Schmekel points out a parallel which he believes to be from Posidonius, Servius in *Aen.* vi. 746, No. 30 in his collection of the fragments of Varro *ant. div. rer.* i:

Aetherium sensum: id est, *πῦρ νοερόν* ignem sensualem, id est, deum; per quod quid sit anima ostendit. Aurai simplicis ignem: non urentis. Simplicis autem nostri comparatione, qui constat de ligno et aere; ille enim per se plenus est et aeternus, quia simplex. Omnia enim *σύνθετα*, id est, composita, exitum sortiuntur, unde et atomos perpetuas dicunt, quia simplices sunt nec recipiunt sectionem.

Agahd, however, gives to Varro only the clause "aetherium deum." The *πῦρ νοερόν* is simplex only in the sense that it is pure fire; it is fed by exhalations from the earth and sea; cf. Cicero *de nat. deor.* ii. 39-41. It is not all eternal qua *πῦρ νοερόν*, for in the *διακόσμησις* it changes into the other elements. This inaccurate account of Stoic theory Servius has combined with the Platonic argument suggested by Vergil's *simplicis*. His one example of simple substances, atoms, is impossible for Platonists and Stoics alike; it may be noted that Schmekel ends his quotation with "exitum sortiuntur."¹

Sections 72-75 are drawn from Plato. Section 72 is parallel in a general way to *Phaedo* 80 D. Section 73 combines material taken from *Phaedo* 84 E ff.; 99 D; and 85 C. As has often been pointed out, the figure in 99 D is employed in a different way by Cicero; but cf. *Laws* 897 D:

μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς ὄμμασι δόξομενοι τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς.

¹ The statement in *Acad. prior.*, section 124, that the soul is simplex according to theories which make it *ignis* or *anima* or *sanguis*, *triplez* according to Plato, has nothing to do with our argument.

In section 74 we have the prohibition of suicide, *Phaedo* 62 B, and in section 75 the thought that philosophy is a *commentatio mortis*, *Phaedo* 64 ff.

These sections, too, have been claimed for Posidonius. Corssen points out two ideas in section 72 as not found in the *Phaedo*: that we should imitate the gods, and that the soul returns to the gods from whom it came; and he cites as parallel to the former *de nat. deor.* 37, to the latter Seneca, *Epist. mor.* 120, 15. But both ideas are most familiar Platonic commonplaces; cf. *Theaetetus* 176 B with Campbell's note; the myth of the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*. In section 74, the prohibition of suicide, Corssen and Schmekel compare the phrase "dominans ille in nobis deus" with Seneca's "sacrum intra nos spiritum, prope a nobis nobiscum esse deum," and assert that here we have the νοῦς-δαίμων of Posidonius. But with this interpretation the next clause makes no reasonable sense: "cum vero causam iustam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni"; for surely "deus ipse" means the same thing as "dominans ille in nobis deus." There is not the least support for this interpretation in the parallels in *de senectute*, section 73, *Somnium Scipionis*, section 15. Schmekel thinks, too, that the mention of Cato shows the influence of a Stoic who is trying to defend suicide under certain conditions, while quoting Plato against suicide in general; but the clause in the *Phaedo* itself, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν παρούσαν, read in the light of *Laws* 873 C, μηδὲ αἰσχύνῃς τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών, shows how Cicero, admiring Cato as he did, could be led to couple him with Socrates.

In section 77 after the mention of the Epicureans and Dicaearchus, who oppose the doctrine of immortality, Cicero adds: Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur tamquam cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant. And he asks the interlocutor whether he does not wish to hear the reasons why death is no evil, even if the soul be not immortal. To the assurance of the interlocutor that no one will shake his belief Cicero rejoins: "Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere; movemur enim saepe aliquo acute concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati." After further assurance on the part of the inter-

locutor Cicero asks: "Num quid igitur est causae, quin amicos nostros Stoicos dimittamus? eos dico, qui aiunt manere animos, cum e corpore excesserint, sed non semper." And the interlocutor adds: "istos vero, qui, quod tota in hac causa difficillimum est, suscipiant, posse animum manere corpore vacantem, illud autem, quod non modo facile ad credendum est, sed eo concesso, quod volunt, consequens, id non concedant, ut, cum diu permanserit, ne intereat."

Before we go on to the more important sections, 79-81, there are several points to be noticed. The admission of the *obscuritas* of the subject is in accordance with the prevailing point of view. The Stoics are placed in section 77 with the opponents of immortality. In the doxography only has there been any allusion to the theory of limited survival. The Stoics whose arguments are used in sections 42-43 are the same as those mentioned here, as we see from the parallel with Sextus already referred to. If in the long passage in which Cicero sets forth the argument from the attributes of the soul Cicero seems to regard the theory that its essence is fire or air as compatible with its *aeternitas*, we cannot suppose that he had Stoics in mind who held this opinion, for, so far as we know, none existed. Posidonius belongs with the Stoics dismissed in section 78 just as much as Cleanthes, since he taught the dissolution of souls into the world-fire.

In section 79 Cicero continues: "credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? . . . huius hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat." Zeller, III, 14, 583, and Schmekel are probably right in holding that Panaetius is distinguished from the other Stoics because he denied altogether the survival of the soul after death.

Cicero then sets forth the objections of Panaetius:

Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quicquid natum sit interire; nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur, quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus appareat. Alteram autem adfert rationem, nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit; quod autem in morbum cadat id etiam interiturum; dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire.

Cicero answers the objections thus:

Sunt . . . ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicitur, de mente dici, quae omni turbido motu semper vacet, non de partibus iis, in quibus

aegritudines, iras libidinesque versentur, quas is contra quem haec dicuntur, semotas a mente et disclusas putat. Iam similitudo magis apparet in bestiis, quarum animi sunt rationis expertes; hominum autem similitudo in corporum figura magis exstat, et ipsi animi magni refert quali in corpore locati sint. Multa enim e corpore existunt, quae acuant mentem, multa, quae obtundant. . . . Quodsi tanta vis est ad habitum mentis in iis, quae gignuntur in corpore (ea sunt autem, quaecumque sunt, quae similitudinem faciant) nihil necessitatis adfert, cur nascantur animi, similitudo.

The arguments of Panaetius were not original with him, but were used by the Epicureans (cf. Lucretius iii. 445-62). An argument very similar to Panaetius' first argument was used by the New Academy against the Stoic conception of God (cf. Cicero *de nat. deor.* iii. 32; Sextus *adv. phys.* i. 139).

Hirzel's refutation of the Posidonian origin of Cicero's reply to Panaetius is quite conclusive: Cicero speaks of parts of the soul, and distinguishes as sharply as possible the *mens* from the lower parts; Posidonius admits only *δυνάμεις*, cf. Galen *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* vi. 501, 10 M: ὁ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ Ποσειδώνιος εἶδη μὲν ἡ μέρη οὐκ ὀνομάζουσι, δυνάμεις δὲ εἶναι φασὶ μίᾱς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὀρμωμένης. Even if at times he spoke inaccurately of τὸ ἄλογον μέρος (cf. Posidonius' definition of the highest good in Clement, *Strom.* ii. 21, 497 P) the very fact that in Platonizing arguments he adopted the term *δύναμις* is decisive for his real opinion. We may point out further, that if Posidonius regarded the soul as a single essence, and as pure *νοῦς* when separated from the body, but developing the affective *δυνάμεις* when joined to the body, it is *παθητική* and thus according to Panaetius' argument liable to destruction.¹ Hirzel is right also in his assertion that the idea that the constitution of the body has an effect upon the soul is essentially Platonic; though this belief is attested for Posidonius, it was by no means peculiar to him.

For his belief that Plato regarded only the *νοῦς* as immortal Cicero had abundant warrant in Plato himself; cf. *Tim.* 41 C, in Cicero's translation, section 41; *Rep.* 611; *Phaedo passim*. Aristotle seems to have had the same conception of immortality in his

¹ The parallel which Schmekel finds in Servius in *Aen.* vi. 724 is a real one, but there is no reason for assigning it to Varro and through him to Posidonius. It is not included in Agahd's fragments. From an independent study we are convinced that Schmekel's collection of the fragments of Varro is not to be trusted.

early *Protrepticus* (cf. fr. 58, Rose) and *Eudemus* (fragment 38); so also the Platonizing Peripatetic Cratippus (*de divin.* i. 70). Of Platonists of the Empire we know that Atticus and Albinus believed only the *νοῦς* to be immortal; and Galen assumes this to be Plato's meaning in *ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἔπονται* (chap. 3). That there were Platonists who gave this interpretation of Plato before the time of Cicero there is no good reason to doubt. The evidence of Olympiodorus, in *Phaedonem* 124, 13 *Norvin*, to the effect that Spensippus and Xenocrates regarded the soul as immortal *μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας* is not convincing, if we read what he says about Numenius, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus; if he was in utter confusion concerning recent authors, being unable to distinguish, as in the case of Plotinus, between temporary survival of a part of the soul after death, and immortality, he is the more likely to have been in error regarding early Platonists; cf. also Richard Heinze, *Xenocrates*, p. 138.¹

Cicero could not have taken sections 79–80 from Posidonius. While it is conceivable that his reply to Panaetius' argument is his own drawn from material in Plato, it is more likely that it was the conventional answer of the Platonic school; for the objections were raised by the Epicureans and presumably were answered.

To sum up our results briefly: Sections 17–24 cannot have been taken from Posidonius. There are certain considerations which make it fairly probable that Cicero was following a definite source, presumably a *consolatio*, making certain interpolations. There is a marked resemblance between this passage and the fragment of Cicero's *Consolatio* quoted in section 66. The arguments from antiquity and consent, in sections 26–30, were commonplaces, known to Cicero from the writings of various schools, including the Stoics. Even if Cicero was following a source, an assumption by no means necessary, there is no proof that it was a work of Posidonius. The argument from our concern about what is to be after us, originally from [Plato] *Epistle* ii, is elaborated by the use of commonplaces; cf. Cicero *pro Archia* sections 26–29; Plutarch *de latenter vivendo*.

¹ L. Reinhardt, influenced largely by this passage of Olympiodorus, and his own misunderstanding of Crantor, is disposed to think that Cicero's interpretation comes from some member of the New Academy, perhaps Antiochus.

Section 36-38, on mythical hells, is parallel to a Stoic passage in Sextus, but does not seem to have been peculiarly Stoic; cf. Plutarch *de latenter vivendo* 1130 D. The argument in sections 40-43, designed to prove that the soul rises after death, is based largely on Stoic material, but cannot, in the form in which we have it, have been written by a Stoic. The Stoic material may have come from Posidonius, but is equally possible for other Stoics. Sections 44-47 though closely attached to the preceding sections, contain nothing peculiarly Stoic. The mention of *πόροι* makes the theory of Stoic origin improbable; the geographical theory prevents us from attributing the passage to Posidonius. The polemic against Epicurus in section 48 and the sentiments concerning Pythagoras and Plato in section 49 point to no source. Sections 50-51 are impossible for Posidonius. Section 52 shows strong verbal resemblance to [Plato] *I Alcibiades*. The argument of the *Phaedrus*, in sections 53-55, cannot have been employed by Posidonius to prove the immortality of the individual soul. The argument from the attributes of the soul, in sections 56-70, is not, as has sometimes been held, an inseparable whole, but combines two of the arguments of *de senectute* 78. Of these the argument from reminiscence cannot have been taken from a Stoic. The argument from the divine qualities of the soul is combined with a certain amount of Stoic material and commonplaces possible for Stoics; but it is involved in the non-Stoic doxography (section 22, the account of Aristotle); it is fully stated in the anti-Stoic fragment of the *Consolatio*; and occurs without Stoic coloring in the *de senectute*. The argument that the soul is immortal because it is like the divine is Platonic, and the idea of the divinity of thought is a commonplace. The fact that the Stoics, too, regarded the soul as divine made it possible for Cicero to use Stoic material in developing this argument, whereas it was obviously impossible in the exposition of the arguments from reminiscence and simplicity. Since this Stoic material was familiar to him, as is apparent from its general character and its appearance in his other works, we have no need to assume that he had a Stoic text before him. The argument from the simplicity of the soul in section 71 cannot be from Posidonius. These four arguments are attributed to Plato in section 71, just as in *de senectute*, section 78. That Cicero was acquainted

with them in Plato cannot be doubted. That he was guided in his choice of them by some (non-Stoic) handbook, is conceivable, but not necessary to assume. There is no trace of Stoic coloring in sections 72-75. Sections 76-78 are directed in part against Stoics who taught the eventual dissolution of the soul; of this number was Posidonius. The reply to the arguments of Panaetius, in sections 79-81, cannot be from Posidonius.

Though a detailed treatment of the *Somnium Scipionis* would lie outside the limits of our present study, we may perhaps be permitted to add a few words concerning the relation between this work and *Tusculans* i. Arguing chiefly from resemblances between the two Corssen came to the conclusion that Posidonius was Cicero's source for the *Somnium Scipionis*. But the greater part of the parallels in the *Tusculans* are not from Posidonius at all. Further, there is no similarity between *Tusculans*, section 43, and *Somnium Scipionis*, section 16: in the former the soul rises to the region beneath the moon, and no higher; it is fed by the exhalations from the earth; in the latter, as in the speculations of Heraclides Ponticus, it rises to the Milky Way, which Cicero places in the heaven of the fixed stars, not in the region beneath the moon; there is no trace of the idea that stars and souls alike are fed by vapors from the earth. Cumont in his recent work, *After Life in Roman Paganism*, summarizes thus what he believes to be the doctrine of Posidonius concerning the ascent of the soul:

It stopped in this ascension when, within the ether which was about the moon, it found itself in surroundings like its own substance. Some elect beings, the divine spirits of the sages, kept such purity that they rose through the ether as far as the highest astral spheres.

But it is impossible to reconcile in this way *Tusculans*, section 43, and *Somnium Scipionis*, section 16, for according to the latter, as according to the *Timaeus* 42 CD, all souls are eventually to return to the highest sphere. Further, we note great similarity in language between the earlier work and the later *Consolatio*, section 26:

Deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositum est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus sic, fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet.

Cf. *Consolatio*:

Ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est.

There is no trace of the *ἐκπύρωσις* in the *Somnium Scipionis*; the phrase *ex quadam parte mortalem* refers to the part of the world subject to becoming and destruction. Thus Cicero is using the word *sempiternus* of the soul in its full sense.

If our results are correct, neither *Tusculans* i nor the *Somnium Scipionis* can throw any light upon Posidonius' theory of the soul. And the gravest doubts are cast upon the validity of many speculations concerning the influence of Posidonius on later writers.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TITLE IN APULEIUS'
METAMORPHOSES

BY B. E. PERRY

When we read the title "Metamorphoses" in ancient books we naturally think of a work like that of Ovid, a work containing a fairly large number of separate myths, generally quite short, and relating, in almost every case, to some ancient and frankly mythical character. The *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, the *Μεταμορφώσεις Συναγωγή* of Antoninus Liberalis, and a short list in Westermann's *Paradoxographi Graeci* are, I believe, the only published remains of this literature. Other books entitled "Metamorphoses" are known to us from citations in Antoninus, Suidas, and the grammarians, under the names of Parthenius, Didymarchus, Nestor of Laranda, Theodorus, and the sophist Hadrian. To be sure, some of these are otherwise mere names to us, but it is nevertheless certain, from the manner in which they are cited, that their books dealt with the same sort of material as Ovid's. Among other books of the same class, though with different titles, may be mentioned the earlier works of Nicander (*Ἐρεπιδόμενα*), Antigonus (*Ἀλλουώσεις*), and Boius (*Ὀρνιθογονία*), from some of which Ovid undoubtedly derived suggestions and material for his own work. Now obviously all of these books belong to a definite category. They represent a distinct and well-defined literary tradition centering about the title "Metamorphoses." Their purpose was no doubt often artistic and epideictic, for many of them were written in verse. But they also had a didactic purpose. They were intended to familiarize the budding rhetorician with classical mythology, to provide him with a handbook of the stock materials indispensable to the professional sophist.¹

In view of this literary tradition, anyone reading Apuleius for the first time experiences some surprise; for he finds that Apuleius' work differs *toto caelo* from other books of the same title. Instead of

¹ Cf. Menander Rhetor, in Spengel's *Rhet. Graeci*, III, 393, for the recognized place of such works in rhetoric. Lucian's dancer, too, must be familiar with this lore (*De Salt.* 57).

a series of stories relating to changes, which seems to be implied by the plural title if by nothing else, he finds, properly speaking, only one. He notices further that this one, instead of being antiquarian, is modern and has nothing to do with classical mythology; that it is several times as long as any myth related in Ovid; that, instead of being heroic or serious, it is farcical; that the man experiencing the change into an ass is a writer¹ of high social standing; and, in short, that the work is a brilliant piece of literary extravaganza having much more in common with Lucian's *True History* or Petronius' *Saturae* than with the usual antiquarian compilations called "Metamorphoses." Confronted with these facts one naturally inquires, Why did Apuleius use this title, seemingly so inappropriate to his work? Can it be that this title is, after all, appropriate? If so, just what does it imply? This latter question, strangely enough, is seldom or never asked. The possibility that Apuleius' title is appropriate, but intended in a somewhat unusual sense, has in the past been ignored. Almost without exception, scholars have hitherto assumed (without saying much about it) that the title "Metamorphoses" is inappropriate, and that it has been erroneously retained by Apuleius from the original Greek *Μεταμορφώσεις*, from which he derived his main story, and which, unlike Apuleius' book, is supposed to have contained a series of separate stories, each involving a transformation and so justifying the plural title in the usual sense. In the same way Helm explains the words of Apuleius on the first page of the *Metamorphoses*: *At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram—figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas ut mireris*. These words, in their most natural interpretation, do not fit the subject-matter of the *Metamorphoses*, since they seem to promise several stories of change. Therefore, says Helm, they were probably copied from the original *Μεταμορφώσεις*—accidentally of course, like the title, and most inappropriately.²

¹ Cf. *Met.* ii. 10, where Fotis addresses Lucius as *scolasticus*; "Ὅνος 55, καὶ γὰρ μὲν ἱστοριῶν καὶ ἄλλων εἰμὶ συγγραφεὺς, ὃ δὲ (Lucius' brother) ποιητὴς ἐλεγείων ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθός. That Lucius is a writer is also hinted at elsewhere, see "Ὅνος 2; *Met.* i. 2, vi. 25.

² R. Helm, *Apulei Opera*, II, 2, p. vi. To me it seems almost certain that these words were added by Apuleius. The only positive indication that they may have been taken from the *Μεταμορφώσεις* lies in the fact of their apparent correspondence with the

This explanation, however, rests entirely upon the assumption that the Greek *Μεταμορφώσεις* contained a series of stories relating to changes. Helm (*loc. cit.*), indeed, assures us that this is certain; and in so doing he re-echoes the opinion of almost all scholars who have touched upon the subject; for it has always seemed, after a glance at Photius (*Bibl. cod.* 129), as if there were no question about the contents of the *Μεταμορφώσεις*, no possibility of any other interpretation than the traditional one.

But let us examine briefly the testimony itself (Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 129, Migne):

Ἀνεγνώσθη Λουκίου Πατρώς μεταμορφώσεων λόγοι διάφοροι.¹ ἔστι δὲ τὴν φράσιν σαφὴς τε καὶ καθαρὸς καὶ φίλος γλυκύτητος· φέγων δὲ τὴν ἐν

statement of Photius (cf. *infra*) that Lucius, the supposed author and hero, "believed credible the metamorphoses of men into each other, of animals into men, and vice versa." Here, however, one must remember that Photius is, to all appearances, merely describing the objects of Lucius' belief, and referring not necessarily to separate stories. He has no definite equivalent for *varias fabulas*; and the apparent correspondence noted by Helm loses all force as an argument when we recall that Photius' words correspond equally as well, and more fully, with *Met.* ii. 1, where Lucius openly professes his belief in metamorphoses and names the varieties.

That the greater part, at least, of the prologue did not come from the original is perfectly evident. The biographical statements must refer either to Apuleius or to Lucius. If they refer to Apuleius they must have originated with him. If they refer to Lucius, it is equally obvious that they could not have stood in the Greek original, because Lucius is made to apologize for his *Latin* style. We are plainly told that Lucius' native speech was Greek, that he learned Latin with difficulty, that the reader must pardon him for imperfection in the use of a foreign, i.e., Latin tongue, *si quid exotici ac forensis sermonis rudis locutor offendero*. Furthermore, we know from the epitome of the *Μεταμορφώσεις* (i.e., the Lucianic *Ὅρος*) and from Photius, that Lucius' home was Patrae, not Corinth, etc., as Apuleius has it. Finally, one wonders what the words *fabulam Graecanicam*, so appropriate in a Latin translation, could have meant in the Greek original. If the biographical and greater part of the prologue is Apuleian addition, the same is very likely to be true of the remainder, the first sentence. It is not until he has finished this preface that Apuleius explicitly introduces the Greek story, and this story begins at precisely the same point, and in practically the same words, as the Greek epitome. Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the original began at the same point.

The words *figuras fortunasque* look like a gloss on the title, intended to explain it in the usual sense. As a matter of fact, all of the *variae fabulae*, save that of Lucius, deal with changed fortunes; but since there is at least one change of form, Apuleius can fairly say *figuras fortunasque*. Such unnecessary glosses, or explanations of the Greek text, are quite in the Apuleian manner, and might be illustrated at length.

¹ *Διάφοροι* probably does not belong in the original title. The word is conventional with Photius in speaking of *λόγοι, μελέται, ἐπιστολαί*, etc., and in almost no case can it be assigned with probability to the original title of a book. See Bürger, *De Lucio Patrensi*, p. 4.

We may translate *διάφοροι* as "different," or merely "several" (so Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*), for it appears to be used here, as often, simply for the want of a definite numeral. Perhaps Photius' MS read *Μεταμορφώσεων [λόγος] ἅ*, in the manner of the MS ϕ of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (Helm

λόγοις καινοτομίαν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν διώκει τὴν ἐν τοῖς διηγήμασι τερατείαν καὶ ὡς ἂν τις εἴποι, ἄλλος ἐστὶ Λουκιανός.¹ οἱ δὲ γε πρῶτοι αὐτοῦ δύο λόγοι μόνον οὐ μετεγράφησαν Λουκίῳ ἐκ τοῦ Λουκιανοῦ λόγου ὃς ἐπιγέγραπται Λούκις ἢ Ὀνος.² ἢ ἐκ τῶν Λουκίου λόγων Λουκιανῶ. ζοῦκε δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ Λουκιανὸς μεταγράφοντι ὅσον εἰκάζειν. τίς γὰρ χρόνῳ πρεσβύτερος οὐπω ἔχομεν γνῶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πλάτους τῶν Λουκίου λόγων ὁ Λουκιανὸς ἀπολεπτύνας καὶ περιελών, ὅσα μὴ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον χρήσιμα σκοπόν, αὐταῖς τε λέξεσι καὶ συντάξεσιν εἰς ἓνα τὰ λοιπὰ συναρμόσας λόγον Λούκις ἢ Ὀνος ἐπέγραψε τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποσυληθέν. γέμει δὲ ὁ ἑκατέρου λόγος πλασμάτων μὲν μυθικῶν, ἀρρητοποιίας δὲ αἰσχροῦς· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Λουκιανὸς σκώπτων καὶ διασύρων τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ τοῦτον συνέταττεν, ὁ δὲ Λούκιος σπουδάζων τε καὶ πιστὰς νομίζων τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλλήλους μεταμορφώσεις τὰς τε ἐξ ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀνάπαλιν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον τῶν παλαιῶν μύθων ὕβλον καὶ φλῆναφον γραφῇ παρεδίδου ταῦτα καὶ συνήφαινε.³

In this review I find nothing that necessitates the opinion that the *Μεταμορφώσεις* contained more than one story relating to change. It is the regular practice of Photius in the *Bibliotheca* to make clear to his brother the general contents of the books he

ad loc.). But even if it be insisted that *διάφοροι* means "different" in the fullest sense of the word, there is still no necessity for the assumption that the books were different in the exact sense that they each contained a separate story involving a metamorphosis. The first two books, at least, were not *διάφοροι* in that sense, as Photius himself testifies.

¹ There is good reason to believe that the real author actually was Lucian; see chapter v of my dissertation, *The Metamorphoses Ascribed to Lucius of Patrae*, New York, 1920 (Stechert).

² Λούκις is doubtless a corrupted form of Λούκιος. The MSS of the *Ὀνος*, with the exception of one used by Courier, read Λούκιος, both in the title and in the text.

³ It is now generally agreed—and the evidence seems conclusive—that both Apuleius and the author of the *Ὀνος* derived their versions of the *Luciad* independently and directly from the lost work of Lucius; that the *Ὀνος* is a mere epitome of the original story; and that the Latin *Metamorphoses* has been abundantly and fancifully interpolated by Apuleius. Cf. Schanz, *Röm. Litt.*³ III, pp. 108–9; W. Schmid, *B.Ph.W.*, 1919, sp. 167. It is likewise almost certain that the real author was not Lucius, for Lucius is the name of the ass in both derivative versions (cf. Schanz, *op. cit.*, p. 106). The book was probably anonymous at one time, and someone, probably before Photius' time, mistook the literary protagonist in the text, who relates the story in the first person, for the actual author—just as Augustine and Adlington did in reading Apuleius. There is no reason to believe that the original *Μεταμορφώσεις* was essentially different in tone from the two extant derivatives. Lucius of the text is, of course, a credulous character, who believes in the reality of all kinds of metamorphoses (see the passages quoted below); and in the mind of Photius this person was identical with the real author. Cf. Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff.

describes.¹ By mentioning the close similarity of the *Μεταμορφώσεις* to the *Όνος* he thereby defines the contents of the former. About other stories he says nothing. Their existence has been *inferred*—chiefly from the plural title and Photius' reference to the first two books. The plural can be well explained otherwise than as referring to separate stories, as I shall hereafter point out. The words *οι δέ γε πρώτοι αὐτοῦ δύο λόγοι*, etc., do not say that *only* the first two books were similar to the *Όνος*. It is quite possible that Photius is here speaking with reserve, that he does not wish to commit himself in a statement relating to the whole book. Inasmuch as he had already read the same story (including the *ἀρρητοποιῖα*) in the *Όνος*, it is quite possible, nay probable, that the good patriarch quit reading at the end of the second book.² Or, if he did read the book through, he may mean to say that the resemblance to the *Όνος* was particularly close in the first two books. These interpretations are certainly quite possible, and I do not believe that they do the slightest violence to the Greek; translate *δέ γε* any way you please.

Further on Photius tells us that Lucius was serious and believed in metamorphoses of various kinds. Hereupon Helm oversteps the mark, when he credits Photius with saying that the *book itself* contained such stories of change.³ Photius does not say this. He is, to all appearances, merely mentioning *the things in which Lucius believed*, and he might have expressed himself in the same words after reading Lucius' remarks in the Latin *Metamorphoses* or the *Όνος*.⁴

It should be clear from what has been said that we are under no necessity of accepting the traditional interpretation of *cod.* 129 in so far as it relates to the contents of the lost *Μεταμορφώσεις*. Photius' words certainly admit of another interpretation.⁵ The old inter-

¹ Cf. *Bibl.*, Praef. 1^o: Χρησιμεῖσαι δέ σοι δηλονότι τὰ ἐκδομένα εἰς τε κεφαλαιώδη μνήμην καὶ ἀνάμνησιν τῶν εἶτε (εἶτι?) κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἀναλεξάμενος ἐπῆλθες, etc. See also *codd.* 130, 188, 189 where Photius briefly describes collections of *παράδοξα* and mentions the various headings and classifications.

² *ἀνεγνώσθη* is a stereotyped formula in the *Bibliotheca*, and need not mean that Photius read the book entire. See *cod.* 41 where, after using this formula at the beginning as usual, he says, near the end of his review, that he has read only half of the book; likewise in *cod.* 97.

³ Helm, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

⁴ See below.

⁵ In two MSS of the *Όνος*, Vat. 90 (Γ) of the tenth century, and Ven. A, the following inscription is found at the end: Λουκιανοῦ ἐπιτομή τῶν Λουκίου *Μεταμορφώσεων*.

pretation sounds very plausible, to be sure, and if, as scholars have unconsciously assumed, the whole problem were merely one of interpreting Photius, I should be willing to let it stand. But other factors tend strongly against it.¹ We know that the story of Lucius, generally supposed to have been confined to the first two books of the original work, was at least sixty (Teubner) pages long, more probably eighty or ninety. The epitome itself (the *Όνος*) is thirty-five pages in length, and if we add to that the supplementary chapters in Apuleius which deal only with the adventures of Lucius, and which all scholars are agreed come from the *Μεταμορφώσεις*, we may estimate the length of the original story at approximately seventy-five pages.² Now this is altogether too long for the first item in a collection. Imagine, if you can, what the whole book would be like on that scale. It would be, to say the least, an anomaly in ancient literature, and Photius could scarcely have failed to call attention to it more explicitly, even if the other stories severally were much shorter. And it does not matter much what sort of stories we imagine to have made up the remainder of this supposed collection, whether they were comic tales of transformation like that of Lucius, or whether they were taken from ancient mythology, in any case a violation of taste and proportion must be assumed that is hard to reconcile with an author writing before the time of Apuleius and in a style which Photius (no mean critic in such matters) describes as *σαφής τε καὶ καθαρός*.

In another part of his *Bibliotheca*, Photius classes the *Μεταμορφώσεις* with the romances of Antonius Diogenes, Lucian's *True History*, Iamblichus, Heliodorus, and Achilles Tatius, then adds immediately that Diogenes appears to have been the root and source of Lucian and Lucius (= *Μεταμορφώσεις*).³ It seems clear that

Rohde thought this a mere echo from Photius. If so, it is at any rate noteworthy that the scribes, or scribe, understood Photius to mean that the *Όνος* is an epitome of the entire *Μεταμορφώσεις*. Such is the obvious meaning of the inscription. Of course the statement *may* be based upon first-hand knowledge.

¹ Cf. Perry, *op. cit.*, chap. iii, for a fuller discussion.

² Forty pages is the total length of the chapters in Apuleius assigned by Bürger to the original, and not found in the *Όνος*. These chapters are: *Met.* i. 3. 4. 20; ii. 11-14. 18. 31. 32; iii. 1-18; iv. 24-27; vii. 1-4. 9-13; ix. 3-4. 11-16. 22. 23. 26-28. 39; x. 1.

³ *Cod.* 166. 112^a: καὶ γὰρ τοῦ περὶ ἀληθῶν διηγημάτων Λουκιανοῦ καὶ τοῦ περὶ μεταμορφώσεων Λουκίου πηγὴ καὶ ρίζα δοκεῖ εἶναι τοῦτο (i.e., Antonius' Diogenes' novel).

Photius here regards the *Μεταμορφώσεις* not as a collection but as a single story.

The traditional interpretation of the title *Μεταμορφώσεις* has no doubt been greatly fostered by the analogy of works like that of Ovid. But we should bear in mind that the book in question, whatever it may be assumed to have contained besides the *Luciad*, was in any case more or less *sui generis* and that it, as well as Apuleius' translation, represents a radical departure from literary tradition. The analogy to Ovid and to other books of the same title is therefore quite insignificant, and *Μεταμορφώσεις* comes under the suspicion of having a somewhat unusual meaning.

Now let us suppose that the original work contained only the story of Lucius and that Apuleius has preserved this rather faithfully in its general outlines.¹ We notice in reading that although there is, properly speaking, only one story involving a metamorphosis, yet there is frequent mention of the *phenomenon* itself. For the sake of tracing this motivation, a short outline of the *Luciad*, as it appears in Apuleius and the *"Όνος*, seems necessary at this point.²

On his way to Thessaly Lucius joins company with two other travelers who are disputing about magic. One of them has evidently just finished the narration of some marvelous tale, whereat the other, a blunt sceptic, declares that it is mere nonsense. "You might as well tell me," he exclaims, "that by a magic whisper rivers may run backward in their course, the salt sea freeze, or stars be torn from their orbits." But Lucius, who describes himself as *non quidem curiosum sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima*,³

¹ There is no doubt that he has made many minor alterations, additions, and omissions even in the main story.

² Although they are by no means essential to my purpose, I have included in this outline two stories of doubtful origin, that of Aristomenes, *Met.* i. 5-19, and Thelyphron, ii. 21-30. Bürger, *op. cit.*, p. 28, excludes the former from the original work on what seems to me very good grounds. But at the same time he shows equally good reasons for believing that some other short story originally stood in the place of it. As to Thelyphron's tale, Bürger is doubtful, but inclines to reject it as not bearing very closely on the fortunes of Lucius. Perhaps here also Apuleius has substituted rather than added. In both cases, of course, we know nothing certain. The original story may have had more discussion of metamorphoses than Apuleius, or it may have had less. But it is certain, from the agreement of both derivatives (cf. *infra*), that references to the subject were fairly numerous in the original, and that Lucius was represented as an ardent student of miracles of this sort.

³ *Met.* i. 2.

eagerly urges the story-teller to continue, at the same time deprecating the stubborn attitude of the sceptic. The short story of Aristomenes, which then follows, relates to the marvelous powers of a certain witch, Meroe. Besides making a walking skeleton of poor Socrates, this Meroe is said to have metamorphosed one of her lovers into a beaver, another into a frog, and still another into a ram. At the end of the story the sceptic laughs scornfully and asks Lucius whether he believes it. Lucius says he does: *ego vero nihil impossibile arbitror*.¹ By this time the travelers have reached their destination, Lucius having been carried along more by his ears, as Apuleius says, than by his horse. On arriving at Hypata our hero is inflamed with a great zeal for investigating magic, especially metamorphoses: *suspensus alioquin et voto simul et studio, curiose singula considerabam. nec fuit in illa civitate quod aspiciens id esse crederem, quod esset, sed omnia prorsus ferali murmure in aliam effigiem translata, ut et lapides, quos offenderem, de homine duratos et aues, quas audirem, indidem plumatas et arbores, quae pomerium ambirent, similiter foliatis et fontanos latices de corporibus humanis fluxos crederem. . . . Sic attonitus, immo vero cruciabili desiderio stupidus nullo quidem initio vel omnino vestigio cupidinis meae reperto cuncta circumibam tamen*.² At length he meets his kinswoman, Byrrrena, who, on learning where Lucius is staying, gravely cautions him against his hostess, "For she is a witch of the first rank and can merge the world in the darkness of Tartarus at her will. She changes her lovers into rocks, into cattle, into all kinds of animals. Beware, Lucius, beware."³ But nothing could please Lucius more than this discovery that his own hostess is skilled in magic.⁴ He leaves Byrrrena abruptly and hastens home, saying to himself as he goes: "Come now, Lucius,

¹ Met. i. 20.

² Ibid. ii. 1-2. Cf. "Ὅνος 4, ἐπεθύμουν δὲ σφόδρα μείνας ἐν ταῦθα ἐξευρεῖν τινα τῶν μαγεύειν ἐπισταμένων γυναικῶν καὶ θεάσασθαι τι παράδοξον, ἢ περὶ μεννῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ λιθομένων. καὶ τῷ ἔρωτι τῆς θεᾶς ταύτης, οὐδὲς ἑμαυτὸν περιήειν τὴν πόλιν, ἀπορῶν μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ζητήματος, ὅμως δὲ περιήειν."

³ Met. ii. 5: "Ὅνος 4, καὶ πολλοὺς μετεμόρφωσεν εἰς ζῷα, τοὺς δὲ τέλειον ἀπώλεσε."

⁴ Met. ii. 6: *At ego curiosus alioquin, ut primum artis magicae semper optatum nomen audivi tantum a cautela Pamphiles afui ut etiam ultro gestirem tali magisterio me tolens ampla cum mercede tradere et prorsus in ipsum barathrum saltu concito praecipitare*; "Ὅνος 5, ἐγὼ δὲ πισθόμενος ὅτι τὸ πάλαί μοι ζητούμενον οἶκος παρ' ἐμοὶ κἀθηται, προσείχον αὐτῇ οὐδὲν ἔτι."

look lively and don't fail yourself. You have the longed-for opportunity. That which you have long prayed for will come to pass, and you will be able to satisfy your soul with miracles. Get acquainted with this maid Fotis and you shall learn what you wish, for servants always know their masters' secrets."¹ From here on to ii. 18 the conquest of Fotis claims a large part of the reader's attention; but we must not forget that it was undertaken expressly for the purpose of investigating magic and metamorphoses, and not primarily from a libidinous motive.² The episode is interrupted by a conversation with his host, Milo, about prophets and prophecy, wherein Lucius expresses the most naïve faith in a certain Chaldaean, Diophanes, who had told his fortune. This Diophanes, for a handsome financial consideration, had foretold that Lucius would become the subject of a marvelous story and that books would be written about him. At this Milo smiles indulgently and, after relating a short anecdote of how Diophanes had been robbed of his pay by a shrewd merchant, ends with the remark, *Sed tibi plane, Luci domine, soli omnium Chaldaeus ille vera dixerit!* Reference to various metamorphoses is again made at Byrrhena's banquet (ii. 22) in the short tale of Thelyphron, and on his way home Lucius meets the three supposed robbers, who, as we learn afterwards, were goat-skins made into men accidentally by the magic art of Pamphile. As a result of these *metamorphoses*, Lucius, the credulous investigator, the author of histories, and brother of a prophet, is publicly sacrificed to the great god Laughter. But still he is not satisfied. He implores Fotis to reveal to his eyes the arts of her mistress, and Fotis consents.³ A few days afterward she announces that Pamphile is about to change herself into a bird, and she causes Lucius to witness the sight in person. Thereupon Lucius himself wishes to be changed into a bird, "For I wished to learn," says he, "whether, if changed into a bird, I should also have the soul of a bird."⁴ But the experiment proves fatal, for Lucius soon finds himself changed into an ass, and the rest of the story is taken up

¹ *Met.*, loc. cit., note *fabulis miris explorare pectus*. See "Ovos 5, for the saying that servants know their masters' secrets.

² Cf. "Ovos 5; 11.

³ *Met.* iii. 19. 21; "Ovos 12, where Lucius again speaks of his long-felt desire to witness a metamorphosis.

⁴ "Ovos 13.

largely with his adventures in this guise. Finally, after regaining his proper form, he is said to have been metamorphosed from a good and useful beast into an ape.¹

I have tried to outline fairly and without exaggeration the efficient motif of the *Luciad* as it is presented in Apuleius and the *"Oros"*. It will be observed that this motif has much to do with the general subject of metamorphoses. It is Lucius' interest in metamorphoses that brings about his ludicrous experiences, and it is through the agency of metamorphoses that he becomes a victim of the god Risus. In effect, the whole story seems to be a humorous and ironical, though good-natured, commentary on metamorphoses and the students of magic, illustrated by much discussion of the subject in general, by numerous references to concrete instances, and finally by the huge farce of Lucius' own transformation into an ass, and, before the curtain falls, back into an ape! Herein, it seems to me, lies the proper explanation of the plural title. "Metamorphoses" is intended, not in a concrete sense as referring to different stories of change, but in a *generic* sense implying some reflections upon and illustration of the general subject. We need not expect a number of stories of change in Apuleius any more than we should expect to find a number of ghost stories in Ibsen's play. In both cases the plural title is used only to suggest an important motif.²

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¹ *"Oros* 56, ἐς πίθηκον μεταμορφωθείς.

² These considerations, and the fact that the protagonist in the original story was represented as a writer and as an investigator of marvels, seem to me good presumptive evidence that the story, in its broad outlines, was intended to be satirical as well as entertaining. H. Werner (*Hermes*, LIII [1918], 225 ff.) points out that the ego-narrative and the biographical details of *"Oros* 55 are a stock feature of what Reitzenstein calls *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen*, usually intended to lend an air of credibility to a marvelous tale. But this is merely a matter of technic, and does not prove that the passage in question was intended soberly rather than satirically. If, as seems likely, our author was poking a little fun at writers on *mirabilia*, he would very naturally use their technic, in the same way that Lucian uses it in the *Vera Historia*, and after the manner of satirists in general. Of course the story is not primarily a satire in the sense that it is polemical throughout, like Lucian's *Philopseudes*. But it is hard to imagine an ancient writer describing the transformation of an author into an ass without intending it more as a satire than as a *Wundergeschichte*. The *Metamorphoses*, or rather its Greek original may at any rate be regarded as the burlesque counterpart of serious works by the same title. It bears essentially the same relation to works of the Ovidian type, and to *Wundererzählungen* generally, that the *Saturae* of Petronius bears to the Greek erotic romance, the *Batrachomyomachia* to the *Iliad*, or *Don Quixote* to *Amadis of Gaul*. To classify the author of the *Μεταμορφώσεις* with the *Paradozographi*, as Reitzenstein does, is surely a mistake.

THE *CIRIS* AND OVID: A STUDY OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE POEM

BY R. F. THOMASON

I. INTRODUCTION¹

Some twenty-five poems, known as the Vergilian Appendix, and attributed by the ancients to the youthful Vergil, have come down to us in inferior manuscripts, but not in the great Vergilian codices. Among the best known of these poems are three short epics, the *Culex*, the *Aetna* and the *Ciris*.² For centuries the most competent

¹ The present study has been prepared under the direction of Professor R. S. Radford, of the University of Tennessee, who has generously placed at my disposal his own large acquaintance with Ovid and the Vergilian and Tibullan Appendices, and has made many valuable suggestions both with respect to the literature of the subject and to the most effective methods of treatment. The conclusions to which the present study of the *Ciris* has led me are in full accord with the views which he has maintained respecting the Ovidian authorship of the whole Vergilian Appendix.

² Professor Radford contributes the following note: "Between the *Ciris* and the *Aetna* the closest possible connection is found to exist. Growing weary of the emptiness of a political career (vs. 2), the youthful poet of the *Ciris* has just begun the grand tour, the eager pilgrimage, the 'archaeological journey' which was the fond desire of every educated Roman, and coming first to Athens (see below, p. 242) he sketches with a bold hand in the opening lines of the poem some of the most salient characteristics of the famous city, notably the four great schools of philosophy and the Panathenaic festival (vss. 3-34). He is keenly alive to all new impressions, and soon breaks out into an enthusiastic reference to the 'gleaming shores of Attica, shining afar with roseate shells' (100-103). He shows also little of the personal reserve that characterizes a Homer, a Vergil, or a Shakespeare, and hence he informs us confidently and frankly that, by means of severe study in the 'Attic garden' (vs. 3), he is now fitting himself to compose at an early date a great philosophical poem in the lofty manner of Lucretius (36-41). The thoroughgoing scientific poem promised in the *Ciris* undoubtedly lies before us in the *Aetna*, and the poem opens (9-92) with the same condescending and disparaging attitude toward the mythology to which we had become habituated in the proemium of the *Ciris* (14-22, 35-41, 54-89). After a powerful and moving declamation in this vein upon the worthlessness of poetic fable and the 'lies that poets tell' (a passage which is identical in part with the brilliant and witty arraignment of the poet's inventive genius contained in *Am.* 3, 12, 19-43), four hundred and fifty close-packed lines of minute volcanic theory and exposition follow—interrupted by a single eloquent and stirring digression upon the grandeur of scientific study (223-83)—and the reader is on the point of mastering all the secrets of mighty Aetna, including the phenomena of the lava-stone and the lava-stream, when presto our brilliant poet suddenly returns with amazing energy and concentration to the subject of the 'archaeological journey,' which appears to him now of less value than the intensive study of nature, but not too

critics have been agreed that all the poems of the Appendix are spurious,¹ with the possible exception of one or two very short pieces which are contained in the *Catalepton* and which purport to give certain personal details. It is usually held, however, that all or nearly all the poems in question belong to the very best period of Roman poetry, the age of Augustus.

In the present study I purpose to examine the language of the *Ciris*, or story of Scylla and Nisus, an epyllion written in the manner of Catullus and of the Greek poets of Alexandria.

More articles have probably been written upon the *Ciris* than upon most books of the *Aeneid*, and it seems quite unnecessary to enumerate all these separate discussions here. Three studies, however, of remarkable excellence cannot be lightly passed over. The first is the discussion by Sillig in his *Epimetrum*,² in which this critic investigates the authorship of the *Ciris* at great length and shows by many conclusive proofs that the poem cannot possibly be the work of Vergil. More than sixty years after Sillig, the distinguished Ovidian scholar, Ganzenmüller, published his masterly study of the *Ciris*,³ an elaborate and comprehensive work, in which he treats almost every phase of the subject with a completeness which often approaches finality. Thus he discusses the biographical details of the poem with great acumen, and in order to exhibit fully the innumerable borrowings which the poem contains from Catullus, Vergil, and Lucre-

valueless to be fully exploited in his poem. The grand tour, it seems, has been completed, and hence he is able, with remarkable vividness, to 'condense into twenty-five lines' (as Sudhaus—on vs. 569—has well observed) 'almost the whole of Pausanias,' and to enumerate with the accuracy of an eye-witness very many of the venerated sites and monuments of 'Ogygian Thebes,' 'Lycurgus' Sparta,' 'Cecropian Athens,' and 'Ilion's ashes.' That this archaeological knowledge and enthusiasm agrees entirely with Ovid's known biographical data, may be clearly seen from the exposition which I have given elsewhere (*Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, 1920, pp. 160 f., and 1921, p. 160). In addition to the *Aetna Catal.* ix is also most closely joined to the *Ciris*, vide P. Jahn, *Rh. Mus.*, 1908, p. 100."

¹ See, e.g., the unfavorable reviews of Frank's "Vergil" by Prescott in *Class. Phil.*, XVII (1922), 275 f., by Pease in *Class. Jour.*, XVIII (1923), 443 f., and by Aly in *Phil.*, *Wochenschr.*, XLIII (1923), 268 ff.; also the review of Rand's "Young Virgil's Poetry" by Güthling, *ibid.*, 178 f.

² In the Heyne-Wagner edition of Vergil, Vol. IV, pp. 137-57, Leipzig, 1832. Ganzenmüller, *Fleckeis. Jahrb. Suppl.*, XX, 555, well says: "Ueberhaupt hat seit Silligs Ausführungen wohl niemand mehr im Ernst an Vergil gedacht."

³ "Beiträge zur *Ciris*," *Fleckeis. Jahrb. Supplementbd.*, XX (1894), 553-657.

tius, he assembles all—or nearly all—the phrases and word-combinations which are drawn from these poets. He does not stop here, however, but he finds that a fourth great poet is everywhere imitated, namely Ovid, and he collects very many of the almost innumerable "imitations" of Ovid which are contained in the *Ciris*. The full argument of the eminent Ovidian scholar may be stated in a somewhat abbreviated form as follows:

Since Teuffel the view has been almost universally accepted that the Messalla¹ to whom the poem is addressed (vs. 36) is Messalinus, the son of the famous orator, and that the poem itself was composed 18-16 B.C. The supposition is therefore natural that our poet has not known and has not used Ovid. I hope, however, to be able to show that this was by no means the case. . . . Since certain phrases and verse-closes have become the common property of the Roman poets, the power of proof belongs exclusively to those expressions which are found only in the *Ciris* and in Ovid and then perhaps in later writers also (pp. 557 f.). . . . Numerous half-verses, verse-beginnings and verse-closes as well as other expressions and word combinations give the *Ciris* an unmistakable Ovidian coloring. The frequency of these coincidences and the fact that they occur in all the works of Ovid alike—the earliest as well as the latest—show clearly that Ovid is not himself the imitator. . . . Rather is it obvious that the author of the *Ciris*, this superlative plagiarist, has known the whole of Ovid, and while

¹ The poet of the *Ciris* does not address any one of the patrons of Vergil, but dedicates his poem to "Messalla" (vs. 36). As is well known, none of the *Vitae* of Vergil ever bring him into the least connection with Messalla, and Vollmer (*Sitz. bayer. Akad.*, 1907, p. 370) labors painfully and almost pathetically to explain away this significant fact. Since *Catal.* ix is also addressed to the famous Messalla, it has long been recognized by authoritative critics as a certain and definite conclusion that the whole Appendix proceeds from a poet—or poets—belonging to the literary circle of Messalla (vide Baehrens, *Tib. Blätter*, 49-53; *PLM*, II, 27; *Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Päd.*, CXI (1875), 144; L. Müller, *RM*, 34 and *praef. Priap.*, XLI; Teuffel-Kroll, *Röm. Lit.*, § 229, 1; Plessis, *Poés. lat.*, 260; cf. Plésent, *Culex* (Étude), p. 290, n. 3). Némethy, in the excellent account which he gives of the intimate relations of Ovid with Messalla (*De Ovidio Elegiae in Messallam Auctore*, Budapest, 1909, pp. 3-6), rightly emphasizes (p. 5) the striking reference to the boy Messalinus which is contained in *Catal.* ix, vs. 44. At a later date not only is the *Ciris* dedicated to him, but his election as quindecimvir forms the chief subject of [*Tib.*] ii. 5. Three of the letters of the exile are also addressed to Messalinus (*Ov. P.* 1. 7; 2. 2; *T.* 4. 4), as well as eight to his younger brother, Cotta. I may add that if we once recognize the *Ciris* as the work of Ovid, even if all other criteria for determining the date of the poem were lacking, we should still know easily that its composition preceded that of the *Ars Amatoria*, which was published before 2 A.D.; for in the latter work we find the poet referring casually and familiarly to the "city of Alcathous" (i.e., Megara), the scene of his youthful song. Cf. *Ci.* 105 f. stat Megara Alcathoi (codd.: acthei) quondam munita labore, | Alcathoi Phoebeique; *A.A.* 2. 421 Alcathoi qui mittitur urbe Pelasga | bulbus; *M.* 8. 7 in urbe | Alcathoi; *M.* 7. 443 ad Alcathoen; *T.* 1, 10, 9 Alcathoi e moenibus.

he has allowed himself an open, unconcealed borrowing from Vergil, he has resorted to a more hidden and shamefaced imitation of Ovid, as though the expressions and phrases which he had read in the latter, had clung to his memory and had reproduced themselves involuntarily and in spite of himself, since he was unable to resist the magic of the Ovidian poetry and its potent influence [pp. 622 f.].¹

Ganzenmüller has assembled, so far as one can judge, about eighty-five striking phrases and collocations (including a few exceptional or unusual single words), which as a rule are common only to Ovid and the *Ciris*.² This latter poem, as is well known, imitates the whole of the *Aeneid*, and also exhibits the metrical characteristics of the early Augustan age.³ It has therefore long been the almost universal judgment of scholars that it was composed very *shortly after the death of Vergil* and in the years 18–16 B.C.; we may add that this is precisely the date at which Ovid, on reaching the age of twenty-five, renounced the senatorial rank (*Trist.* 4, 10, 35) and betook himself to Athens for the purpose of literary and philosophical study (*Ibid.* 1, 2, 77).⁴ Since, however, Ganzenmüller finds striking and frequent

¹ "Nur hat er den Ovid im Vergleich zu Vergil mehr versteckt, verschämt nachgeahmt, oft wohl auch unbewusst." It should be added that, in his view of the close relation between Ovid and the *Ciris*, Ganzenmüller had been preceded in large part by another thoroughly competent Ovidian critic, A. Zingerle (*Kl. philol. Abh.*, III, Innsbruck, 1882, pp. 24–30), who gave many striking examples of the dependence of one poet upon the other. If therefore Drachmann (*Hermes*, LXIII, 425) expressly declares that "all attempts to show the knowledge of the poem in other poets than Vergil are failures," this is but another proof of his wholly inadequate preparation for this field of research (see below, p. 247). For where Ovidian study is concerned, a Drachmann or even a Sudhaus (cf. *Hermes*, XLII, 476, n. 1) should not match himself too confidently against a Zingerle and a Ganzenmüller: *sutor ne ultra crepidam!* On the remarkable similarity (first noted by Sillig) between the two nurse-scenes in the *Ciris* and in Ovid's story of Myrrha (*Met.* x. 382 ff.), see Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII (1907), p. 490.

² A smaller number of phrases occur in one other poet only.

³ L. Müller, *R.M.* 3, 22, 78.

⁴ That the *Ciris* was written at Athens (*Cecropius hortulus*, vs. 3), was the universal judgment of scholars for centuries (cf., e.g., Skutsch, *Aus Vergils Frühzeit*, p. 82). It was reserved for Vollmer in 1907 to suggest in a footnote of three lines (*op. cit.*, 370, n. 5), without any semblance of argument or evidence, that the "Greek original" might perhaps ("etwa . . . wohl") receive the credit for this part of the prooemium, but it is difficult to dispose in this summary manner of the twenty-four unbroken lines (12–35) which celebrate eagerly the four philosophical schools ("Wisdom's four ancient heirs," v. 15), and constitute at the same time the *locus classicus*—for Roman times—on the peplus as borne in the Panathenaic procession and adorned with the victories of Athena (Minerva) over the Giants! In other parts of the poem also, as Ganzenmüller has so elaborately shown (pp. 639 f.), our author exhibits the most intimate and

coincidences of expression between the *Ciris* and all the works of Ovid, including the very latest, he is led to reject the received date of its composition, and he conjectures instead that it was written *shortly after Ovid's death*, and about the year 19 A.D., by an admiring disciple (*op. cit.*, 623, 656).

Whatever we may think of the particular conclusion reached respecting the date of the poem, there can be no doubt that Ganzmüller's study is a veritable masterpiece of its kind, and as such it excited at first unbounded admiration among scholars seriously interested in the study of the Vergilian Appendix. The mystery relative to the actual author had not, however, been solved, and when shortly afterwards the prolonged Skutsch-Leo controversy broke out in Germany over the *Ciris*, the attention of critics was directed to a wholly different point. Skutsch, as is well known, maintained that Gallus, the founder of the subjective erotic elegy, was the author of the poem, and that, in compliment to his friend, Vergil had borrowed from Gallus the twenty or more lines which his works have in common with the *Ciris*. After a ten years' debate nothing came of Skutsch's contention,¹ yet we should freely recognize that his thesis constituted a great advance upon the long-discarded Vergilian theory,

loving acquaintance with both the sites and the usages of Attica. Since Vollmer's sleight of hand performance, however, the ordinary rules of evidence seem largely to have been set aside in certain quarters in the case of our poem; therefore it seems unnecessary to combat seriously the curious speculations of Frank (*Class. Phil.* XV [1920], 106-14) and of DeWitt (*ibid.*, XVII [1922], 104-10), which would connect the *Ciris* closely with Naples (!), and which are almost as airy and as unsubstantial in texture as the "baseless fabric of a dream." They are in fact distortions—or at least unwarranted extensions—of the very careful and guarded statements which the cautious and wary Birt (*Catalepton*, p. 17) makes with respect to a possible acquaintance between Vergil and the philosopher Siron at Naples ("vielleicht auch in Neapel . . . anscheinend in Zusammenhang mit Neapel"). The poet who wrote the *Ciris* with all its manifold allusions to Attica and to "learned Athens" (*Ov. H.* 2, 83) was the same, we may be sure, who in after years remembered so well in his various works the theoretical teachings (at least) of Pythagoras, Heraclitus and the Stoa, and who never forgot the "flowers that bloom on Hymettus" and the violet hues that its rosy peaks assume both at sunrise and sunset (*A.A.* 3, 687 *prope purpureos colles florentis Hymetti*; *M.* 7, 702 *vertex de summo semper florentis Hymetti | Lutea mane videt Aurora*).

¹ Thus Witte, a pupil of Skutsch's, writes (*Hermes*, LVII [1922], 576): Wir können nicht länger bestreiten, dass der Streit um die *Ciris* gegen Skutsch entschieden worden ist." Mackail, however, in his recent booklet (*Vergil and His Meaning*, Boston, 1922, p. 55), still attributes the poem to Gallus, and seems unaware of the present views of scholars.

in that it attributed the epyllion to a genuine love poet of the Catullan and neoteric school, such as Gallus undoubtedly was, but such as we have no right to assume Vergil ever to have been in any shape or form. Ganzenmüller's solution meanwhile had been almost completely forgotten except by a few critics of superior acumen, such as Némethy, Klotz, and the veteran Birt.¹ Yet, in my judgment, Ganzenmüller in all his study has committed only a single error, and that one of a purely technical nature. The evidence which he so carefully assembled did not justify the positive conclusion that the *Ciris* was composed after Ovid's death by an imitator. Clearly he should first have concluded that the poem was *either* written by Ovid himself in his youth *or* by some imitator after his death, and then he should have proceeded carefully to weigh these alternatives and to decide between them. Ganzenmüller was wholly unable, however, to surmount two serious difficulties, which obscured for him the first alternative: (1) Ovid's youthful works—with the exception of the *Hal.*, the *Medic.*, the *Consolatio*, the first *Amores*, and the six double *Epistles* (*Her.* xvi-xxi)—had all been published anonymously or pseudonymously, as Gruppe (1838) and Némethy (1909) were the first to perceive in part. (2) For centuries critics had lost fifteen entire years out of the Pelignian poet's productive life and artistic development, and the result had been to produce as great turmoil and confusion as if (for example) Shakespeare's greatest works, *Hamlet* and *King Lear*, had been wrested from his thirty-ninth and forty-third years respectively, and violently transferred to his twenty-fourth and his twenty-eighth years.² Furthermore, while Ganzenmüller

¹ Thus Schanz (*Röm. Lit.*, II, 1³, p. 98, n. 2) summarily dismisses the whole study and the proof of a "hidden, shamefaced" dependence upon Ovid, solely upon the ground that it would make the poem fall in the year 19 A.D. Némethy, however, both in his edition (e.g., p. 18) and in *Rh. Mus.*, LXII, 484 everywhere follows Ganzenmüller only too literally. Klotz also follows him very closely in a recent article in *Hermes* (LVII [1922], 588-99), which shows careful study and reflection, but adds only a little to his predecessor's great collection of material. Birt, though greatly undervaluing P. Jahn's proof of the dependence of *Met.* viii upon the *Ciris*, well says in his *Kritik u. Hermeneutik*, p. 240 (Müller's *Handbuch*, I, 3, München 1913): "For the *Ciris* we must still always go back to the work of Ganzenmüller whose most searching, and thoroughgoing studies cannot be ignored. . . . I believe like him, that the *Ciris* stands under Ovidian influence."

² This forcible transfer to the juvenile period of consummate masterpieces like the second *Amores* and *Heroides* i-xv, which show a wholly perfected art in respect both

rendered most valuable service in establishing the intimate relation existing between the *Ciris* and Ovid, yet in adopting the view that the poem was composed in 19 A.D., he assumed a most improbable date for a work which (as all agree) is almost entirely dependent upon Catullus and the neoteric school, and which clearly belongs in its metrical characteristics to the early Augustan age.¹

It is needless to remark that, in the course of the Skutsch-Leo controversy, valuable single observations were made upon the *Ciris* by Skutsch himself, by Leo, Sudhaus, and others, yet the third really important contribution to the study of the poem is that of Paul Jahn (*Rh. Mus.*, LXIII [1908], 79-106). In addition to other valuable results, Jahn shows very clearly that the briefer and the partly different story of Scylla and Nisus which is told by Ovid in *Met.* viii, is dependent in part upon our *Ciris* and often imitates it.²

to the dactylic virtuosity and to very many other equally difficult refinements, is contrary to Ovid's own most express statements (*Am.* ii. 18, 19-26; cf. iii. 15, 7-20), and has been rejected in recent years by many of the best critics, as Jacoby, *Rh. Mus.*, LX (1905), p. 71, and Schanz, *Röm. Lit.*, II, 1³, § 293.

¹ The *Ciris* is of comparatively early date, and hence for the student of versification cannot possess an interest equal to that of the later "metrical experiments" contained in the Appendix, namely, the *Culex*, the *Moretum*, the great *Priapea* and the *Maccenas*. Thus the *Culex*, though very immature in many respects, is metrically much more advanced and shows unmistakably the beginnings of the dactylic virtuosity; cf. Radford, "Tibullus and Ovid," Part II, *AJP*, 1923, p. 233. Yet the *Ciris* exhibits peculiarly Ovidian examples of hiatus which are absent both from Cat. and from Verg. e.g., *Ci.* 424 *O' ego crudelis*; 287 *O' iterum* (cf. Ganz., 633). (*O ego* occurs five times in Ov., one of these cases being in Ovid's own Scylla story: *M.* 8. 51; 9. 487; 2. 520; *P.* 1. 4. 49; *Nux* 159). Also the *Ciris* agrees with Ovid alone in allowing a word of the scansion ~ ~ ~ ~ before the closing quadrisyllable of a spondaic line, as *Ci.* 73 *coniugium castae violaverat Amphitrites* (Ganz., 626 f.). Ovid and the *Ciris* also have the same proportion of Greek words at the close of spondaic lines (66 per cent against Vergil's 55 per cent only), and Klotz has acutely observed (*Hermes*, 1922, p. 598) that, with one exception, all the *σπορδαίοντες* of the *Ciris* that cannot be paralleled in other authors (Verg., Hom., Callim.) can be paralleled in Ovid. Ganzenmüller (p. 633) even discovers in its treatment of synaloepha a distinct advance upon Vergil and an approach toward the stricter system of Ovid. Finally in the proportion of pause at the close of the line (51.3 per cent), the *Ciris* is not only very close to Cat. (50.8 per cent) and Lucr. (about 50 per cent), but is also not far removed from the *Moretum* (47.2 per cent); cf. Drachmann, *Hermes*, 1908, p. 414.

² Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII (1907), p. 476, n. 1, expresses briefly the same view, as also do Ellis, *AJP*, XV (1894), 493, Knaack, *Rh. Mus.* LVII (1902), 221, Teuffel-Kroll, *Röm. Lit.*, II, § 230, 2, n. 1, and Schanz, II, 1³, § 241. The question of the relation of our *Ciris* to the two passages in Propertius which mention the *Ciris* legend (3. 19, 21-28; 4. 4. 39 f.) is of little importance, yet it is not without interest. Jahn's treatment here (*Rh. Mus.*, 1908, pp. 87 ff.) is wholly unsuccessful. The first passage

His exact words are: "Ovid has therefore, I think, known our *Ciris* and read it very carefully for his purpose [p. 86]. . . . Ovid knows and values the *Ciris* [p. 87]." It may be noted in passing that the two or three particulars in which the version which is given in *Met.* viii differs from the story as told in the epyllion,¹ by no means preclude Ovid from being the author of both versions; for, as is well known, he often tells the same story two or three times in his various works, "each time in a different way."²

We may mention finally two articles dealing either wholly or partly with the *Ciris*, which champion the Vergilian authorship of the poem—one by Drachmann (*Hermes*, XLIII [1908], pp. 405–26), and the other by Vollmer (*Sitz. bayer. Akad.*, 1907, pp. 335–74). Drachmann's study contains some valuable material and some acute observations, especially in relation to the treatment of pause in the Latin poets (pp. 413–17)—a subject upon which he has long been a recognized authority, but which, I may add, affects the authorship

mentions (vs. 26) Scylla's punishment in being bound to Minos' ship. It is therefore dependent either upon Parthenius' version or—less probably—upon the first rude draft of our own *Ciris* which its author expressly mentions (cf. *Ci.* 44 f.); since the third book of Prop. was published about 22 B.C., it can bear no possible relation to the completed poem. The second passage is contained in the fourth book which was published about 16 B.C. In the usual manner of the Roman poets (Verg. and Ov. also, whenever the latter is so inclined), it mixes the legend of the two Scyllas. It is possible therefore—yet by no means certain—that it was written (though probably not published) before Prop. had seen the proemium of our *Ciris*, which in composition is the latest part of the poem, and which—for a temporary purpose—expressly protests against the common confusion of the two Scyllas. The disregard of a protest respecting a mythological matter would scarcely have estranged the two friends.

¹ Thus in the *Ciris* Scylla is bound to Minos' ship and dragged through the sea as a punishment for her crime, but in *Met.* viii she leaps of her own accord into the water and swims after the departing ship. Again in the epyllion Minos had apparently promised to marry Scylla in return for the gift of the lock, but in *Met.* viii, after the crime has been committed, he rejects with horror the proffered gift; cf. Kreunen *Proleg. in Cirin*, Utrecht, 1882, p. 84. The latter adopts (pp. 67 f.) the current view that the *Ciris* follows closely Parthenius' Greek version of the story, though Callimachus is also a possibility; see other references in Schanz, § 240, p. 97. It is probable that Ovid's later account goes back to a different original.

² Cf. A.A., 2, 128 (of Ulysses' stories to Calypso): *ille referre aliter saepe solebat idem*. See also G. Krassowsky, *Ovidius quomodo in idem fabulis enarrandis a se ipso discreperit*, Königsberg, 1897; B. Pressler, *De fabulis et in Met. et in Fastis diversum in modum narratis*, Halle, 1903. It will be sufficient, however, to refer the general reader to the widely varying accounts of the "Rape of Proserpina," which are given in the *Met.* (v. 341 ff.) and the *Fasti* (iv. 417 ff.), and which are discussed briefly by Schanz, *Röm. Lit.*, II, 1^a, § 304, p. 327.

of the *Ciris* only very remotely. So far, however, as concerns the discussion of grammatical constructions and of unusual vocabulary, which his article also contains (pp. 418-26), I find myself unable conscientiously to accord his treatment the high praise which several American scholars, such as Frank and Rand, have freely bestowed upon it.¹ This part of the article is, in fact, a scholar's first rough draft of a grammatical study, which produces the impression that it should scarcely have been published in its present incomplete and uncorrected form. The author is himself fully aware of the hasty character of his own production, and writes apologetically as follows (p. 419, n. 1):

I have brought together the following remarks with the aid of the usual helps (lexicons, indices, etc.), as far as was possible (so gut es anging); I had not planned any collections of my own in this field, which in general lies far from my own studies (diesem Gebiete, das meinen Studien überhaupt fernliegt).

According to his own statement, then, Drachmann has undertaken no investigation of his own in a field which was almost wholly unfamiliar to him, and under the circumstances we cannot but wonder that he should have attempted at all to treat the difficult Vergilian Appendix. After actually examining his data, however, we find ourselves wondering also what the particular lexicons and indices were from which he has drawn his material. They were certainly not of a very accurate or trustworthy kind. Thus he cites (p. 422) *ostrum* (*Cir.* 387) as a rare word and as occurring twice in Vergil. In reality it occurs twice in the *Ciris*, fourteen times in Vergil, and five times in Ovid, whom he does not mention at all. Again commenting (p. 420) on *fecit ut esset* (*Cir.* 528), he tells us that this construction "is archaic, but is found here and there in the Augustans." Nothing could be more misleading than this statement; for Ovid has *facio ut* nine times.² Catullus and Propertius use it often, and

¹ Thus Frank (*Class. Philol.*, XV [1920], 103) refers to Drachmann's discussion as "a masterly one," and Rand (*HSCP*, XXX [1919], 146) expressly says: "Drachmann's studies strike me as the best yet written upon the subject." Since Drachmann's article contains in fact many gross inaccuracies, it is evident that both these scholars have read it very hastily and without an opportunity for critical examination.

² "Di facerent, sine patre forem," without *ut*, also occurs in Ovid's own later version (*Met.* viii. 72). Drachmann is also mistaken (p. 423) in saying that *que*—*que* never occurs in the *Cir.*; it is found in verse 338 (*meque deosque*).

Lucr., Hor. and Tib. each have it once. Similarly *facio* with *ne* and an object clause occurs once in Verg. and seven times in Ov.; for complete citations, see below, § x. On *olim cum* (*cum olim*), which occurs *Cir.* 22, he cites Ter., Lucr., Verg., but omits Lygd. 5, 23 f.; [Tib.] ii. 3, 29; Ov. *M.* 4, 65; 11, 508, etc. On *aerumna* (p. 420) he cites Cic., Plaut., Ter., but omits Ov. *T.* 4, 6, 25 (see also below, p. 261); on *adsigno* he quotes only Cic., and omits Catal., Tib. Ap., Hor.; on *appono* he does not mention that Verg., Tib., Prop. each have it once, and Ov. has it thirty times; on *nudo*, "disclose, divulge," he omits Ov. *Am.* 2, 5, 5; on *sordes* he quotes Ov. *A.A.* 1, 519, but omits *Am.* 1, 10, 15. Examples of similar incompleteness might be multiplied, but I trust that it is already clear to the reader that Drachmann's article cannot be justly placed beside the learned and scrupulous studies of the Appendix which have proceeded from such scholars as Sillig, Naeke, Ribbeck, Baehrens, Ganzenmüller, Ellis, Munro, Leo, P. Jahn, Sudhaus, Schanz, Plésent, Holschmidt, Némethy, Radford, Fairclough, Rand,¹ and perhaps from several others.

Drachmann deserves commendation, however, at one point especially. He has illustrated the rare words of the *Ciris* very fully from the comic and tragic poets, including Ennius, Accius, Pacuvius, Afranius and others. This is a very happy circumstance; for not only does poetry almost always admit the free use of archaisms, but Ovid himself in the famous epilogue of the first book of the *Amores* (i. 15, 19 f.), which commemorates the principal Greek and Roman authors, pays a generous and enthusiastic tribute both to Ennius and to Accius, whom he has sincerely loved and often imitated.² Drachmann's comparisons at this point are therefore extremely apposite.

It remains to mention the well-known article of Vollmer published in the *Sitz. bayer. Acad.*, 1907, in support of Vergilian authorship. Every student of the *Appendix* will be sincerely grateful to Vollmer for his fruitful labors as an editor and a diligent restorer of the text, but this fact should not prevent us from recognizing clearly the extremely

¹ I do not of course regard Rand's conclusions with respect to authorship as correct, but his article does contain, in addition to the full literature of the subject, both a brilliant and sound account of the literary development and in part also of the personality of the author of the *Appendix*.

² For other tributes to Ennius, cf. *T.* 2, 423; *A.A.* 3, 409.

hasty and ill-considered character of the article in question. For Vollmer too makes no independent investigation of his own of a positive character, but after refuting several hasty assertions of Jacobs, allows himself the following frank and unabashed confession (p. 362): "I omit other remarks of Sillig upon single words such as *currus* and *natura*, because they prove absolutely nothing respecting the authorship. On my part, moreover, I collect nothing new, because such details give no real help." After this amazing statement with respect to the phraseology of the poem, we cannot be surprised when he tells us expressly that he attaches no importance to such facts as the non-occurrence of *neuter* (*Cir.* 68) in Vergil, or the use for the first time (*Cir.* 383) of *capto* with the infin., although, in point of fact, both Ganzenmüller (p. 607) and Ellis (*AJP*, VIII [1887], 11) had already noted that this remarkable construction occurs also in Ovid. It is not strange then that the American disciples of Drachmann and Vollmer are likewise greatly averse to any detailed study of the language and meter. Thus DeWitt, in the Preface to his *Virgil's Biographia Litteraria* (New York, 1923), says with remarkable frankness: "I am more inclined than before to minimize the importance of stylistic and metrical studies as criteria of date or genuineness."¹

An entirely new view, however, of the authorship of the whole Appendix has lately been put forward. In a series of articles published in recent years Professor Radford, as is well known, has maintained that both the Tibullan and Vergilian Appendices contain the youthful works of Ovid up to his thirty-fifth year.² In agreement with his views I have undertaken a detailed study of the vocabulary and individual words of the *Ciris* in relation both to Ovid and to Vergil, with a view to supplementing Ganzenmüller's proof of Ovidian influence, which is based upon a study of phrases and striking word-combinations. It is scarcely necessary to point out that it was quite impossible for Ganzenmüller in 1894 even to suspect that the *Ciris* was a youthful work of Ovid and to study its language minutely in

¹ It is not unfair to say that, of the American advocates of Vergilian authorship, Rand alone in his very able article (*HSCP*, XXX, 103 ff.) shows genuine interest in the language of the Appendix and in the full literature of the subject.

² See "The Juvenile Works of Ovid," *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LI (1920), 146-71, and "The Priapea and the Vergilian Appendix," *ibid.*, LII (1921), 148-77; also "Tibullus and Ovid," *AJP*, XLIV, 1-26, 230-59; etc.

this connection,¹ since at that time the mature masterpieces, such as the *Amores* and the perfected *Heroides* (i-xv), had long been erroneously transferred to the juvenile period. Again a minute comparison with Vergil could not seem to him in any way desirable or necessary, since the ascription of the poem to this latter had been universally rejected for fully half a century. In recent years, however, as we have already seen, the situation has materially changed, and several well-known scholars, such as Vollmer, Drachmann, Kaffenberger, Conway, Rand, Frank, and DeWitt, have revived the long-forgotten Vergilian hypothesis, partly on purely sentimental and emotional grounds, such as a wish to utilize and exploit the great name of Vergil, and partly also from a natural desire to reach some definite and positive conclusion respecting the authorship of the mysterious Appendix.

The present study includes, first, all words used in the *Ciris* which either do not occur at all in Vergil or occur rarely (136 cases); second, words which occur in Vergil, but with a different meaning or construction (53 cases); third, words which do not occur later in the received corpus of Ovid (48 cases, in addition to eight Greek proper names). I have also examined all the words of the first group to see to what extent they are favorites with Ovid. As regards the words of the second group, I have endeavored to ascertain whether they have the same meaning and construction in Ovid as in the *Ciris*. In treating the third group of words it has been my purpose to show why Ovid later discontinues their use. Some additions are also made to Ganzenmüller's collection of Ovidian phrases, and the striking words which are common only to Ovid and the *Ciris*, or only to Ovid and the *Culex*, among the poets of the Golden Age are clearly shown. I have modeled my study in some respects upon the admirable work of W. Holt Schmidt,² a pupil of Birt's, who has shown that the language of the *Culex* is Ovidian throughout. It is believed that the results obtained, if taken in conjunction with the biographical details of the poem, will go far toward settling finally the mooted question of authorship.

¹ A few striking single words, it should be noted, are treated by Ganz., as *quinquennium* (p. 562), *Pandionius* (p. 572), etc.

² *De Culicis carminis sermone*, Marburg, 1913.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to imagine that the present study is concerned only with minute details. It seeks to exhibit also the general character of the language of the *Ciris* in a broad and comprehensive way. Thus the use of Greek words and forms (§ vii), of color-terms (§ vi), and many newly coined words (§ ix) is shown to be Ovidian. Especially conclusive is the evidence of the many diminutives (§ ix) and erotic terms which are found in the poem. Thus Vergil scarcely ever admits the use even of those words which were *originally* diminutives, such as *capillus* ("little head," "little hair") and *puella*, and prefers to use in their stead the more lofty *coma*, *crinis* and *virgo* (pp. 257-58); *ocellus*, "little eye," which is an especial favorite with Catullus, Propertius, and Ovid, he never employs (p. 258). Furthermore *cupidus*, "eager," "passionate," is purposely shunned by Vergil (only once),¹ who is no love poet in the proper sense of the word, but it is often used both by Catullus and by Ovid (p. 257). The case is similar with *iucundus*, "joyous," "jocund" (only once), which is too gay and bright a word for the grave and stately Vergil (p. 258).² Moreover Vergil usually prefers subdued and moderate colors to bright and glaring ones, i.e. *albus* to *candidus*, *ater* to *niger*, *fulvus* to *flavus*; this is directly opposed to the usage of the *Ciris* and of Ovid (§ vi), and also to that of Catullus.

In a word, as is usually recognized, the *Ciris* is a second edition of the famous sixty-fourth poem of Catullus, and its brilliant, but immature author models himself everywhere principally upon the soft, languishing, and informal language of Catullus (p. 261).³ In short he aptly characterizes his own style with the words *gracilem molli pede claudere versum* (vs. 20). Every observant reader will perceive how widely this elegant and dainty, but often colloquial manner departs from the lofty and majestic language of Vergil, which avoids everything that is familiar and commonplace.

¹ In this one passage (A. 8, 165), as Sillig (on *Cir.* 77) has acutely observed, *cupidus* is used for *cupidus amore*, as often also in the elegiac poets.

² Cf. Tennyson's *Ode to Virgil*: "Thou majestic in thy sadness at the doubtful doom of human kind." On *iucundus*, see the excellent list of Catullus' "fashionable epithets of style and conduct" in Simpson's *Select Poems of Catullus*, p. 184.

³ In a less degree upon the language of Calvus and Cinna (see Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII [1907], 479-504), and doubtless upon that of Valgius also (*Paneg.*, 177).

The *Ciris* is the work of a poet already well versed in the treatment of lighter themes (vss. 20 f., 92-100). It is not quite sufficient therefore to say with Klotz (*Hermes*, LVII [1922], 595) that the diminutives and the erotic expressions which he so freely uses belong to the epyllion in and of itself. Rather the preciosity, the elegance, and the softness of the epyllion style are thoroughly suited to our poet's disposition and temperament, and have long been the salient characteristics of his Muse.¹ It is unnecessary to point out that these characteristics in themselves materially limit and restrict the possible authorship of the poem. Vergil, for example, composed neither the elegy nor the erotic epyllion which is so closely akin to the elegy. Nor yet did he possess either the remarkable fluency or the ready versatility which were the gifts of the gods both to Catullus and to Ovid, but which are by no means an unalloyed boon to those among the sons of men who would fain achieve the highest excellence in literature and in art. Vergil himself attained supreme greatness, not merely from the endowment of native genius or from the possession of a rich fancy, but because—like the “singer of sweet Colonus”—he “saw life clearly and saw it whole,” and because also, like Weimar's “strong much-toiling sage,” with steady and consistent aim he “pursued a lonely way,” his mind fixed on high ideals and well-nigh on a single goal. If he had eagerly cultivated in youth Catullan excess in the use of diminutives, eroticisms and Grecisms, neoteric exuberance of anaphora and of exclamation, Alexandrian love of parallelism, parenthesis and pause at the close of the line,² and if with this equipment he had written the *Ciris* at twenty-five in the lighter vein of Catullus, Calvus, and Cinna, it is highly improbable that he would ever have composed the “divine *Aeneid*” at fifty in the grand and majestic style of Ennius and of Homer. The author of our romantic epyllion is much rather the great disciple and successor of Catullus, who, as competent critics have often observed,³ was so

¹ It is a truism to say that the *Metamorphoses* themselves are for the most part a series of epyllia skilfully joined together; cf. Schanz, pp. 319 f., 326, 384.

² All these characteristics are well treated by May, *De stilo epylliorum Romanorum*. Kiliae, 1910, and the comparison of the epyllion with Ovid is a topic that naturally recurs continually in his discussion, as p. 57 (Grecisms), p. 59 (diminutives), p. 62 (anaphora), p. 80 (parallelism), p. 86 (rhetorical divisions), etc.

³ E.g., Zingerle, *Ovid u. seine Vorgänger*, I, 36; Danysz, *De poetarum Rom. studiis Catull.*, Posnaniae, 1876, p. 18.

similar to his youthful master both in his personal character and in his poetic genius.¹

II. ADDITIONS TO GANZENMÜLLER'S COLLECTION OF PHRASES

Large as is the collection of phrases and striking collocations common to Ovid and the *Ciris*, and occurring in no other author, which Ganzemüller has made,² it is far from being complete and probably includes only about two-thirds of the entire number. I wish to make the following additions to his list, which do not apply, however, to the whole poem, but only to those lines which I have found also to contain distinctive Ovidian words. My examples also enable the reader to see at a glance whether the phrase in question is common to Ovid and the *Ciris* alone, or whether it occurs also in some other poet of the Golden Age. In the first case an asterisk (*) is prefixed to the verse in which the particular phrase is found; where it occurs in one other poet only, a dagger (†) is prefixed. I inclose in parentheses phrases which are extremely frequent in Ovid and which occur only rarely in Vergil:

(Vs. 1: *iactatum laudis amore: laudis amor* occurs three times in Ovid (T. 5, 12, 38; M. 11, 527; P. 4, 7, 40), but also twice in Verg. (A. 7, 496; 5, 394) and once in Hor. (*Epist.* 1, 1, 36); cf. also P. Jahn, *Rhein. Mus.*, LXIII [1908], p. 102). †Vs. 11: *blandum deponere amorem*: Ov. T. 1, 3, 49 *blando patriae amore*. Elsewhere only in Lucr. 1, 19 *blandum per pectora amorem*. *Vs. 21: *sed magno intexens, si fas est dicere*, peplo: Ov. P. 4, 8, 55 *si fas est dicere*; 4, 16, 45 *dicere si fas est*; Ad Liv. 129 *si talia dicere fas est*. Ovid has *si fas est* also with the following infinitives: *contingere* (T. 3, 5, 27), *loqui* (T. 5, 2, 46), *ire* (T. 3, 5, 27), *scribere* (T. 2, 515), *monuisse* (Am. 2, 13,

¹ Teuffel-Kroll, § 230, 5, 1, states that the author of *Catal. ix* is a "novice who imitates rather Ovid's than Vergil's manner." Similarly Cruttwell, *Rom. Lit.* 311, n. 3, remarks respecting the *Ciris*: "It is very much in Ovid's manner, though far inferior." This is an acute observation in part, though the ascription of marked "inferiority" is doubtless due mainly to the fact of the unknown author. It is well known that the *Ciris* borrows whole verses and blocks of verses from Vergil, totaling more than twenty lines in all. While this is an excessive form of imitation (cf. Leo, *Hermes*, 1902, p. 54), due largely to the immaturity of youth, yet it is not wholly dissimilar to the case of *Trist.* 2, 447-60, where we find ten verses cited more or less verbally from Tib. 1, 6. Zingerle (*Ovid*, I, 56) aptly remarks here: "This whole phenomenon is of the highest interest for the correct explanation of the reminiscences which creep into Ovid's works from other poets." The epicedion upon Tib. (Am. 3, 9) also cites three Tib. lines.

² Ganzemüller's collection contains at least eighty-five phrases, which are either common to Ovid alone or else occur in only one other poet (see above, p. 242). Némethy's commentary is also very valuable.

27), *queri* (H. 3, 6), *componere* (M. 5, 417); so also *credere*, *Aetna* 173. He has *si fas est* alone three times (F. 1, 25; T. 3, 1, 81; P. 2, 8, 37); so also [Tib.] 2, 3, 74. The phrase is drawn by Ov. from Cat. 51, 2 (cf. 89, 5) and Prop. 3, 12, 5; it never occurs in Verg.; see also below, § x. Vs. 27: *felix illa dies*: Ganz., p. 562, omits the following examples of *illa dies* in the first foot: Ov. H. 5, 33; 7, 93; T. 4, 2, 73; 5, 3, 1. *Vs. 32: *aurata cuspidē*: Ov. M. 7, 673 *aurea cuspidē*. Vs. 38: *lunae sidera*: cf. Ov. M. 14, 172 *sidera solis*. †V. 53: *poenam solvens*: Ov. M. 1, 209 *poenas solvit*; so also Lucr. 5, 1224. The more usual *poenam* (-as) *persolvere* occurs Cat. 64, 295; Tib. 1, 9, 13; Verg. A. 9, 422. (†Vs. 55: *nam verum fateamur*: Catal. 5, 12 *nam fatebimur verum*. In addition to Ganzenmüller's five examples, Ovid has the following five cases of *vera fateri*: H. 8, 97; 14, 47; R. 409; M. 7, 728; T. 1, 9, 16; also *vera confiteri* (R. 318, 320). Vergil has *vera fateri* only once: A. 2, 77). (Vss. 71, 190, 334, 437, 513: *quid enim commiserat illa*? Ovid uses *quid* (*quis*) *enim* 26 times, while Vergil has it only once (A. 12, 798; cf. 5, 850). Ganz., p. 601, omits four examples: M. 4, 704; 10, 61; H. 5, 69; 16, 7). Add also *quis enim*: Mor. 79; Aet. 117; cf. Catal. 9, 41 (*nam quid*). †Vs. 77: *forma cum vinceret omnis*: Ov. H. 16, 70 *vincere quae forma digna sit una duas*; F. 6, 44 *forma victa mea est*. Once also in Hor. (Ep. 15, 22): *formaque vinces Nireia*; cf. below, § x. (Vs. 83: *numen fraudare deorum*: Aet. 85 *numina divom*; Ovid has *numen deorum*, *deum* or *dei* four times (F. 3, 705; M. 11, 134; H. 16, 30; P. 4, 13, 24), and *numen divom* only once (M. 6, 542), while Vergil has *numen divom* five times (A. 2, 777; 5, 56; 6, 368; 2, 123; 4, 204), and *numen deum* only once (2, 623); cf. Ganz., *ad loc.*; Alzinger, *Studia in Aetnam collata*, p. 50. Cat. has only *n. divom* (66, 134; 76, 4), Lucr. uses both freely, Prop. and Hor. each have *n. dei* or *deorum* once.)

(†Vs. 93: *magna praemia*: Ovid has *magna praemia* six times (H. 16, 19; 16, 374; Am. 2, 9, 40; A.A. 3, 406; M. 13, 16; Ad Liv. 216). Vergil has the phrase only once: A. 12, 437, Hor. has *grandia pr.* (Ep. 2, 2, 38), *multa pr.* [S. 2, 1, 12]). *Vs. 103: *ridentia litora conchis*: add to Ganz., p. 573, Ov. A.A. 2, 519 *litore quot conchae*; 3, 124 *litore concha*; T. 5, 2, 23 *litora quot conchas*; cf. Radford, *AJP*, XLIV, 235, on [Tib.] 4, 2, 19. *Vs. 125: *firmandum numine*: Ov. M. 10, 430 *numine firmat*. †V. 156: *etsi quis nocuisse tibi periuria credat*, and v. 189 *quis non malit credere*: Ov. F. 2, 414 *quis credat pueris non nocuisse feram*. Ov. has *quis credat* five times (A.A. 3, 281, Ad Liv. 143; M. 1, 400; F. 1, 518; 2, 414); cf. *quis credit*, Aet. 117; *quis crederet* twice (A.A. 2, 43; T. 3, 9, 1; cf. F. 2, 8); *quis credere possit* three times (H. 18, 123; M. 7, 690; 15, 613; cf. *credere quis possit*, Priap. 55, 1; *quis credere posset* once (T. 1, 2, 81). Verg. does not have *quis credat*, although he uses *quis crederet* once (A. 3, 187), and Lucr. has only *qui credere possis* (6, 411). On the frequency of rhetorical questions and exclamations in the *Ciris*, see also Skutsch, *Aus Vergils Frühzeit*, p. 81. *Vs. 160: *aurea tela*: Ov. M. 1, 468

duo tela . . . quod facit (amorem), auratum; cf. Némethy, *ad. loc.* *Vs. 161: *nimium terret*: Ov. *F.* 3, 289 *nimium terrere*; cf. *T.* 1, 5, 37 *nimium trepidate*. Vs. 169: *teneris pedibus*: Ovid has *tener pes* six times (*Am.* 1, 4, 44; *A.A.* 1, 162; 2, 212; 2, 534; *H.* 16, 66; *F.* 1, 410); so also *Tib.* 1, 7, 46; *Prop.* 1, 8, 7. (Vs. 218: *sidera mundi*: add to Ganz. (vss. 7, 218), Ov. *F.* 5, 545 *sidera mundo cedere*.) †Vs. 238: *Myrrha cepit ocellos*: Ov. *Am.* 1, 10, 10 *oculos capit ista meos*; also *Prop.* 3, 10, 15 *oculos cepisti Properti*; cf. *Am.* 3, 11, 48 *perque tuos oculos, qui rapuere meos*; *ib.* 2, 19, 19 *nostros rapuisti ocellos*. *Vs. 245: *numina iuro*: add Radford, *AJP*, XLIV, 247, on [*Tib.*] 4, 13, 15 (*numina iuro*) to Ganz., p. 591. *Vs. 256: *marmoreum pedem*: Ov. *Am.* 2, 11, 15 *marmoreis pedibus*. †Vs. 263: *falsa imago*: add *Aet.* 88 (*falsa imagine*) to Ganz., p. 593. *Vs. 275: *ut me, si servare potes, nec perdere malis*: Ov. *H.* 21, 58 *me, precor, ut serves, perdere velle velis*. Still more striking is the similarity to the verse of the *Medea* which is quoted by Quintilian (8, 5, 6): *servare potui; perdere an possim, rogas?* Cf. Heyne, *ad loc.*; the pointed antithesis is of course drawn from the schools of rhetoric. Vs. 319: *an nescis, qua lege patris de vertice summo edita candentis praetextat purpura canos*: Similarly Ovid's accounts elsewhere (*Am.* 3, 12, 21; *M.* 8, 9) emphasize the "white (*cani*) locks," though he speaks once (*A.A.* 1, 331) of "purple locks." *Vs. 327: *tantum facinus*: Ov. *M.* 13, 310 *facinus tantum*. *Vs. 340: *sollicitos animi aestus*: Ov. *Am.* 3, 2, 39 *hic meus est animi, non aeris aestus?* Cf. below, § x. †Vs. 349: *postera lux*: Ganz. notes that Ov. has *postera lux* five times (also *Hor. S.* 1, 5, 39), but does not state that Verg. has *postera . . . dies* instead four times (*A.* 3, 588; 5, 42; 7, 148; 12, 113) and *postera . . . Aurora* once (*A.* 4, 6). Ov. is fond also of *postera nox* (*M.* 10, 471, etc.). †Vs. 354: (*nutrix*) *sedula causas*: Ov. *H.* 21, 95 *sedula nutrix*; also *Hor. A.P.* 354. *Vs. 355: *submissis vocibus*: *Lydia* 6 *submissa voce*; Ov. *M.* 7, 90 and *Ad Liv.* 289 *submissa voce*. *Vs. 360: *orbum parentem*: Ov. *M.* 13, 647 *parentem . . . orbum*.

Vs. 364: *nunc alia ex aliis*: *Catal.* 9, 53 *nunc aliam ex alia*; Ov. *M.* 15, 253 *ex aliis alias figuras*; cf. *Panegy.* 17 *alios aliosque*; cf. Ganz., p. 604. (†Vs. 388: *divom responsa*: add Ov. *M.* 13, 336 (*responsa deum*) to Ganz., vs. 119). †Vs. 392: *pater Oceanus*: Ov. *Ad Liv.* 438 (*Oceanusque pater*. Vergil (*G.* 4, 328) adds *rerum* (*Oceanumque patrem rerum*). Vs. 404: *supprimit . . . flamina venti*: *Panegy.* 124 *flamina venti*; Ov. *A.A.* 3, 99 *flaminibus venti* cf. also *Lucr.* 1, 290; *Cat.* 64, 239; *Cic. Arat.* 100. †Vs. 435: *metus deorum*: Ov. *F.* 3, 278 *deumque metu*; also *Hor. C.* 1, 35, 37; cf. *Lucr.* 3, 980 and 5, 73 (*divom metus*). †Vs. 440: *sternetur lectulus*: Ov. *F.* 2, 337 *strati lecti*; cf. *M.* 6, 431 *stravere torum*; *Ad Liv.* 316 *sternitur torus*. *Sternere lectum* occurs twice also in *Prop.* (2, 13, 21; 3, 6, 11). (†Vs. 444: *famularum munere fungi . . . non licuit?* Ovid has *munere fungi* three times with the genitive after *munere*, as here (*A.A.* 2, 158; *R.* 795;

P. 4, 9, 12), and once without (*M.* 10, 273); Vergil has the phrase only once, and without the genitive: *A.* 6, 885). Vs. 449: *inflexa cervice recumbit*: cf. *Ov. A.A.* 3, 779 *cervice reflexa*; cf. *Ganz.*, p. 613; Zingerle, *Abh.*, II, p. 27. Vs. 450: *bracchia nodis*: add *Aet.* 365 (*bracchia nodo*) to *Ganz.*, p. 614. Cf. also Sudhaus, *ad loc.* Vs. 460: *sinuantur lineae*: cf. *Ov. H.* 8, 23 *sinuosaque vela*; cf. *Ganz.*, p. 614. †Vs. 461: *in cursu*: Ovid has *in cursu* at least three times (*H.* 5, 121; *Am.* 1, 8, 109; *R.* 430); it is drawn from *Lucr.* (five times: 3, 8; 5, 617; 6, 302, 307, 321). (Vs. 463: *angustis faucibus*: add *Aet.* 168 *angustis in faucibus*.) *Vs. 468 ff.: *tutum longe Piraeae cernit*: . . . hinc Venus illi *Sunias* (*Sinius B*): *Ov. F.* 4, 563 *Sunion expositum Piraeaeque tuta recessu Linquit*. Vs. 491: *tenera effigies*: cf. *Ov. M.* 3, 354 *tenera forma*; 4, 345 *tenero corpore*. Vs. 512: *thalamus accepit*: Ovid has *thalamo receptus* (*recepit*) four times (*H.* 12, 62; *M.* 14, 297; 9, 279; *A.A.* 2, 407). Vs. 534: *duplici sidere*: cf. *Ov. M.* 3, 420 *geminum sidus*.

III. OCCURRENCES OF WORDS

OID AND VERGIL CONTRASTED¹

1. We may consider first those words common to the *Ciris* and Ovid, which either do not occur at all in Vergil or occur rarely. An

¹ My own work was already completed when Professor Fairclough kindly sent me the advance sheets of his article on the "Poems of the Appendix Vergiliana" (*Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LIII [1922], pp. 5 ff.), which contains lists of non-Vergilian words for the whole Appendix. These lists are most admirable in character, and show the non-Vergilian character of the Appendix in the clearest and most striking manner possible. A few important omissions occur, however, in the treatment of the single poems of the Appendix; in the case of the *Ciris*, they are the following non-Verg. words: **comploro*, 285; **facinus*, 327; *fugito*, 351 (not in *Ov.*); *intra* (adv.), 256; **languor*, 223; **pila* ("ball"), 149; **resideo*, 126; **sordes*, 249; **squalidus*, 506; **studeo*, 240; **vagus*, 197. Fairclough also omits to mark with an asterisk the Ovidian words *aerumna*, 58, and *polleo*, 411, 483. A more serious fault is the failure to indicate that the following readings are only conjectures: *argute*, 186; *interverto*, 84; *livesco*, 450; *nicto*, 218; *praes*, 321; *senium*, 249. It is needless to say, however, that these few omissions do not affect appreciably the excellent and wholly convincing percentages—which are given at the close of the article—for the non-Vergilian words appearing in the various poems.

So far as regards the relation of the Appendix to Ovid, Fairclough's study is also very valuable, and since he uses Burman's Index, the Ovidian character of the vocabulary is clearly shown in part. Thus after the citation of many examples and proofs, he concludes as follows: "Many of the non-Vergilian words in the *Ciris* are much in evidence in Ovid. . . . The *Ciris* indeed, like the *Aetna* and the *Culex*, is distinctly more Ovidian than Vergilian in its vocabulary." He makes, however, the mistake of not pursuing his investigation further and of being content, at this point, with a purely negative conclusion. In fact he shows no acquaintance with the studies of Zingerle, Eschenburg, Drobisch, and Hultgren upon the development of the Ovidian meter and style, and is therefore in no position to account for the disappearance from the mature Ovid of a moderate number of spondaic and archaic words which occur in the *Ciris* and other poems of the Appendix. It should be added also that he appears

asterisk (*) opposite a word indicates that it does *not* occur in Vergil. There are 136 words in this list:¹

Actaeus, 102, 10 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. *adsiduus*, 346, 417, 31 Ov., 5 V.A., 1 T.A., 8 Verg. **Aegina*, 476, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. *aequoreus*, 451, 45 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Verg. (first in Cat., v. Bednara, *Archiv*, XV, 228). **aerumna*, 58, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **alumna*, 224, 246, 274, 289, 311, 324, 331, 338, 347, 381, 441, 7 Ov., 11 V.A. **Amathusia*, 242, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **animans*, 491, 3 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet. **antistita*, 166, 1 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 581; Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII (1907), p. 481. *appono*, 532, 30 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 Verg. (see § x). **Athenae*, 22, 469, 7 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Aet. **Atticus* (adj.), 115, 5 Ov., 2 V.A. **Bistonis*, 165, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **cani* (subst.), 320, 10 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A. (§ x). *capillus*, 52, 126, 168, 236, 321, 382, 169 Ov., 6 V.A., 1 Aet., 5 T.A., 2 Verg. (p. 260). *Cecropius* (adj.), 3, 128, 5 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 Aet., 2 Verg. **charta*, 39, 62, 14 Ov., 5 V.A., 6 T.A. **chorda*, 178, 5 Ov., 2 V.A., 2 T.A. **ciris*, 90, 202, 205, 488, 489, 537, 1 Ov., 6 V.A. **comploro*, 285, 1 Ov., 1 V.A.² *consors*, 15, 16 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A., 2 Verg. *consuesco*, 259, 17 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Verg. (§ x). **Crataeis*, 66 (bis), 1 Ov., 2 V.A. *cupidus*, 78, 93, 132, 393, 28 Ov., 5 V.A., 5 T.A., 1 Verg.; cf. Kreunen, *Proleg. in Cirin*, p. 32, and Ganz. 569. **curalium*, 434, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **Cythnus*, 475, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **Daulias*, 200, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 565. *deliciae*, 433, 18 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Verg. (§ x). **denubo*, 330, 1 Ov., 1 V.A.³ **detondeo*, 186, 3 Ov., 1 V.A. **Dictyna*, 245, 305, 3 Ov., 2 V.A. **Echidna*, 67, 6 Ov., 1 V.A. **Emathius* (adj.), 34, 3 Ov., 1 V.A. **Erectheus*, 22, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **expallesco*, 81, 4 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Némethy, *ad loc.* **facinus*, 327, 28 Ov., 1 V.A. *figura*, 56, 51 Ov., 3 V.A., 2 Aet., 3 T.A., 3 Verg. *fraudo*, 83, 11 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. *fungor*, 444, 22 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. *furialis* (conject.), 374, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Verg. *geminus*, 374, 13 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. **Giganteus*, 30, 5 Ov., 2 V.A.; cf. Holtschmidt, p. 85, and Ganz. 563. *gracilis*, 20, 151, 498, 17 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. (§ x). **haliaetolos*, 204, 528, 536, 1 Ov., 3 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 586. **Hellespontus*, 413,

wholly to overlook those critics who have studied the language of some part of the Appendix in a thoroughgoing and detailed fashion, e.g. Birt, Holtschmidt, Förster and Plésent for the *Culex*; Karl v. Reichenbach, Otto Wilde for the *Moretum*, etc. It is evident then that Fairclough's study, valuable as it is, and conclusive as it is on the negative side, embraces only a part of the necessary field.

¹ Corrections have been made in many cases where Burman's Index omits one or more passages. Valuable citations from Cat. and Ov. may be found through the references given to Ganzennmüller, Némethy and others. For the two Appendices I everywhere use the abbreviations V.A. and T.A. Where T.A. and Aet. are not expressly mentioned, it is meant that the word in question does *not* occur in these poems.

² This whole line is peculiarly Ovidian; for Ovid is the first poet to use *comploro* (see below, § viii), and he alone has the phrase *questus aniles* (*M.* 9, 276).

³ Ganz., p. 601, points out that *denubo* is first found in Ov.; cf. also Drach., 422.

3 Ov., 2 V.A. **Homerus*, 65, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A. **Ilithyia*, 326, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **imperfectus*, 492, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **incingo*, 475, 12 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A., 2 Verg. **infamis*, 87, 9 Ov., 1 V.A. **infesto* (conject.), 57, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 567, and Zingerle, *Kl. Philol. Abh.*, III, 30. **infestus*, 111, 117, 466, 532, 23 Ov., 9 V.A., 3 Aet., 8 Verg. (§x). **internodium*, 491, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **Iolciacus*, 377, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **Isthmos*, 463, 8 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A. **iucundus*, 385, 12 Ov., 5 V.A., 1 Aet., 3 T.A., 1 Verg. **iuro*, 155, 235, 245, 80 Ov., 3 V.A., 5 T.A., 7 Verg. **ius iurandum*, 155, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **labellum*, 496, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **languidus*, 461, 17 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. **languor*, 223, 11 Ov., 2 V.A. **lascivio*, 142, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **lectulus*, 440, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **Leucothea*, 396, 3 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ném., *ad loc.* **leviter*, 11, 10 Ov., 2 V.A. **libido*, 13, 16, 13 Ov., 3 V.A. **Libys*, 440, 3 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 612. **ligo*, 371, 14 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 Verg. **lintheum*, 460, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 Verg. **lustrum* ("period of time"), 24, 14 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **macero*, 244, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **marita* (noun), 443, 8 Ov., 1 V.A. **marmoreus*, 222, 450, 476, 503, 18 Ov., 6 V.A., 3 T.A., 4 Verg. **mendacium*, 362, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Aet. **meretrix*, 86, 6 Ov., 1 V.A. **mulier*, 83, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. **Myrrha*, 238, 4 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ném., *ad loc.* **neco*, 447, 18 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. **neuler*, 68, 3 Ov., 1 V.A. **Nisēius*, 390, 1 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 607. **novenus*, 371, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 605. **nubo*, 354, 12 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A. **ocellus*, 132, 238, 348, 20 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 T.A.; cf. Ganz. 576. **Ogygius*, 220, 1 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet.; cf. Ganz. 588. **oportet*, 262, 8 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg. **orbis*, 360, 37 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Verg. **Ossaesus*, 33, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **pagina*, 41, 5 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Verg.; cf. Kreunen, p. 60. **Palladius*, 29, 7 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Verg. **Pandionius*, 101, 408, 1 Ov., 3 V.A.¹ **persequor*, 254, 14 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Verg. **pertimesco*, 82, 17 Ov., 1 V.A. **pila* ("ball"), 149, 8 Ov., 1 V.A. **Piraeus*, 468, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **polleo*, 411, 483, 7 Ov., 3 V.A.² **Polyhymnia*, 55, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **populator*, 111, 3 Ov., 1 V.A. **probo*, 388, 65 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 T.A., 3 Verg. (§x). **pronuba*, 439, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Verg. **puella*, 64, 91, 140, 189, 199, 223, 251, 351, 484, 522, 163 Ov., 23 V.A., 24 T.A., 8 Verg. **quaestus*, 78, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **quinquennium*, 24, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 562. **quivis*, 241, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **relevo*, 340, 19 Ov., 1 V.A.³ **remoror*, 217, 236, 7 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 T.A.; cf. Holt. 103, 124; Drach. 421; Ehr. III 68. **repentinus*, 460, 2 Ov., 2 V.A. **respergo*, 525, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **resideo* (pres. stem), 126, 9 Ov., 5 V.A. **retineo*, 152, 170, 436, 511, 57 Ov., 4 V.A., 3 Verg. (p. 260). **Rhamnusia*, 228, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf.

¹ Holtschmidt, pp. 96, 124, states incorrectly that Ov. was the first to use the adj. *Pandionius*. It occurs, however, in Prop. 1, 20, 31; cf. also Ganz. 572.

² Holtschmidt, pp. 99, 124, points out that Ov. was the first poet to use this word after Lucr. and Plaut.

³ For the phrase *relevare aestus*, see Ganz. 602. He adds: "Except in Ov. I have nowhere found this term."

Ganz. 589. *ritus*, 36, 127, 389, 25 Ov., 3 V.A., 3 Verg. *rudis*, 243, 44 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Aet., 2 Verg. (§x). **salutifer*, 477, 4 Ov., 1 V.A. **sapientia*, 14, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **Sciron*, 465, 1 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A. *Scorpius*, 535, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **sedulus*, 354, 16 Ov., 2 V.A. **Seriphos*, 477, 4 Ov., 1 V.A. *sinuo*, 460, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 2 Verg. (§x). **sordes*, 249, 2 Ov., 1 V.A. **squalidus*, 506, 11 Ov., 2 V.A. **studeo*, 240, 4 Ov., 1 V.A. *submissus* (adj.), 355, 8 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 2 Verg.; cf. Ném., *ad loc.* **supprimo*, 404, 16 Ov., 1 V.A. *tabes*, 254, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Verg. **tabesco* (pres. stem), 249, 450, 1 Ov., 3 V.A. *Tethys*, 392, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **tribuo*, 93, 270, 19 Ov., 4 V.A., 2 T.A.; cf. Holt. 60. *trux*, 76, 21 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 Aet., 2 Verg. **tumulo*, 442, 8 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Ganz. 612 (first in Cat., *vide* Bednara, *Archiv*, XV, 230). **Tyndarides*, 399, 3 Ov., 1 V.A. **Typhon*, 32, 1 Ov., 1 V.A. **unicus*, 334, 11 Ov., 2 V.A. **vagus*, 197, 20 Ov., 8 V.A., 6 T.A.; cf. Holt. 112, 124. *vexo*, 60, 481, 10 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 T.A., 2 Verg. *vigilo*, 46, 28 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg. **vorax* (conject.), 57, 3 Ov., 1 V.A.; cf. Zingerle, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

It will be noted that 87 words contained in the above list do not occur at all in Vergil.

2. Of the non-Vergilian words in the *Ciris* the following occur very frequently in Ovid:

facinus, 327, 28 times; *ocellus*, 132, etc., and *vagus*, 197, 20 times; *relevo* 340, and *tribuo*, 93, etc., 19 times; *pertimesco*, 82, 17 times; *sedulus*, 354, and *supprimo*, 404, 16 times; *charta*, 39, etc., 14 times; *libido*, 13, etc., 13 times; *nubo*, 354, 12 times; *languor*, 223, *squalidus*, 506, and *unicus*, 334, 11 times; *cani* (subst.), 320, and *leviter*, 11, 10 times; *Homerus*, 65, *infamis*, 87, *mendacium*, 362, and *resideo* (pres. stem), 126, 9 times; *Isthmos*, 463, *marita* (subst.), 443, *pila* ("ball"), 149, and *tumulo*, 442, 8 times; *alumna*, 441, *Athenae*, 22, 469, *polleo*, 411, etc., and *remoror*, 217, etc., 7 times; *Echidna*, 67, and *meretriz*, 86, 6 times; *Atticus* (adj.), 115, and *Giganteus*, 30, 5 times.

3. The following words are very rare in Vergil, but are great favorites with Ovid and form an important part of his vocabulary. The figures in parentheses indicate the frequency of usage in the two poets in proportion to the length of their works:¹

Actaeus, 102, 10 Ov., 1 Verg., (3:1). *aequoreus*, 451, 45 Ov., 1 Verg., (16:1). *appono*, 532, 30 Ov., 1 Verg., (11:1). *capillus*, 52, etc., 169 Ov., 2 Verg., (34:1). *consors*, 15, 16 Ov., 2 Verg., (3:1). *consuesco*, 259, 17 Ov., 3 Verg., (3:1). *cupidus*, 78, etc., 28 Ov., 1 Verg., (9:1). *deliciae*, 433, 18

¹ There are 12,902 verses in the whole of Vergil, and 34,835 verses in the received corpus of Ovid, including in the latter *Hal.*, *Med.*, *Nux.*, *Consolatio*, and the six double *Epistles* (*Her.* xvi-xxi), which the metrical treatment shows to be of about the same date as the *Consolatio* and the *Maecenas*.

Ov., 2 Verg., (4:1). *figura*, 56, 51 Ov., 3 Verg., (7:1). *fraudo*, 83, 11 Ov., 1 Verg., (4:1). *fungor*, 444, 22 Ov., 1 Verg., (7:1). *gracilis*, 20, 17 Ov., 1 Verg., (6:1). *iucundus*, 385, 12 Ov., 1 Verg., (4:1). *languidus*, 461, 17 Ov., 1 Verg., (6:1). *ligo*, 371, 14 Ov., 1 Verg., (5:1). *lustrum* ("period of time"), 24, 14 Ov., 1 Verg., (5:1). *neco*, 447, 18 Ov., 1 Verg., (6:1). *orbis*, 360, 37 Ov., 1 Verg., (13:1). *probo*, 388, 65 Ov., 3 Verg., (9:1). *puella*, 64, etc., 163 Ov., 8 Verg., (8:1). *rudis*, 243, 44 Ov., 2 Verg., (9:1). *trux*, 76, 21 Ov., 2 Verg., (4:1). *vigilo*, 46, 28 Ov., 1 Verg., (10:1).

4. The following list shows the preferred Vergilian equivalents for the words common to the *Ciris* and Ovid:

**animans*, 491, 3 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet.; Verg. has *animal* 5 times. *capillus*, 52, etc., 169 Ov., 6 V.A., 1 Aet., 5 T.A., 2 Verg.; Verg. has *coma* 28 times, *crinis* 30 times, *caesaries* 5 times.¹ *consuesco*, 259, 17 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Verg.; Verg. has *suesco* 3 times. *cupidus*, 78, etc., 28 Ov., 5 V.A., 5 T.A., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *dulcis* 50 times, *avidus* 11 times. **detondeo*, 186, 3 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *tondeo* 20 times. **expallesco*, 81, 4 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *palleo* 13 times. *iucundus*, 385, 12 Ov., 5 V.A., 1 Aet., 3 T.A., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *dulcis* 50 times, *gratus* 20 times, *suavis* 5 times. *labellum*, 496, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *labrum* 3 times. **lascivio*, 142, 1 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *lascivus* (adj.) 3 times. **lectulus*, 440, 2 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *lectus* once, *cubile* 14 times, *torus* 18 times. **Libys*, 440, 3 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *Libycus* 14 times. *ligo*, 371, 14 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *reliquo* twice. *linteum*, 460, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *velum* 36 times, *carbasus* twice. **marita* (subst.), 443, 8 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *matrona* once, *mulier* once, *femina* 11 times, *coniunx* (masc. and fem.) 68 times. *neco*, 447, 18 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Verg.; Verg. has *caedo* 31 times, *occido* 3 times, *interficio* once. **ocellus*, 132, etc., 20 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 T.A.; Verg. has *oculus* 98 times. *persequor*, 254, 14 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Verg.; Verg. has *sequor* 151 times, *insequor* 16 times and *consequor* 6 times. **pertimesco*, 82, 17 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *timeo* 18 times. *puella*, 64, etc., 163 Ov., 23 V.A., 24 T.A., 8 Verg.; Verg. has *virgo* 53 times. **remoror*, 217, etc., 7 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 T.A.; Verg. has *moror* 36 times. **resideo* (pres. stem), 126, 9 Ov., 5 V.A.; Verg. has *sedeo* 42 times. *retineo*, 152, etc., 57 Ov., 4 V.A., 3 Verg.; Verg. has *teneo* 153 times. **supprimo*, 404, 16 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *premo* 73 times, *reprimō* 4 times and *deprimo* twice. **tumulo*, 442, 8 Ov., 1 V.A.; Verg. has *sepelio* 6 times and *humo* 3 times. **vagus*, 197, 20 Ov., 8 V.A., 6 T.A.; Verg. has the verb *vagor* 6 times.

¹ *Capillus* is proportionally thirty-four times more frequent in Ov. than in Verg. (p. 259). Verg. follows here closely Ennius, Accius and Pacuvius, whose fragments wholly avoid this diminutive. The preference, on the other hand, of Plaut. and Ter., of Cic., Varr., and Caes. for *capillus* shows that it was orig. colloquial or prosaic. For the relative frequency of *capillus*, *coma* and *crinis* in Roman authors, see the excellent table in the *Thesaurus*, s.v. "capillus." Excellent in general is the statement: "*Praeferuntur coma et crinis a poetis inde a Catullo et apud argenteae aet. scriptores*," but Ov. and Hor. are exceptions.

IV. INDEBTEDNESS TO LUCRETIVS AND CATULLUS

The following are distinctively Ovidian words, drawn primarily by Ovid from his great exemplars, Lucretius and Catullus,¹ but as a rule rarely used elsewhere:

**aerumna*, 58, 1 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Lucr., (1 Hor.). **Amathusia*, 242, 1 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Cat. **animans*, 491, 3 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 41 Lucr., (1 Hor.). **Bistonis*, 165, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., Calvus fr.,² (1 Hor.). *Cecropius* (adj.), 3, etc., 5 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 Aet., 3 Cat., (2 Verg., 2 Prop.). **charta*, 39, etc., 14 Ov., 5 V.A., 6 T.A., 4 Lucr., 6 Cat., (13 Hor.). *consors*, 15, 16 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A., 2 Lucr., (2 Verg., 1 Hor., 1 Prop.). **curalium*, 434, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Lucr. **Daulias*, 200, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Cat. **Erectheus*, 22, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Cat., (1 Prop.). **expallesco*, 81, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Cat., (1 Hor.). *figura*, 56, 51 Ov., 3 V.A., 2 Aet., 3 T.A., 57 Lucr., 4 Cat., (3 Verg., 1 Hor., 11 Prop.). *fraudo*, 83, 11 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Cat., (1 Verg.). *fungor*, 444, 22 Ov., 1 V.A., 8 Lucr., (1 Verg., 4 Hor., 1 Prop.). **Hellespontus*, 413, 3 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Cat. *imperfectus*, 492, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Lucr., (1 Verg.). *incingo*, 475, 12 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Aet., 1 T.A., 2 Cat., (2 Verg.). *labellum*, 496, 7 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Lucr., 7 Cat., (1 Verg., 1 Prop.). **languor*, 223, 11 Ov., 2 V.A., 1 Lucr., 2 Cat., (2 Hor.). **leviter*, 11, 10 Ov., 2 V.A., 4 Cat., (1 Hor., 5 Prop.). **libido*, 13, etc., 13 Ov., 3 V.A., 2 Lucr., 4 Cat., (6 Hor., 4 Prop.). *ligo* 371, 14 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 Cat., (1 Verg., 1 Tib., 3 Prop.).

**macero*, 244, 1 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Lucr., (2 Hor.). **mendacium*, 362, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Aet., 1 Cat., (10 Hor., 1 Prop.). **nubo*, 354, 12 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 2 Lucr., 12 Cat., (1 Hor., 6 Prop.). **ocellus*, 132, etc., 20 Ov., 4 V.A., 1 T.A., 7 Cat., (18 Prop.). *orbis*, 360, 37 Ov., 2 V.A., 2 Lucr., 2 Cat., (1 Verg.). **pila* ("ball"), 149, 8 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Lucr., (3 Hor., 4 Prop.). **Piraeus*, 468, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Cat., (1 Prop.). **polleo*, 411, etc., 7 Ov., 3 V.A., 7 Lucr., (1 Hor., 1 Prop.). *quivis*, 241, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 36 Lucr., 5 Cat., (1 Verg., 9 Hor., 9 Prop.). **remoror*, 217, etc., 7 Ov., 3 V.A., 1 T.A., 6 Lucr., 2 Cat., (2 Prop.). *respergo*, 525, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Cat., (1 Verg.). **resideo* (pres. stem), 126, 9 Ov., 5 V.A., 2 Lucr., 2 Cat., (1 Prop.). **Rhamnusia*, 228, 2 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Cat. **squalidus*, 506, 11 Ov., 2 V.A., 3 Lucr., 1 Cat. **studeo*, 240, 4 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Lucr., 1 Cat., (5 Hor.). *tabes*, 254, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 4

¹ The relation of the *Ciris* to Catullus has best been described by Schwabe (*In Cirin carmen observationes*, Dorpat, 1871, p. 3): "Si opus poeticum cum tetrino comparare licet, quae Catullo *Ciris* poeta debet, ea quasi *stamen* efficiunt, cui *subtemen* maxime Vergilianum insertum est"; cf. Teuffel-Kroll, *Röm. Lit.*, II, § 230, (2), 2. The debt to Calvus and Cinna is also great, as has been most fully shown by Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII (1907), 479-96; cf. Witte, *Hermes*, 1922, p. 587. The words and phrases of the poem are drawn largely from Catullus, Lucretius, and Vergil; see Baehrens, *PLM*, II, 186 ff.; Kreunen, *Proleg. in Cirin*, pp. 36 ff.; Ganzemüller, *op. cit.*, 557, 562 ff.; Némethy, edition, 17 ff.; Schanz, *Röm. Lit.*³, II, § 241, p. 99; P. Jahn, *Rh. Mus.*, 1908, p. 103; Rand, *HSCP*, XXX (1919), 151-53. It is possible also that a few words may be taken from Propertius.

² Cf. Sudhaus, *Hermes*, 1907, p. 480.

Lucr., (3 Verg.). *tabesco (pres. stem), 249, etc., 1 Ov., 3 V.A., 7 Lucr., 1 Cat., (1 Hor., 2 Prop.). *tabes*, 254, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 4 Lucr., 1 Cinna frg., (3 Verg.); cf. Sudhaus, *Hermes*, XLII, 493. *Tethys*, 392, 9 Ov., 1 V.A., 3 Cat., (1 Verg.). *tribuo, 93, etc., 19 Ov., 4 V.A., 2 T.A., 12 Lucr., 1 Cat., (2 Hor., 3 Prop.). *tumulo, 442, 8 Ov., 1 V.A., 1 Cat. *Tyndarides, 399, 3 Ov., 1 V.A., 2 Lucr., (2 Hor., 1 Prop.). *unicus, 334, 11 Ov., 2 V.A., 5 Lucr., 7 Cat., (3 Hor., 2 Prop.). *vorax (conject.), 57, 3 Ov., 1 V.A., 4 Cat.

V. CLOSE RELATION TO THE TIBULLAN APPENDIX

The following are striking words common to the *Ciris* and Ovid, which also occur in the T.A.:¹

*cani (subst.), 320, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 10 Ov. *capillus*, 52, etc., 6 V.A., 5 T.A., 169 Ov. *charta, 39, etc., 5 V.A., 6 T.A., 14 Ov. *chorda, 178, 2 V.A., 2 T.A., 5 Ov. *consors*, 15, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 16 Ov. *fraudo*, 83, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 11 Ov. *gemino*, 374, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 13 Ov. *gracilis*, 20, 4 V.A., 1 T.A., 17 Ov. *incingo*, 475, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 12 Ov. *Isthmos, 463, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 8 Ov. *iucundus*, 385, 5 V.A., 3 T.A., 12 Ov. *marmoreus*, 222, etc., 6 V.A., 3 T.A., 18 Ov. *neco*, 447, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 18 Ov. *ocellus, 132, etc., 4 V.A., 1 T.A., 20 Ov. *puella*, 64, etc., 23 V.A., 24 T.A., 163 Ov. *remoror, 217, etc., 3 V.A., 1 T.A., 7 Ov. *Sciron, 465, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 1 Ov. *submissus* (adj.), 355, 1 V.A., 1 T.A., 8 Ov. *tribuo, 93, etc., 4 V.A., 2 T.A., 19 Ov. *vagus, 197, 8 V.A., 6 T.A., 20 Ov.

¹ On the numerous *phrases* which are common to the *Ciris* and *Culex*, on the one hand, and to the T.A. (the *Lygdamus* and the *Panegyric*), on the other, see Némethy, *Rh. Mus.*, LXII (1907), 484 f.

ADDENDUM TO PAGE 252, NOTE 2

On the sentence structure of the *Ciris*, see Crittenden (*The Sentence Structure of Virgil* [Ann Arbor, 1911], p. 63), who observes: "One is impressed at once by the wide divergence between the sentence structure of the poem and that of the authenticated works of Virgil. Virgil's sentences are almost always short; many of those in the *Ciris* are inordinately long. . . . Virgil's structure is almost invariably very simple and regular; that of the *Ciris* is usually complex, and exceedingly involved and irregular, rendering the poem unusually difficult to read. . . . Virgil uses parentheses very sparingly, and exceedingly brief ones; long and involved parentheses are very conspicuous in the *Ciris*."

[To be continued]

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

ON OVID *AM.* ii. 19 AND iii. 4

These two elegies, although somewhat different in situation and point of view, have, apparently, a resemblance in theme. In the first the poet complains that his *puella* is not guarded closely enough to be desirable, and he begs her *stultus vir* to remedy the defect. An interlude (vss. 19-36) advises the *puella* herself to put difficulties in Ovid's way. In the second, however, in which vs. 26 closely parallels *Am.* ii. 19, 4, the elegist pleads with a *durus vir* who guards the desired one only too well. Here Ovid interweaves with the statement of *Am.* ii. 19, that a guarded mistress is more eagerly sought after by lovers, a second argument—not found in the other elegy—that restraint will tempt the *puella* herself to seek forbidden fruit. In spite of the obvious divergences in treatment and situation both elegies seem to depend on the same general *motif*, the superior desirability of a difficult or dangerous love.

The frequent occurrence of this theme has been illustrated by Kaibel (*Philodemi Gadarensis Epigrammata p. VIII*) in his annotation to Philodemus, *A.P.* xii. 173, 5-6. The Greek epigrammatist had made his choice between two prospective sweethearts with the words: . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔτοιμα βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ ποθῶ πᾶν τὸ φυλασσόμενον, and Kaibel (cf. Brandt, edition of *Amores*, p. 153) thinks that from this passage is derived both *Ars Am.* iii. 601 and vs. 25 of *Am.* iii. 4, above: *quidquid servatur cupimus magis*. The version of the *motif* given in Callimachus *A.P.* xii. 102, 5-6: χοῦμός ἔρως τοῖσδε· τὰ γὰρ φεύγοντα διώκειν οἶδε, τὰ δ' ἐν μέσσω κείμενα παρπέταται, however, appears more significant to him. From it, he conjectures, is translated Horace *Sat.* i. 2, 105 ff.; Ovid *Am.* ii. 9, 9, and finally *Am.* ii. 19, 36 *quod sequitur fugio, quod fugit ipse sequor*. He adds "*quod carmen (Am.* ii. 19) *totum in hoc argumento versatur.*" Ehwald, *Bursian's Jahresb.*, XLIII (1885), 173 ff., agrees with him and says of *Am.* ii. 19, "dieses ganze Gedicht ist aber, wie Kaibel richtig hervorhebt, eine Ausführung des Themas: τὰ μὲν φεύγοντα κ.τ.λ.

The individual resemblances cited by Kaibel are striking—although Ovid and Horace may have seen this trite *motif* in other sources—but an examination of both *Am.* ii. 19 and iii. 4 seems to suggest that their main theme is more in accordance with the Philodemean than the Callimachean version. A love that is guarded, not one that flees pursuit, is, in *Am.* ii. 19 Ovid's ideal, in *Am.* iii. 4, his bane.

The phraseology of the elegies, as well as the situation, appears to bear this out. *Am.* ii. 19 begins with the lines:

*Si tibi non opus est servata, stulte, puella
At mihi fac serves, quo magis ipse velim.
Quod licet, ingratum est; quod non licet acrius urit.*

Here the forms of *servare* and the occurrence of *velim* and *quod non licet acrius urit* seem to be reminiscent of *ποθῶ πᾶν τὸ φυλασσόμενον*. Similarly the contrasting expression *οὐ γὰρ ἔτοιμα βούλομαι* may possibly be found in *quod licet, ingratum est*.

Throughout this elegy forms of *servare* (cf. vss. 1-2, 29, 47, 50) and variations of the other phrases quoted in the last paragraph (cf. vss. 2-4, 23-26, 30-31, 52) recur. On the contrary the Callimachean phraseology occurs but once and is found in the interlude addressed to the *puella*. In this same passage, another variation (vss. 32-33) of the general theme is believed by Ehwald to be a reminiscence of Callimachus, xii. 43, 3-4. The main thread of the elegy, however, appears to be dominated by the thought that a *guarded* mistress is more desirable.

Similarly, in *Am.* iii. 4 the phrasing—with *custos* and *custodire* as occasional alternatives for *servare*—is, apparently, suggestive (cf. vss. 1, 4, 5-7, 9, 17-18, 23, 25-26, 29, 33, 35) and reaches its climax in the lines already quoted (vss. 25-26).

The main theme of both the Latin elegies, therefore, seems to agree with Philodemus' variation of the *motif* rather than with Callimachus'. That Ovid's version was influenced directly by Philodemus is a possibility, but it appears more probable that the Roman poet is here, as elsewhere, drawing from a common stock of themes and situations, some of which may have been given greater vogue by the Greek epigrammatist during his stay in Italy (cf. Cicero, *In Pis.*, cap. 28 ff.).

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NOTE ON PLUTARCH, *DE COMMUNIBUS NOTITIIS*, 1059

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε δήπου καὶ τὰ ἐποικοδομούμενα (μὴ) βέβαια κείσθαι καὶ πάγια, τῶν πρώτων μὴ μενόντων. . . .

In the context Plutarch has been arguing that the dialectic of Chrysippus by overthrowing the first axioms of logic casts suspicion on all other ideas. The text yields a faulty logic. He cannot mean to continue: "for it is not possible that the superstructure *also* should *not* be secure and firm when the first principles are unsettled." It has been proposed to omit *μὴ*, but to make tolerable sense it would be necessary to cancel *καὶ* 'also' as well. I

am not sure how the Teubner editor intends his query μή οὐ? to be taken. A better remedy is to read ἀβέβαια, and instead of πάγια, πλάγια. This gives the obvious and natural thought that it is not possible for the superstructure not to be unstable and awry if the foundation is insecure.

Plutarch had met this image in Plato's *Laws* 793 C, where note καὶ τὰ καλῶς ὕστερον ἐποικοδομηθέντα, τῶν ἀρχαίων ὑποπεσόντων, which became a commonplace. Cf. Lucretius iv. 513 f.: denique ut in fabrica, si pravast regula prima, etc. If the hiatus is objectionable, a synonym might be found for ἀβέβαια, but πλάγια is surely the remedy for πάγια.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Die Homerische Kunstsprache. Von KARL MEISTER. Leipzig:
B. G. Teubner, 1921. Pp. viii+262.

Meister's treatment of the interrelation between Homeric verse and language in the first part (pp. 3-58) of this volume seems to me a masterly piece of constructive work. I differ from the author on one fundamental matter—the location of caesurae and diaereses; but a discussion would run far beyond the limits proper to a review. Here I shall merely refer to Cauer's restatement, *Grundr.*, p. 189, of my position; and note that from the difficulties, well set forth by Meister (pp. 3-4), I should infer not the conclusion given on page 5, but a need to re-examine our concept of caesura. I am consequently skeptical about the rhythmical effect of word boundaries as such (p. 55), and would in other places prefer a different form of statement; but am happy to find that in the questions here discussed this divergence of opinion does not lead to more serious disagreement.

It is a novel but a sound conclusion when it is shown (pp. 3-27) that except in the fifth foot (p. 56) the poets are neither pro-dactyl nor pro-spondee. Contrary opinions are due to facts produced by a variety of causes. The excess of dactyls in the third foot is merely a corollary to the preference for a trochaic caesura. In the fourth foot words ending in a trochee prove troublesome (laws of Hermann and of Wernicke) and the poets are seen straining the habits of the language—chiefly in matters of word formation—to avoid them. They alter them, however, both to dactyls and to spondees; but the change to the dactyl is easier, and in the cases we can detect (presumably therefore in others) more frequent, thus bringing about an increase of dactylic word ends at this point. There is no trace of such changes in either direction in the first¹ and second feet; nor in the fourth foot is there evidence of a dislike for spondaic word ends, or for spondees within a word.

There is little to say in criticism and that only of details. I should add to the artificial dactyls of the fourth foot *ἐκείθανον* for *ἔκευθον*. It is not cited from later literature and the only example in Homer is Γ 453 οὐ μὲν γὰρ φιλότῆτί γ' ἐκείθανον, εἴ τις ἴδοιτο. There should be no further thought of the emendation of the line.² I should also deduct (ἐ)τιταίνετο E 97 Α 370 from the examples of the middle used instead of the active. The verb means to pull at a thing in a way that will strain it; thus oxen tug at the

¹ But the favoring of -ειν over -ιμεν, cf. La Roche, *Hom. Unt.*, pp. 68 f., is not discussed. It is all the more remarkable because the reverse is true in the fourth foot.

² Cf. *Classical Philology*, XVII (1922), 91.

plow, horses at the chariot, and the archer at his bow.¹ The last combination is particularly intimate, and will thus justify the use of the middle in these lines, and φ 259 ἀγνή· τίς δέ κε τόξα τιταίνουτ'; ἀλλὰ ἔκηλοι. Then © 266 τόξα τιταίνων is exceptional—due to the demands of the verse close. Furthermore περ in Δ 454 is not superfluous; both Monro and Ameis-Hentze-Cauer see the point; "for thee shall be no γέρας θανόντων, tho thou art dead."

The problem of the fifth foot is dismissed too lightly. It is true that when a spondaic word constitutes the sixth foot it is most unusual for the fifth foot to be a spondee.² But, as such lines according to Meister (p. 6) are only about 30 per cent of the poem, there remains the problem why should we find something less than 900 σπονδευόμενοι in nearly eleven thousand lines.³ In substance I would hold to the explanation given in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXXIV (1913), 161-63, 171 n. The presentation of Meister's argument would have gained had one point been made explicitly: if the artificial dactyls were all in words of the form - - - their appearance only in the fourth foot would have been without significance for reasons indicated briefly by Meister (p. 12) and with more detail in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXVIII (1907), 405 f. Fortunately other types - - - - -, - - - -, - - - not thus restricted are included among the examples.

No less interesting is Meister's treatment of the verse close. Besides illustrations of the way the poets here force the language into the shape required by the meter there is a discussion of the effect upon Homeric style that comes from the wish to bring sentence end and verse end together. It is manifested in unsuited epithets, in hysteron proteron, in repetitions, and in omissions. The material is not meant to be complete, so that the section (pp. 28-34) is stimulating rather than conclusive. It raises also the question of *enjambement*, which deserves study and will need definition. Under the heading metrical lengthening (pp. 34-40) I may note the explanation of ἡγάθεος, (ἡμαθόεις?), ἡνεμόεις, etc.; in principle it goes back to Buttmann and has been revived recently (*Lexil.*, p. 149) by Bechtel. Meister's list does not differ greatly from Bechtel's, nor can I see that his explanation of the ἡ- is an advance. Bechtel carries the lengthening back not merely to the time of the poets of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (so Meister) but even to that of their Aeolic predecessors. I have argued on other grounds that the metrical lengthening is pre-Homeric.⁴

¹ The maid pulling out the table, and Zeus the golden scales, show shifts of meaning that need not be discussed.

² I am pleased to note that Meister has reached independently (p. 8) practically the same explanation for the ἡῶ δ' ἄν type as that given in *American Journal of Philology*, XXXIV (1913), 163.

³ Following Ludwig's table for the *Iliad*; Meister's restriction to A-T (read 758 for 778) seems due to the pagination of Ludwig's table.

⁴ *American Journal of Philology*, XXVIII (1907), 409.

Meister's explanation (pp. 40-44) for the use of final short syllables as long is interesting but not entirely convincing. That the "ictus" has nothing to do with it I can accept, and can also believe that a large factor is the imitation of verses in which the loss of a consonant had rendered the cause of the lengthening imperceptible. But that the latter is the whole explanation I doubt. Forms like ἀμφηρεφῆα may represent another type of metrical lengthening; so also πατέρι, Ἀχλλῆϊ, if they are not datives in -αι modernized. Nor am I prepared to deny on the analogy of the tragic meters all influence of a pause. Whether such syllables were lengthened in pronunciation by the poets, or whether in these cases they merely tolerated a defective rhythm is a question for which our data seem to me insufficient. The orthographic difference between Τηλέμαχῃ, μαχησόμενός and εἰναλίη, οὔνομα, ὑπείροχος cannot be older than the fifth century. Even if it reflects the then current pronunciation—which is by no means certain—it is too late to be decisive. The treatment of the grammarians is still less serviceable, being merely a superficial classification of the orthographic facts of our text, or of a pronunciation fostered by them. The vital question for us is: how far are lengthenings of a type not employed elsewhere permitted in the first and sixth arses.¹ If we call verses showing such peculiarities στίχοι ἀκέφαλοι, στίχοι μείουροι we are shifting the meaning of these terms. That may be a gain if it is clearly understood, otherwise it must lead to confusion.

Most valuable of all is the section (pp. 45-56) in which Meister discusses the problem of verse ictus. By a thoroughgoing examination it is shown that there is nothing either in the placing of words of the metrical values - -, --, ---, or in the elision or non-elision of final long vowels and diphthongs, or in the making of position to warrant the assumption of such a factor. The theories of Ehrlich, Jacobsohn, and Sommer² all fall before his arguments, until nothing in favor of the assumption remains. He is well entitled to generalize his conclusion: *entweder haben alle altgriechischen Versarten den Iktus gehabt oder keine*. As he points out the history of the Greek vocalism—contrast the Italic and Germanic—makes it improbable that the differences in force of articulation should have been made a factor in poetical rhythm.

The remarks on the pre-Homeric hexameter, with their prudent skepticism, the wise suggestion that it was perhaps freer and not stricter than the Homeric verse, and the interesting observation of the non-Indo-European character of words connected with music³—contrast the words of saying⁴—form a fitting conclusion.

¹ It seems clear that no thesis is thus privileged.

² A more detailed exposure of the weakness of Sommer's hypothesis in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXXIV (1913), 156 ff. The printer's devil seems to have been busy in the last column at least of Meister's table on page 53.

³ Compare a similar observation for architectural terms, Hoffman, *Gesch. d. gr. Spr.*, I, 15 f.

⁴ Reference to Buck, "Words of Speaking and Saying," *American Journal of Philology*, XXXVI (1915), 1 ff., 125 ff., would have been decidedly in place.

The second part (pp. 61-252), *Archaische und moderne Formen*, offers a more difficult problem. Meister has been captivated (p. vi) by the analysis of the *Iliad* recently published by Wilamowitz to whom he has dedicated his work. He must have seen like the reviewer¹ that with the current view of the Homeric language, Wilamowitz' analysis is impossible; and the present section may be described as an attempt to construct a new history of the epic dialect under which Wilamowitz' analysis can live. It is a good thing that the attempt should have been made, and certainly it could never have been made in more able and brilliant fashion. The problems raised will need careful testing in detail. In some cases—those chiefly that relate to the latest stages of the Homeric poems and to some details of their tradition² the reviewer believes Meister's conclusions will stand the ordeal. In others they will probably break down and thus necessitate the modification of his primary hypothesis—the absolute correctness of Wilamowitz' analysis.

The topics treated may be indicated briefly by a quotation of the chapter headings: i (pp. 61-92), "Die Praesenskonjugation der Verba contracta"; ii (pp. 93-107), "Aoriste und Futura zweisilbiger Stämme auf -ā als Quellen von Praesentien"; iii (pp. 107-10), "Zum Imperfektum von εἶναι"; iv (pp. 110-26), "Passivaorist und κ-Perfekt"; v (pp. 126-35), "Zur Flexion der Neutra auf -os und -as"; vi (pp. 135-46), "Der Kasus auf -φι(ν)"; vii (pp. 146-76), "Quantitative Metathesis"; viii (pp. 176-96), "Kontraktion"; ix (pp. 196-209), "Das Vau"; x (pp. 209-26), "Hauchlaut und Hauchzeichen"; xi (pp. 226-52), "Die Entwicklung der homerischen Kunstsprache." These chapters do not, of course, constitute a systematic treatment of the Homeric language; but they do make a good beginning toward such an achievement—and it is a thing urgently needed. For Homer we have nothing comparable with what has been done for the Vedic noun by Lanman, or for the Vedic verb by Avery. The gap is as real and as painful now, as it was when, years ago, Collitz called attention to it. Meister has begun to fill it in sound workmanlike fashion³ and we have excellent reasons to be grateful to him.

The reviewer is of those who have hoped that the study of the Homeric language would contribute decisively to the solution of the Homeric question. We are now assured (p. 246) that this hope is doomed to disappointment.

¹ *American Journal of Philology*, XLII (1921), 276, 279.

² His arguments for an Ionic not an Attic Homer do not convince me.

³ It is very exceptional to find in his work misstatements such as recur on pages 149 f.: "Ἀρπείς, Τόδευς die beiden Formen sind bei Homer noch nicht belegt," but cf. B 106, E 126, S 00, 801, Δ 387, 396, 399; nouns in -εῖς, -ήος, either have no patronymic or form it "mit dem . . . Formans -ιος, Νηλῆιος, Καπανῆιος," but Νηληιάδης, Καπανηιάδης, etc., also occur; "als Patronymikon begegnet -ίδης niemals" must refer to the inscriptions just cited, though it is not clear from the context; "dass der grössere der beiden Ἀρπείδης (and also Ἀρπείων) niemals aber Ἀρπείος νίος heisst" comes from Meyer's statement (p. 17) about the narrative and overlooks the instances cited on page 16 of Ἀρπείος νίε. These disfigure rather than weaken his argument that Ἀρπείδης is not a patronymic but a gentile name from which Ἀρπείος is afterwards abstracted. I find the argument on other grounds unconvincing, and would follow Hirt, *Handb.*, pp. 404 f., in explaining the contrast Ἀρπείος-Ἀχιλλῆος.

The assurance presupposes, however, the correctness of Wilamowitz' analysis of the *Iliad*, and that is more than it is necessary to concede. We are reminded, there is always the possibility—or even the probability—that of a given set of forms both the “earlier” and the “later” may be older than the oldest parts of the *Iliad*. That is true, but need not bring our work to a halt. I may give as an illustration the analogic spread of κ -forms in the aorist. The middle $\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron$ is found only in two late passages (K 31 in the *Doloneia*, Ξ 187 in the $\Delta\iota\omicron\varsigma \delta\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\tau\eta$) of the *Iliad*. The second plural active does not occur, the first only $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\kappa\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$, μ 401; of the third person ($\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omega\kappa\alpha\nu$, $\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$ $\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$, ($\kappa\alpha\tau$) $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$ there are twelve examples in the *Odyssey*, but six in the *Iliad*. Of these six both Meister and myself would regard four (X 379, Ψ 745, Ω 271, 795) as late. What he would do with N 303 I cannot say: the context is regarded by Wilamowitz (p. 223) as old,¹ but the line closes a very curious simile (cf. Fränkel, *Die hom. Gleichn.*, p. 96), and even one who shared Wilamowitz' belief might well decline to put stress on it as evidence. There remains Z 300 in the visit of the $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ to the temple of Athene. What are we to conclude? The assumption that the change is pre-Homeric will save Wilamowitz' analysis; but it also forces us to assume that these forms so frequently attested in the *Odyssey* and later strata of the *Iliad*, are absent from the earlier parts of the *Iliad* only through accident. An ancillary hypothesis of that sort is in itself not satisfactory; and when we recall that this short episode is conspicuous for its disregard of the digamma (*American Journal of Philology*, XXXIII [1912], 413),² that it contains contracted forms (Bechtel, pp. 120, 200), that it makes trouble for the analyst (Bethe, *Homer*, I, 225 ff.) and for the student of Homeric antiquities (Cauer, *Grundr.*, pp. 341, 346 ff.), we must sacrifice Wilamowitz' analysis, accept the late date of the passage, and refuse to carry $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$, etc., back beyond the latest strata of the *Iliad*.

Another illustration may be found in the forms (well treated by Meister, pp. 116–26) of the κ -perfect. They are confined to stems ending in a long vowel, diphthongs excluded. There are no forms from $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota$, $\acute{\iota}\eta\mu\iota$, or $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$, the aorist of these verbs being used as a perfect; a fact, I may add, which helps explain the analogic influence of these aorists upon the perfects of other verbs. From stems with ablaut κ -forms are limited to the singular of the indicative and of the subjunctive; forms without κ being used for the plural of the indicative (the plural subjunctive is not attested) for the optative, the imperative, the infinitive, and the participle. The exceptions are isolated examples of $\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\eta\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota$, $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota$, $\pi\epsilon\phi\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota$ (?) $\beta\epsilon\beta\lambda\eta\kappa\omicron\iota$ and $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\iota\alpha$, $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\iota\alpha\varsigma$, $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\iota\epsilon$. From stems without ablaut the κ -forms are declared to be not thus “auf bestimmte Teile des Perfektsystems beschränkt, sondern über

¹ With Robert and Bechtel I regard it as decidedly late.

² According to Meister, Bethe in an inaccessible article has shown a “Dutzend nicht gesprochener Vaulaute.” On this surprising statement cf. now Bethe, *Homer*, II, 303 n.

dieses ohne erkennbare Regel verstreut." The examples (add δέδουκεν, E 811, I 239, μ 93) do not bear out this assertion:¹ except for the addition of the participle they are subject to precisely the same limitations, and they include also an exceptional τεθαροσῆκαςι. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to expect a correlation between κ-forms of the plural indicative and the later parts of the poems. The examples are πεφύκᾱσι, η 114 (Herodian, πεφύκει codd.), in the description of the garden of Alcinous; κατατεθνήκαςι, O 664, in an interpolation admitted by Wilamowitz (p. 158 n.), and τεθαροσῆκαςι, I 420=687, which again raises the question whether Wilamowitz is correct in his dating, this time the *Embassy* as early. There remains one difficulty: in Δ 434 the MSS are divided between ἐστήκαςι and ἐστήκωσι, either being syntactically possible. The context is considered old by both Robert and Wilamowitz and if I were convinced that this was right I should read ἐστήκωσι, maintaining that the spread to the plural began earlier in the subjunctive than in the indicative, and accounting for the lack of other examples by the rarity of the form. We are dealing, however, with a simile which may easily be of different age from its context, and I think it can be shown that there is another reason for preferring this conclusion.²

In the imperfect of εἶναι we have an old pair ἦεν, *ἔεν of augmented and unaugmented forms. Now ἦσαν is a later form, and the explanation of ἔσαν as simply its unaugmented form seems unlikely in view of the predominance of the augmented forms in this verb. The testimony of ἦσθα, ἦμεν, ἦτε may of course be discounted, but we have only ἦα—ἔα being due to metathesis. Analogic (ἔφερον : ἔφερον :: ἔεν : x) and late is ἔον found only Δ 762 (bis), Ψ 643; and it must be counted against Wilamowitz' analysis that it dates these two passages differently, thus compelling Meister³ to class ἔον as "relativ alt."⁴ I would suggest therefore that analogy (ἦεν : ἔεν :: ἦσαν : x) has produced ἔσαν. Whether that happened in Homeric or pre-Homeric times

¹ The significant difference is in the absence of forms without κ, the exceptions βεβρώθοις, δεδαώς being more apparent than real. That means we have here the creation of a new system of forms, not the remodeling of an old one.

² The essence of these ideas was expressed with reference to Robert, p. 143, in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXXIII (1912), 420. I am surprised to find myself now credited with a "Versuch die κ-Perfekta (i.e., in all its forms) als Indizien jungen Ursprungs der sie enthaltenden Gedichte zu verwenden." I must disclaim the credit for originating the views actually expressed, and protest against the expansion of them into an obvious absurdity. I may now add that all examples of κ-participles (B 218, K 98, 312, 399, 471, P 748, X 94, β 61, μ 281, χ 403) come from strata I should consider late.

³ In passing I may call attention to Meister's sound observation (p. 109) that ἦν (before vowels), ἦν, ἦσθα are confined to late parts of the *Iliad* (B 687, K 351, Δ 808 [interpolation] X 410, 435, Ω 499, 630) and to the *Odyssey*. As all these forms presuppose the existence of ἦν, this is but a corollary to Bechtel's proposition that ἦν is late—a proposition with which Meister disagrees.

⁴ His treatment of ἔεν really demands that it be pre-Homeric.

can be judged only from the distribution of the examples. At the start it is clear that *ἔσαν* has gained greatly in the *Odyssey*; for including compounds *ἦσαν* : *ἔσαν* as 47:38 in the *Iliad* but as 24:32 in the *Odyssey*. That leads to the expectation that the examples in the *Iliad* will come chiefly from its latest strata. Of them 32 occur in Robert's third *Iliad* or later (along with but 30 instances of *ἦσαν*; the *Ἑκτορος ἀναίρεσις* has in its oldest parts another, Φ 236, with two examples (Σ 258, X 248) of *ἦσαν*; and in the second *Iliad* *ἔσαν* is found thrice (A 267, Z 421, N 491), *ἦσαν* five times (Γ 145, 190, Λ 232, Π 462, Σ 38). But the oldest separate lays, the *Πάριδος καὶ Μενελάου μονομαχία* and the *Διομήδους ἀριστεία* have only *ἦσαν* (Γ 15, 384, E 14, 630, 850) and the same is true of the Koon episode (*ἦσαν* Λ 232); while the *Ulias* has five examples of *ἦσαν* (Z 315, N 525, 604, Π 23, 780) to two (A 321, Δ 438) of *ἔσαν*. Neither of the latter, however, is certain: A 321 if not interpolated may be read τὼ γ' ἦσαν with elision as in βούλομ' ἐγώ; and Δ 438 is in the simile that has already drawn attention to itself by its use of *ἐστήκασι*. I may now add to the evidence against the *γέραιραι* episode its use of *ἔσαν* alone, of which it contains three examples (Z 244, 248, 289), short as it is.

Meister's practice is more encouraging than his theory. I have noticed above his treatment of *ἔην*, *ἦν*, *ἔσθα* and on pages 247 ff. he not only notices linguistic differences between Hesiod and the Aphrodite hymn when compared with Homer, but also collects from his work a number of forms marked linguistically as "late" which "begegnen nur in der Odyssee und zwar augenscheinlich mehr in Füllpartien und Einlagen als in den Hauptteilen." To these he adds observations by Debrunner and Wackernagel. The increase of the abstracts in *-σύνη*, *-ίη*, *-ρίς* he does not count because he has allowed Shewan and Scott to talk him into the belief that this difference between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is "illusorisch." But, given the number of lines in each poem, and taking without inquiry the figures (*Iliad* 79, *Odyssey* 81) with which Scott operates, it is merely a simple problem in arithmetic to determine whether the increase is zero or 32 per cent. The reiteration of Scott's formula that the difference vanishes has met with a success that a Coué might envy, but at this late date¹ it is surprising to find a man of Meister's caliber among the victims. The conclusion drawn is that it is still a matter of personal judgment to decide whether these observations warrant the assignment of definite parts of the *Odyssey* to a time or place different from that assigned to the rest of the Homeric poems. We must wait for more extended observations.²

I think we can hope for more than that. Meister's statement (p. 246) that he has been able to find no difference between the songs of the *Iliad*,

¹ Cf. *American Journal of Philology*, XLII (1921), 86, and the literature there cited.

² As one such I may refer to my description of the curious semantic difference between *ποθή* in the *Iliad* and *πόθος*, *ποθή* in the *Odyssey*, *Classical Philology*, XV (1920), 387-89, which holds good in spite of Shewan, *ibid.*, XVI (1921), 195-97.

means in reality no difference which will support Wilamowitz' analysis. The inference to be drawn is that Wilamowitz' analysis is wrong. It leads to improbabilities of two sorts. (1) That a form found once or twice in his earliest parts of the *Iliad* lies dormant for a long time and then crops out plentifully in the latest parts of the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*. (2) That all the changes we can observe are either pre-Homeric, or confined to the latest parts of the *Odyssey*; the language being in the meantime stationary. I see in Meister's negative result a cause for encouragement: the linguistic evidence will not support one hypothesis as readily as another.

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Histoire du costume antique. By LÉON HEUZEY, with Introduction by EDMOND POTTIER. 142 illustrations and 8 plates, 5 of which are in color. Paris: Edouard Champion, 5, Quai Malaquais. 60 francs.

Anything from the pen of the veteran archaeologist, Léon Heuzey, invites attention, whether one accepts his opinions or not. His latest book, *Histoire du costume antique*, is a collection of articles written by M. Heuzey, some if not all of which have appeared from time to time in *La revue de l'art ancien et moderne*.

Strictly speaking, the contents of the book do not justify the title "History of Ancient Costume," nor even "The Story of Ancient Costume." The seven chapters which constitute the volume are devoted to a discussion, by no means exhaustive, of six Greek garments and one Roman garment, the toga. No attempt is made to trace historically the development of any of these draperies, and no decorative forms excepting the colored borders are discussed. However, the purpose of the author, as indicated in the last paragraph of the first section of his Introduction, is to give the results of his reconstruction on the living model, of the seven draped garments which he discusses. Despite its title, therefore, it is perhaps only fair that the book be considered wholly with reference to the expressed purpose of the author.

Naturally a reconstruction of ancient costumes involves an examination of the two sources of information regarding them, literature and the existing monuments—sculpture and painting.

The introductory chapter is a delightful one on the nature of drapery, its rendering in art, and a comparison of the oriental and the Greek artist's conception of the artistic value of drapery. To the oriental artist it furnished space for elaborate ornamentation; to the Greek, whether wearer or artist, it was a subtle means of expressing the human figure.

Owing to the interest of the Greek artist in the nude male figure, the student of Greek costume has difficulty in finding really adequate illustrations

in existing sculpture; and vase paintings, valuable as they are for study by reason of their great number and variety, can by no means be regarded as wholly trustworthy.

For the first garment of which M. Heuzey presents a reconstruction, the exomis, he has used illustrations from both sculpture and vase painting, and his arguments as to the form of the garment and his reproduction of it on the living model are convincing. The same may be said of his treatment of the himation and of the short chiton worn by Greek men and boys, to which he gives the Latin name, "tunic." The long chiton, such as appears on the famous Charioteer of Delphi and in numerous vase paintings, M. Heuzey mentions with illustrations from the original monuments, but attempts no reconstruction. In the last section of his chapter on the tunic (chiton) he states that the Greeks had a tunic made of two pieces of cloth joined by a seam under each arm and on each shoulder, but he gives no authority and makes no reference to any such garment in existing works of Greek art. He does give his own design of the garment, from which it seems, though he does not definitely say so, that the arm's eye is shaped by being actually cut out. While Greek vase paintings of the later periods may afford some evidence of the existence of such a garment, it is certainly not characteristically Greek.

The chlaina, M. Heuzey dismisses briefly as a garment of the Homeric period, and applies the name chlamys to all brooch-fastened cloaks of the historic period. Further, he asserts that these cloaks were always rectangular in shape and relies mainly on vase paintings for his illustrations.

The beauty and grace of the rectangular mantle as it appears in Greek art, are due to the perfection of its proportions as applied to the human figure. Unfortunately M. Heuzey, in his reproductions, has hampered himself by the use of a certain Abyssinian shawl or mantle in the collection of textiles in the École des Beaux Arts. This piece of cloth is much too wide in proportion to its length to reproduce successfully the draped garment in question, and its appearance on the living model is clumsy as compared with its Greek prototype.

A rectangular, brooch-fastened mantle such as M. Heuzey discusses appears frequently in Greek art, but that it is absolutely identified with the chlamys admits of argument. There are also numerous examples of a brooch-fastened mantle whose lower edge is circular; see reliefs from the Theater of Dionysus in the Athens National Museum (Svoronos, *Das Athener Nationalmuseum*, Plates 61 and 62; also see Plates 75 and 99 of the same publication): also statues of Hermes in the Room of the Gladiator of the Louvre, in the Museo Profano of the Lateran and in the Vatican. Since the chlamys is definitely associated with Hermes (Pausanias v. 27. 8; Ovid, *Mét.* 2. 733) there can be no reasonable question as to its identification on his sculptured figure.

The stock literary evidence in support of the circular form of the chlamys is Plutarch *Alexander* 26; Strabo C, 793; Diodorus xvii. 52 and Pliny *N.H.* v. 62. For discussion of the form of the chlamys in connection with these passages, see F. B. Tarbell, "The Form of the Chlamys," *Class. Phil.*, I, 283 ff.¹ In each of the cases just cited, the reference is to the shape of the site of the city of Alexandria. Plutarch, Strabo, and Diodorus say that its shape was that of the chlamys, which, as Dr. Tarbell pointed out, indicates that the term chlamys needed no further qualification. Pliny alone states that the shape was that of a Macedonian chlamys, which (see Tarbell, *loc. cit.*) may simply mean that Pliny believed that the chlamys was of Macedonian origin. M. Heuzey refers to the passages from Plutarch and Strabo, but bases his thesis entirely upon the statement of Pliny, and argues that the circular chlamys was a Macedonian garment, and ignores the presence of such a garment in works of Greek art.

With regard to the elaborate dress of Greek women as represented in vase paintings of the early red-figured style and by the group of archaic statues in the Acropolis Museum in Athens, M. Heuzey holds that the elaborate and formal folds are due to archaism and artistic convention, and that the drapery in reality hung naturally with no artificial placing of the folds. On this question archaeologists are divided, one group agreeing with M. Heuzey; another arguing that the draperies closely resembled the sculptured figures. Between the two, are those who take middle ground, and a reconciling solution of the problem is yet to be found.

M. Heuzey discusses at length and with clearness the peplos, and his reconstructions of the girded and closed style successfully reproduce its graceful lines. His reconstruction of the open peplos (Fig. 75) is a little indefinite. Several inches of the drapery seem to trail on the floor at the model's right side, which it does not do on any figure in Greek art. His reconstruction of the so-called Ionic chiton (to which he gives the name "tunic") is a little less successful, due to his failure to properly dispose of the width of the drapery by means of the fastenings on the shoulders and along the arms. As a result, the upper part of the garment in some of his reconstructions gives the impression of untidy looseness instead of ease and grace.

The last garment which M. Heuzey considers is the Roman toga. He devotes the greater part of his discussion to (a) the shape of the toga and (b) the purple border.

He contends that the shape of the toga, whether with or without a sinus, was always an exact semi-circle, and that it retained this shape unmodified, at least until a very late period; that this semi-circle was so draped that the straight edge of it formed the edge of the sinus. He interprets Dionysius of Halicarnassus iii. 61, and Quintilian *Inst. Or.* xi. 139 as absolute proof of

¹ In later years, Dr. Tarbell revised his opinions as to the exact shape of the chlamys.

this theory, and ignores the overwhelming evidence of the many togated statues and relief figures. In the passage just cited, Dionysius is describing the dress of the Romans; he says:

. . . . καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυροῦν ποικίλον, οἷα Λυδῶν τε καὶ Περσῶν ἐφόρον
οἱ βασιλεῖς, πλὴν οὐ τετράγωνόν γε τῷ σχήματι καθάπερ ἐκεῖνα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἡμι-
κύκλιον. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀμφιεσμάτων Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν τόγας Ἕλληνες δὲ τήβεννον
καλοῦσιν, οἷκ' οἷδ' ὁπόθεν μαθόντες.

M. Heuzey finds that Dionysius in this passage has said "in terms the most precise" that the toga is a semi-circle. If that be true, then he has said with equal precision that the toga is bright and many colored, which, as a general proposition, no one would undertake to defend. Quintilian, in the reference cited, is describing the proper dress for an orator and regarding the toga he says, "*ipsam togam rotundam esse et apte caesam velim*. . . ." Surely "*rotundam*" cannot be interpreted as describing the hard and fast shape of an absolute semi-circle.

With regard to the purple-bordered toga, the toga praetexta, M. Heuzey assumes that in order to justify the use of the word "praetexta," the border must be actually woven into the web of the toga, and that it could only be so woven upon a straight edge, and that therefore the toga must always have had one straight edge. He ignores the many instances in Latin literature of the use of some form of the verb *praetexo* in connection with a border of any kind and attached in any way, as *Ver. Ec.* vii. 12 and *Aen.* vi. 5. In defending his theory, M. Heuzey admits that the bronze statue in the Museo Archeologico in Florence, known as the "Arringatore," presents a grave difficulty. The toga on this statue is accepted as the toga of the early Republic which had no sinus. The lower edge extends about midway between the knee and ankle and on it a border is plainly indicated. M. Heuzey explains that as this toga had no sinus, and as the upper edge is gathered into a compact roll of folds which crosses the breast and shoulders and passes under the right arm, it was not a suitable place for a distinctive ornament like the purple border; but when the sinus developed, its graceful curve was a more appropriate place for the border, which was transferred from the lower (curved) edge of the toga, to the upper edge which formed the sinus. On this point his argument is well founded and evidence for the purple border on the sinus is afforded by a togated figure in a wall painting in the House of the Vettii in Pompeii. But since the border was simply changed from one edge of the toga to the other, why need there be any change in the manner of attaching it? M. Heuzey admits that it was originally attached (not woven) to the curving edge of the toga as shown on the "Arringatore": when it was transferred to the other edge of the toga, why must that edge be absolutely straight and the border woven into it?

Moreover, if, in order to justify the name "praetexta," it is necessary that the border be woven into a straight edge of the toga, and if, as M. Heuzey admits, the border evidently remained on the curving edge of the

toga until after the development of the sinus, then there could have been no *togae praeextae* until after the appearance of the sinus, or until the first century B.C. But literature gives unmistakable evidence that the toga praetexta was a very ancient garment, antedating not only the sinus, but even the "Arringatore" itself. Pliny *N.H.* ix. 39 (63) states that it was used in the time of Tullus Hostilius; hence it was, at that time, a toga without a sinus, and as M. Heuzey has admitted in regard to the "Arringatore," the border must have been attached (not woven) to the curving edge of the garment. So his own admission nullifies his argument that the border must be woven into the edge of the toga, and that therefore that edge must be straight; and his theory is absolutely contradicted by existing sculptures.

In reconstructing the toga on the living model, M. Heuzey has used a certain Abyssinian fabric, from which he has cut as large a segment of a circle as the cloth would permit. He gives three illustrations of this toga draped on the living model so as to form the sinus.¹ The first one (Fig. 125) he calls "the ordinary adjustment of the large toga," and the illustration is from a photograph of the living model, which is the only sort of illustration that can be admitted as proof in the reconstruction of costumes. In this illustration, the cramped and restricted sinus, the full ruffle produced by the lower part of the toga on the model's left side, and the wholly incorrect contour of the lower edge of the drapery, are inevitable in any attempt to drape as a toga a piece of cloth having the shape of the one which M. Heuzey has used. The drapery lacks the stateliness and dignity characteristic of the large Roman toga. For the other two illustrations he has used drawings, and of neither of the three forms has he given a back view.

In discussing the *cinctus Gabinus* and the toga of the consular diptychs, M. Heuzey has placed on his living model what he offers as a possible draping to produce the former, and a possible prototype of the latter; but he admits that these are mere conjectures. The later forms of the toga, preceding the form on the consular diptychs, are not included in his discussion.

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Polybius. The Histories with an English Translation. By W. R. PATON. In Six Volumes. London: Heinemann. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922. Volumes I and II.

Mr. W. R. Paton, whose excellent Loeb translation of the Palatine Anthology was reviewed in these pages, completed before his sudden death in 1921 this translation of four out of the five entirely preserved books of

¹ This toga has the form published by M. Heuzey, "La Toge Romaine" in *La revue de l'art ancien et moderne*, 1897, 97-107, 204-214, and reproduced by Daremberg et Saglio, *Dict. des Antiq.*, V, 350 and by Sandys, *A Companion to Latin Studies*, 191.

Polybius which has been seen through the press by the editors and furnished with a brief introduction by Colonel H. J. Edwards. Each volume is provided with an index. There are practically no notes. The translation is substantially correct and gives the meaning of Polybius in fluent, conventional English historical style. It is not literal, but follows the original more closely than Schuckburgh whose erroneous rendering of the first sentence it silently corrects. The translator has an abundant supply of English nouns and idiomatic phrases to replace Polybius' decadent verbs and too-frequent adverbs. And in general he makes no attempt to give the reader an idea of the qualities of Polybius' style that Professor Gildersleeve once compared to the dirty tricks that make a man disagreeable in society. As Professor Postgate in his essay on translation says of Frazer's Pausanias, "his English is on a higher plane than the decadent Greek . . . and there is no reason why he should spend pains to bring it down to that level." But the English reader will not understand why a sensitive Grecian can hardly read this sagacious and instructive historian without a cry of pain.

PAUL SHOREY

Ausführliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie.

Herausgegeben von W. H. ROSCHER. *Supplement: Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte während des Mittelalters im Abendland und während der Neuzeit.* Von OTTO GRUPPE. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1921.

The only competent critic of this useful supplement to the indispensable Roscher Lexikon would be the author himself. He has doubtless not read all the keys to all mythologies which he cites or summarizes as a warning to future (George Eliot) Mr. Casaubons. Why should he or anybody else read Moneta, *problema, mythologicum: utrum immolatio Phrizi eadem sit ac Isaaci necne?* Diss. prior et posterior Wittenberg, 1721. But he has surely seen and read more of this sort of thing than any reviewer available in America. A modest and melancholy preface explains the conditions which determine the present form of the book. It was originally composed on a much larger scale in the years 1906 to 1909. The abbreviation required by the publishers was accomplished by cutting out the history of mythological studies in antiquity and at Byzantium and omitting in the revision a chief interest of the longer version—the relation of the mythological theories of each and every age to its literary and philosophical culture as a whole. The printing of the book was interrupted by the war and the author has not seen the manuscript since 1913. It is now, he thinks, not the originally designed contribution to "culture history" but rather a book of reference for students of Greek and Latin mythology.

For Americans it should have another value. It represents the soberer side of German scholarship. And the admirable *Schlussbetrachtung*, though it takes no note of the literature of the last ten years, is not superseded either as a statement of the present problems of mythological study or as a warning against the excesses of the anthropological, the folklorist, and the would-be sociological methods. All essential advances in our knowledge of the religions of antiquity, Gruppe points out, have been made through the critical study of the tradition by the science of classical philology. The book may be commended to the American student, then, not merely as a work of reference, but as salutary reading for its reasonable temper and sound logic. The chapter on Creuzer, for example, does not contemptuously dismiss him as the representative of an "overcome standpoint" but discriminatingly explains the truths after which his sentimental and ambiguous rhetoric was feeling.

Secondary sources and the index learning which turns no student pale have of late threatened to standardize the cross section or bird's eye view type of book. If we leave the composition of such books to Germany, we have no right to complain that they deal more fully with the German, French, and sometimes the Italian literature of the last four centuries, are somewhat sketchy in their treatment of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and that their references to English literature are mostly perfunctory and the perspective of them often out of focus. Gruppe finds much more meaning under the paradoxes of Warburton than an English historian would. He thinks that the time was not ripe to understand Warburton's real meaning which was, he says, that every society tends to adopt the opinions that will help it in the struggle for existence. Perhaps. His surprise that Bacon, the founder of modern thought, belongs to the old allegorizing school in mythology should have been tempered by the consideration that Bacon's *Wisdom of the Ancients* is an exercise of literary ingenuity and was probably not intended as a scientific account of the origin of the myths. The failure even to mention the Platonist Taylor or Lemprière's *Classical Dictionary* strikes a student of English literature oddly. But it is of course precisely in these minor matters that the difference of perspective reveals itself.

In his concluding remarks Gruppe notes as a distinguishing quality of the Greek poet and myth-maker that he relied on the beauty of his inventions to carry conviction of their truth. The English reader is reminded of Ruskin's eloquent comment on Pindar's

χάρις . . .
ἐπιφέρεισα τιμὴν καὶ ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστόν.

The German writer might have quoted Goethe's

Märchen noch so wunderbar
Dichterkünste machen's wahr.

PAUL SHOREY

The Works of Aristotle translated into English. *Meteorologica*. By E. W. WEBSTER. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923.

Aristotle's *Meteorology* fills the entire gap between astronomy and biology in his system. Its scientific value is slight since he did not know the composition of the atmosphere or the nature of combustion, had no thermometer or barometer, regarded earth, water, fire, and air as elements and in spite of the anticipatory protest of Plato conceived the stars to consist of a fifth element not subject to change. Historically, however, the book influenced the thought of all later antiquity and through Seneca's *Natural Questions* that of the Middle Ages on its topics, and the historian of ideas cannot afford to neglect it. The Jowett bequest translation, then, is a very welcome supplement to Gilbert's book on the *Meteorology of the Ancients* and the admirable edition of the text by the American scholar, F. H. Fobes. It is the work of a young Oxford scholar, Erwin Wentworth Webster, who was killed near Arras on the ninth of April, 1917, while leading his company in an attack. The Preface of the editor to which no signature is attached expresses the hope that the errors will not be found to be serious ones. They are in fact few and slight and could not be laid at the door of the translator who had no opportunity to revise his work. The most important is that in the note on 340 B where "the upper region as far as the moon" is explained to mean "the region between the air properly so-called and the moon." That, I think, is impossible, both by language and context. Aristotle is speaking of the ether which comes down as far as the moon, but which though a different order of element from fire or air yet admits of degrees of purity as it approaches its limit.

In 355 A 18 the rendering: "It is absurd . . . that these thinkers should consider the sun only and overlook the question how the rest of the heavenly bodies subsist" misses the humorous irony of *φροντίσαι* and *παριδεῖν τὴν σωτηρίαν*, "take anxious thought for the conservation of the sun and neglect the preservation of the other stars." But the translation as a whole is an excellent piece of work and a better memorial of what we have lost than a headstone in the fields of France.

PAUL SHOREY

Translation and Translations. By J. P. POSTGATE. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1922.

Professor Postgate like Dean Swift would write entertainingly about a broomstick, and in this volume he has a very interesting subject. He does not hesitate to exploit his predecessors—Tytler, Blass, Cauer-Tolman, Wilamowitz, Gildersleeve, Arnold, T. H. Warren, Browning, Fitzgerald, and Flora Ross Amos' Columbia College dissertation on early theories of translation. He cites again many of their illuminating instances and repeats their

pat stories. But he has many new and apt illustrations of his own. His writing here, as in his *Flaws of Classical Research*,¹ is drenched in matter. He discusses with unabated zeal the eternal questions "Should a translation be 'free' or 'literal'?" Should its aim be the pleasure of the general reader or the approval of the scholar? Should it read like an original? May the translator improve upon his author? Are anachronisms and modern allusions permissible? Should verse be rendered by verse and should the metre chosen be a replica or only the best available analogue of the original? Should the translation be commensurate with the original, line for line, or admit some license of expansion and contraction? What are the advantages and disadvantages of rhyme as employed, for example, by Professor Gilbert Murray in Greek tragedy? On all these points Professor Postgate finds something pertinent and suggestive, if not always something absolutely new, to say.

His main novelty is his demand for a more finely discriminating nomenclature. The distinction, however, which he proposes between retrospective and prospective translation derives its chief significance from an obsolescent feature of English classical education. The aim of retrospective translation is to convey the meaning of the original to those unacquainted with its language. Prospective translation seeks further to exhibit the translator's knowledge of the language into which he translates. Retrospective translators might be called simply translators; prospective translators *verters*. Prospective translation, in short, is doing Milton's *Comus* into Greek iambs to prove that you can. However helpful these refinements for Professor Postgate's purpose, the world in general will find that it can afford to neglect them.

With most of the sensible opinions and *obiter dicta* here set down I am in cordial agreement, and with the best will to "say something *contra* that we may be two" I can find little to say in the way of dissent qualification or addition. I should perhaps state a little more explicitly than Professor Postgate does that all ways of translation like all methods of constructing tribal lays are good in their time and place, provided they are frankly avowed and we do not attempt to substitute the translation for the original as philological evidence. Why should we grudge any reader the pleasure he takes in Pope's periwigged Homer or in Murray's Swinburnized Euripides? The critic can always score on Pope by contrasting with him a simple literal rendering. But to take Professor Postgate's own instance I prefer Pope's

Such honors Ilion to her hero paid
And peaceful slept the mighty Hector's shade

to Purves'

Such was the burial of Hector, master of horses.

¹ Cf. *Classical Philology*, Vol. V, p. 225.

The original is not only simple, but in sound, rhythm and suggestion stately and impressive. Such was the burial of Hector master of horses is neither. Pope leaves upon the mind of any reader not obsessed by fanatic aversion to any hint of eighteenth century style the impression which the close of the Iliad made upon the Greek anthologist:

Hector whom Homer sings to every age
The sole support of Ilion's god-built walls,
Thy funeral sealeth that immortal page.
The rest is silence when great Hector falls.

I would also put in a plea for anachronism and modern allusions in satire and comedy at least, the effect of which cannot be conveyed in any other way. Professor Postgate quotes a brilliant page of Gildersleeve on the text, "Theoretically the translation ought to be achromatic." But I appeal from Gildersleeve on his best literary behavior, from Gildersleeve sober to Gildersleeve—in the classroom and in an Aristophanic mood. The main objection to modern allusions is not that they are anachronisms, but that they are too often irrelevant and false analogies and that if put into print they soon cease to be modern allusions and are as unintelligible as the original. But, as Professor Postgate says, all translations grow obsolete in a generation or two.

One other reserve concerns Professor Postgate's acceptance of the conventional estimate of the superior capacity of the German language for translation. The plasticity of German does enable it to reproduce with decalcomanic fidelity, exotic metres, double rhymes and compounds. But it rarely renders real beauty, stateliness, or exquisite touches of diction or rhythm. It can translate *ἀνέρες ἠπποκροποῦνται* by gaulgerüstete Männer but it is helpless before the parting of Hector and Andromache or the reply of Achilles to the embassy. Its devotees can feel no difference between

Clarenz ist da, der eidvergessene Clarenz

and

Clarence is come, false, fleeting, perjured Clarence.

Even the much praised Strodtmann version of Tennyson's

The Splendour falls on castle walls

is over praised. It begins well.

Es fällt der Strahl auf Berg und Thal

and it keeps the double rhymes. But all the magic of

The long light shakes across the lakes,
And the wild cataract leaps in glory

vanishes in the matter-of-fact evasion

Viel' Lichter wehen auf blauen Seen
Bergab die Wasserstürze jagen.

But these are matters of opinion and irreducible sentiment.

Puzzling is Professor Postgate's serious discussion of the opera libretto translation of

Voi che sapete
che cosa è amor

which he quaintly styles "an Italian song whose authorship is unknown to me."

The essay on translation serves as an introduction to a collection of Professor Postgate's own experiments in both the retrospective and the prospective kind. As specimens of his retrospective work he gives a few English renderings of Horace, Tibullus, Lucan, and Martial which read pleasantly, but are not notably better than those which other professors treasure in their desks. More important are the prospective translations of English poetry into Latin verse. We rarely practice that art in America and my reading in this field is less wide than I once intended and still wish it to be. I began to read Professor Postgate's translations from duty and continued for pleasure. In my amateur judgment he does hexameters and pentameters very well indeed, and I take a genuine if mild pleasure in

scinde sinus pectusque feri; pete uocibus astra,
turrigeræ flammis nondum illa rubentia Troiæ.

for Rossetti's

Yea, rend thy garments, wring thine hands, and cry
From Troy still towered to the unreddened sky

and in

et per araneolas, argentea fila, coruscas
aureus ex uiridi fulsit abitque color

for Tennyson's

And all the silvery gossamers
That twinkle into green and gold.

He does not disdain tags of reminiscence—*suspensus arator—nota maior imago—immobile saxum—laesove papavera collo*. But he seems to write Latin as one to the manor born, the verse flows and is only occasionally harsh or obscure. I ask for information whether the substitution of the car for the steeds is not a little bold in

Prosiluit currus, velut ira arderet herili.

The attempts at lyric metres seem less successful, perhaps because they are inherently more difficult not to say impossible. It is quite incomprehensible to me how one who discourses so sagely on the importance of choosing a metre congruous to the thought and feeling could bear to turn Housman's glorious epitaph on an army of mercenaries

These in the day when heaven was falling

into the fantastical, dainty metre of hendecasyllables. Housman's lines

were evidently predestined for the Simonidean elegiacs into which my friend and one time pupil Professor Woodhead of the University of Toronto superbly rendered them.

PAUL SHOREY

The Greek Theater and Its Drama. By ROY C. FLICKINGER. Second edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922. Pp. xxviii+368. Eighty-four illustrations.

This new edition of Professor Flickinger's admirable book¹ unfortunately does not embody a thorough revision. It is rather a reprinting from the original plates with certain minor changes in the text and notes, the substitution of a new and more satisfactory drawing in Figure 74 (p. 286), and the addition of twelve pages of "Corrigenda et Addenda" including four new figures (Figs. 81-84), two of them inspired by my *Greek Theater of the Fifth Century Before Christ* (1919), two taken from Von Gerkan's *Das Theater von Priene* (1921). These changes and additions enhance the usefulness of the book. But one may be permitted to express a regret that a more searching revision of certain matters mentioned in reviews of the former edition was not attempted and that the bibliography has not at all points been brought up to date. Even so, however, the book is in my judgment easily the best work in English upon the subject of Greek scenic antiquities, and the author is to be congratulated that the sale of his book has been sufficient to make a new printing necessary.

A few points invite comment. The statement that "the theater was pushed some fifty feet farther north" (p. 68) has been corrected to read "about thirty-five feet," but the similar statement on page 65 remains in its original form. This oversight, though slight, is certain to be confusing to the lay reader. The remark on page 258 that "a whole trilogy was no longer than the average modern play" has been modified to read "about as long as the average modern play." "About twice as long" would have been nearer the truth. Any one of the extant tragedies of Sophocles requires at least two hours for its presentation.

The statement (p. 16) that "the verb first used to designate the actor's function was ἀποκρίνεσθαι," together with the note (p. 338) that "ἀποκρίνεσθαι became ὑποκρίνεσθαι when masks were introduced and the actors spoke from 'beneath' or 'behind' them (ὑπό)" is a more serious matter. No evidence is cited to show that the original verb was ἀποκρίνεσθαι, and I doubt if any evidence can be found. Certainly it is not afforded by the definition of ἔλεος given by Pollux as a τράπεζα ἐφ' ἣν πρὸ Θεσπίδος εἰς τις ἀναβὰς τοῖς χορευταῖς ἀπεκρίνατο. Nor is it provided by the statement of Photius: ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἱ παλαιοί· καὶ ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐντεῦθεν, ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ χορῷ. This definition is usually wrongly punctuated, not

¹ See my review of the first edition, *Class. Phil.*, XIV (1919), 179 ff.

only in citations in various handbooks, but in the editions of Photius as well. It should read: ὑποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· οἱ παλαιοί, κτλ. (=οὕτως οἱ παλαιοί or δηλοῖ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς). This is clear from a comparison with other similar definitions given by Photius, such as

κατεύχεσθαι· τὸ καταρᾶσθαι· οὕτως Πλάτων.
καταλαμβάνειν· τὸ κατελῆφεν· Ἡρόδοτος.
κατάγεσθαι· τὸ καταλύν· οὕτω φασὶν οἱ Ἀττικοί.
ἐσιέφθην· τὸ ἐσεβάσθην· Σοφοκλῆς.
ὀκνεῖν· τὸ φοβεῖσθαι δηλοῖ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς.

The meaning is unmistakable. The old word was ὑποκρίνεσθαι, which was used in the sense of the later ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The fact that ὑποκρίνεσθαι was in use as early as the time of Homer with the meaning "answer" as well as "interpret," and the further fact that the noun was ὑποκριτής, not ἀποκριτής, seem decisive. If this be granted, the hypothesis (it is nothing more) that ὑποκρίνεσθαι when used of actors meant to speak from beneath or behind a mask, does not carry conviction.

Among the "addenda" the author sets forth a new and interesting theory (pp. 342 ff.) regarding the development of the scene-building and the introduction of the proskenion. If I interpret his meaning aright, this theory, at least so far as concerns the proskenion, seems not to differ essentially from my own, as I have tried to show in my article on "Problems of the Proskenion" (*University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, Vol. VII, No. 5, June, 1923). The chief differences between his view and my own concern the earlier stages in the development of the scene-building and the date when the arrangement of columns (or equivalent) and panels was introduced. In matters so uncertain far be it from one to quarrel.

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The Making of Latin: An Introduction to Latin, Greek and English Etymology. By R. S. CONWAY. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923.

We heartily agree with these sentences in the Preface: "This new knowledge has been current for some forty years, but it has been treated hitherto as a privilege suited only for students doing highly specialized work. . . . The truth is that few things add more interest even to the elements of a language than the good salt of a little etymology."

The object of the book, as described in the Preface, "is to explain as simply as possible the principles of the modern Science of Language, and to indicate the chief results of these principles in the study of Latin, with some of the consequences in that of English and the Romance languages." The

first part of the object is, on the whole, admirably carried out. The book presents the results of modern investigation and will therefore be welcomed by the college professor who is not a linguistic specialist and by all who wish to make a brief survey of the early history of the Latin language. The material is simply presented, though most of it is beyond the reach of the boy and girl of fifteen who, according to the Preface, are not too young to use it. The early pages are quite within their reach, but the latter ones are not. It may be questioned, too, whether the sub-title and the last phrase quoted above are entirely justified: the introduction to Greek and English etymology is casual in that it is carried out through examples supporting the Latin. Still less true is it that the book traces the consequences in English and the Romance languages of the principles which were operative in Latin, though there are occasional examples. A striking omission is in the discussion of *arbor* in section 219. It is stated that on the analogy of *arbor* names of trees in *-us* went over to the feminine gender in a body, but nothing is said of the sensational revolt of these words in Vulgar Latin, as a result of which they not only returned to their original masculine condition but even forced *arbor* to go along with them. On the other hand, Conway does explain in the very next section the feminine gender of French nouns in *-eur*. If the development of the Romance languages (including English) out of the Latin could have been treated systematically, the book would be much more valuable, but it is only fair to say that such treatment is really not within its scope.

The Indo-European languages are very briefly described, without mention of the latest to be made known, Tokharian. This is followed by a discussion of phonetic laws, of consonant and vowel classes, of Grimm's and Verner's laws, of accent, of ablaut, of the pronunciation of Latin, of syncope, of the history of Latin sounds (which takes up more space than any other topic), of the history of inflectional forms.

Conway pronounces the Latin accent a stress accent, but admits the possibility (with Abbott) of "some raising of the tone also in the language of polite society."

In the presentation of the pronunciation of Ciceronian Latin the danger of using English equivalents becomes apparent. Latin short *o* is likened to that in English *not*, which is correct enough for the English reader but will not do for the American. A better example than *Isaiah*, with its varying pronunciation, should have been selected to illustrate Latin *ae*.

The presentation of material which has hitherto been somewhat inaccessible to the general student is well illustrated by Exon's laws of Plautine accent and syncope, which, so far as I know, have never appeared in a handbook. Some of the innovations may seem at times rather hazardous for a handbook, as the theory that both *ipse* and *ille* are derived from the pronoun **so*. It is a mistake to say that in later Latin *ae* became *ē*: it became a long

open *e*. A strange statement is that on page 64, that "the spelling 'quum' seems to have been merely an invention of scholars in the 17th or 18th Century to distinguish the Conjunction from the Preposition." Marius Victorinus (vi. 13 K) advocates the spelling *quum* for the conjunction and *cum* for the preposition. Furthermore, the form *quum* is so commonly found in early Spanish manuscripts that its occurrence in a manuscript is looked upon as a Spanish "symptom."

But it is not to be assumed that the book is replete with errors. It is a good and useful book, impossible though it is to do more than call attention to the vast amount of interesting material in it, from the parallelism of *brevisiter* and *straightway* to the explanation of the construction *amplius ducenti* as meaning "liberally two hundred." In this country it will be used as a textbook with college classes in linguistics or historical Latin grammar.

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Epicuri Epistulae Tres et Ratae Sententiae a Laertio Diogene Servatae.

In Usum Scholarum Edidit P. VON DER MÜHLL. Accedit Gnomologium Epicureum Vaticanum. Leipzig: Teubner, 1922. Pp. x+69.

Scholars of the older generation who sought in their youth to penetrate the Garden of Epicurus found it a thicket, in which the paths were so overgrown as hardly to be discernible. Usener's *Epicurea* recovered enough of the plan to make it again inviting. Since then it has become, one might almost say, a popular resort. Usener's work, though not final, laid broad and deep foundations, upon which all subsequent studies of the text and thought of Epicurus rest. The number and importance of such studies have steadily increased, and there is good reason to expect ere long a comprehensive and fairly exhaustive account of the Epicurean philosophy. An adequate critical edition of the entire text of Diogenes Laertius is one of the greatest desiderata; but for the tenth Book, which is devoted to Epicurus, Usener's edition will serve until it is superseded. The translation of Otto Apelt (1921) is fairly satisfactory, being superior to those of Hamelin (1910) and Kochalsky (1914). Of Bignone's I cannot speak, because the copy which I ordered long ago has not yet arrived. With such aids it is now relatively easy to study Epicurus; but relatively only, because the intrinsic difficulties still remain to plague the conscientious scholar.

Critical editions of the entire tenth Book of Diogenes Laertius are to be expected from Bignone and von der Mühl. The former has given proof of his acumen and sound scholarship in his volume on Empedocles, and critics speak well of his *Epicurus*. In the little volume under review von der Mühl

claims to have superseded the first 81 pages only of Usener's *Epicurea*, but has added the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*. Though made "in usum scholarum," the edition is furnished with a bibliography, in which the reviewer has noted no important omissions, and with an exceptionally full apparatus criticus, which includes many cross-references well calculated to facilitate the study of *Epicurus*. These references were of course largely supplied by Usener, but were in part made in subsequent studies of the text. As the editor has apparently read all these studies and refers in the notes to a large proportion of the suggestions made by scholars, his book will serve a very useful purpose irrespective of the judgment of the editor in particular cases. On the general soundness of his judgment the opinions of critics may very well be divided. I have compared his text and annotations with the copious notes I have made in my copy of Usener, and find a striking difference at many points; but I should want to work through the entire text again, for which undertaking I have not yet found time, before taking issue with the editor. In particular one ought, it would seem, to take account of Bignone's detailed and comprehensive study. Since I cannot do this at present, I think it is wiser to reserve judgment regarding the permanent value of the editor's work, while recognizing the convenience and practical service of the little book. Particularly welcome is the text of the *Gnomologium* with the editor's copious annotations.

The paper and the type are not so good as one might desire, because taken together they are trying to the eye; but the proofreading is generally excellent.

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